In recent news and analysis (the most recent of which was published in The New York Times), Saudi Arabia has reportedly been trying to fend off the region’s revolutions with its own counter-revolution. “We’re sending a message that monarchies are not where this is happening,” Prince Waleed bin Talal al-Saud, of the Saudi Royal family was quoted as saying rather assuredly. “We are not trying to get our way by force, but to safeguard our interests.” This has been followed up by reports that Saudi Arabia has been spending Billions in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain trying to keep a semblance of what once was.
If these reports were true, it would be rather amusing to think that Saudi Arabia actually thinks it can do anything to reverse the concurrent revolutions in the region at a time when the world at large has come to the realization that it is irreversible. Even the United States during the last days of Mubarak’s reign abandoned its long-time ally in favor of what it saw as inevitably going to be a popular victory. And yet some in Saudi Arabia rather Don Quixotesquely appear to believe they can fight the windmill of change.
Perhaps this optimism comes from believing that all that has to be done is simply repeat the policies of the 1960’s when the kingdom vehemently opposed Nasser’s and other populist movements in the region. This rather simplistic associational argument is oblivious of the regional sea change that has occurred over the past 40 years from a geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-social, and technological standpoint. The world today is quite different. There is no longer a communist threat, meaning the Arab people themselves in their revolutions are not against the interests of the West as some Arab communist revolutionaries may have been back in the 1960’s. On the contrary, the youth leading charge see themselves very much a part of a globalized world. They seek the same freedoms the United States and other Western nations enjoy. The world has been sympathetic to their struggle. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia has little to offer in soft power terms.
Geo-economically and geo-socially, the region itself is in a shambles and in need of massive reform. The Arab population continues to burgeon and is in dire need of opportunities and jobs- something which even Saudi Arabia with all of its endowed resources has not figured out for its own population. Official Saudi reports place unemployment at 10%, which is considered a gross underestimate of actual, especially among the youth. But even if we took the Saudi figure at face value, it means there are hundreds of thousands of jobless Saudi youths with no future and no voice to ask for any. Saudi Arabia’s own economic woes are not an example with which it can lead the region. Neither are its social ills. Half of its population (women) is not allowed to work fully yet (granted there has been recent improvement), and the other half due to numbing government subsidies may not have enough incentive to. On every trip to Saudi, one indelibly reads reports of the need for Saudization, a term used to for the government policy aiming to replace foreign expat labor with indigenous Saudi workers. While it is a good policy, it nonetheless points to the structural problems the kingdom is facing. This situation can hardly be exported to a region so direly in need of micro-productivity, entrepreneurial activity, and employment opportunities.
And finally on the technological side, any form of censorship has been muffled due to advances in Satellite communication, mobile telephony, and the Internet. In the book I mention some anecdotes from within Saudi on the very subject highlighting the futility of any form of censorship in this day and age.
Perhaps this optimism comes from believing that all that has to be done is simply repeat the policies of the 1960’s when the kingdom vehemently opposed Nasser’s and other populist movements in the region. This rather simplistic associational argument is oblivious of the regional sea change that has occurred over the past 40 years from a geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-social, and technological standpoint. The world today is quite different. There is no longer a communist threat, meaning the Arab people themselves in their revolutions are not against the interests of the West as some Arab communist revolutionaries may have been back in the 1960’s. On the contrary, the youth leading charge see themselves very much a part of a globalized world. They seek the same freedoms the United States and other Western nations enjoy. The world has been sympathetic to their struggle. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia has little to offer in soft power terms.
Geo-economically and geo-socially, the region itself is in a shambles and in need of massive reform. The Arab population continues to burgeon and is in dire need of opportunities and jobs- something which even Saudi Arabia with all of its endowed resources has not figured out for its own population. Official Saudi reports place unemployment at 10%, which is considered a gross underestimate of actual, especially among the youth. But even if we took the Saudi figure at face value, it means there are hundreds of thousands of jobless Saudi youths with no future and no voice to ask for any. Saudi Arabia’s own economic woes are not an example with which it can lead the region. Neither are its social ills. Half of its population (women) is not allowed to work fully yet (granted there has been recent improvement), and the other half due to numbing government subsidies may not have enough incentive to. On every trip to Saudi, one indelibly reads reports of the need for Saudization, a term used to for the government policy aiming to replace foreign expat labor with indigenous Saudi workers. While it is a good policy, it nonetheless points to the structural problems the kingdom is facing. This situation can hardly be exported to a region so direly in need of micro-productivity, entrepreneurial activity, and employment opportunities.
And finally on the technological side, any form of censorship has been muffled due to advances in Satellite communication, mobile telephony, and the Internet. In the book I mention some anecdotes from within Saudi on the very subject highlighting the futility of any form of censorship in this day and age.
And yet, a report recently listed Prince Waleed bin Talal as the most powerful Arab in the globe. Perhaps this power tends to give a person a sense of confidence to tackle any problem. Unfortunately, the Arab region’s calamity is one problem neither Waleed nor the Kingdom as a whole with all their resources can oppose let alone resolve. Nor can any other nation for that matter. In fact, in the book I argue that each Arab nation will have to resolve its problems one citizen at a time giving them self-determination but also exerting self-sufficiency. For that to happen indigenous reform is what is needed not imposed stifling. Saudi Arabia, which also needs internal reform, would stand to benefit if it realized that it cannot begin reforming its own society by impeding everyone else from reforming their own.
Ironically, in the very same report, which listed Bin Talal as the most Powerful Arab, Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google mid-manager credited with enabling the Egyptian uprising, was listed as the second most powerful. This has led some to conclude that power and money still rule. Actually, it doesn't. For in the region, there are only a dozen or more Billionaires such as Waleed, but there are potentially 300 million Waels out there.
Waleed would be better served not to bet against the Arab revolutions, nor spend his money impeding the wheels of change and the Waels of the Arab world. Instead, he should try to find ways to invest in reform within the kingdom, which is direly needed to improve the livelihood of the Saudi people. The way for a stable and prosperous Saudi Kingdom is to reform internally and not to oppose it internationally.