In a recent article in the New York times, Robert Worth questions the role (or lack thereof) that the Arab Intelligentsia have had on the current revolutions transpiring in the region. He writes,
The absence of such figures in the Arab Spring is partly a measure of the pressures Arab intellectuals have lived under in recent decades, trapped between brutal state repression on one side and stifling Islamic orthodoxy on the other. Many were co-opted by their governments (or Persian Gulf oil money) or forced into exile, where they lost touch with the lived reality of their societies. Those who remained have often applauded the revolts of the past year and even marched along with the crowds. But they have not led them, and often appeared stunned and confused by a movement they failed to predict.
I touched on the very subject from some different angles in an Op Ed article published in 2003, which I invite my readers to review:
Arab Intelligentsia Walks a Tightrope
Wissam S Yafi
As published in:
The Daily Star and Al Jazeera, 5/14/03
Arab intelligentsia, carpe diem! In the runup to the Iraq war, much of the Arab intelligentsia walked a tightrope. While not wanting to be perceived as supporting Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, they vigorously condemned America. Even before the first bullet had been fired, typewriters banged away in New York, London, and Paris finding America guilty of warmongering, oil robbing, and colonization.
What is ironic is that the intelligentsia is by definition enlightened and hence liberal in its inclination. Recently though, the Arab intelligentsia accidentally found itself in the unorthodox position of defending one of the most repressive regimes in the world against one of the most liberal. How did this twist of fate come about? There were several reasons. With the war almost over, it is important to understand them, for they will affect the development of some of the liberal ideas being propagated.
The first reason for this twist is chronic disenchantment. Arabs over the past several decades have become disillusioned with lack of economic opportunity, political representation, and social stability. Pan Arabism failed. Autocracies failed. Military dictatorships failed. Being at the forefront of some of these movements, it is not surprising that the Arab intelligentsia has turned skeptical. The key questions to be asked here are therefore: Has the intelligentsia become so disenchanted that it will give up at the moment when real liberal reform may finally be emerging? Will they no longer preach for the one social ideal that has yet to be tried in their region -democracy- because it was forcefully brought in by America, even if it is closest to their principles?
This brings us to the second reason: Arab pride. After centuries of military defeat and humiliation by external powers, some Arabs perceive their pride to be all that remains and obstinately take counterintuitive positions and ones in apparent self-disinterest- Palestinian suicide bombings of Israeli civilians as opposed to Israeli military targets being a case in point. While pride is good, unbridled pride risks blindness and perhaps even ridicule, such as met the declarations of Sahaf, the Iraqi information minister. While for it to occur within a very closed and isolated Baathist Iraq may be understandable, for it to also occur to Arab thinkers living in much less repressive environments points to a more serious problem. There comes a time when humility, national interest and the desire to learn from mistakes must be made more expedient than pride. Germany and Japan after World War II are good examples to learn from, having risen from humiliation by sheer hard work, intelligence; and yes why not, a bit of national pride.
The third reason for the Arab intelligentsia’s apparent misalignment may be their misunderstanding of the Arab street. While it may be easy to blame the intelligentsia, in reality does anyone in the Arab world truly know what the Arab street wants? Everybody was saying that Iraqis loved Saddam Hussein until the images of them trampling on his fallen statue’s head emerged. While some may point to polls, what is it exactly that these polls are measured against when little if any institutionalized opposition exists to come up with alternative ideas; when political process for the most part is imaginary, generating chronic apathy; and when clientelism reigns supreme? Could it be that all the Arab street wants is practical solutions and freedom to think and work, perhaps?
The fourth reason is simply geopolitical miscalculation. Pre-Sept. 11, 2001 Cold War intrigue was overutilized, post-Sept. 11, 2001 realities ignored, American intentions and interests misunderstood, and Iraqi power and regime allegiance overestimated. Nevertheless, it was surprising to see some renowned expatriate Arab thinkers sticking to over-simplistic and outdated conspiracy theories when indications pointed to fundamental shifts in US policy toward the region.
With all this said, what does it all mean to the future of the region? Essentially, it means one of two scenarios. One is that the Arab intelligentsia puts the past behind it, sets pride aside, and searches for a flicker within itself to light a torch that carries a liberal message. Another scenario is that it could bury itself under a heap of past disappointments, emerging only to regain what little pride it perceives still remains through futile and unconstructive attacks on any reform initiative coming to the region.
Recently, many typewriters have fallen silent. My hope is that it is a sign of introspection and not surrender, because a difference can yet be made. Arab intelligentsia, Carpe diem!
The absence of such figures in the Arab Spring is partly a measure of the pressures Arab intellectuals have lived under in recent decades, trapped between brutal state repression on one side and stifling Islamic orthodoxy on the other. Many were co-opted by their governments (or Persian Gulf oil money) or forced into exile, where they lost touch with the lived reality of their societies. Those who remained have often applauded the revolts of the past year and even marched along with the crowds. But they have not led them, and often appeared stunned and confused by a movement they failed to predict.
I touched on the very subject from some different angles in an Op Ed article published in 2003, which I invite my readers to review:
Arab Intelligentsia Walks a Tightrope
Wissam S Yafi
As published in:
The Daily Star and Al Jazeera, 5/14/03
Arab intelligentsia, carpe diem! In the runup to the Iraq war, much of the Arab intelligentsia walked a tightrope. While not wanting to be perceived as supporting Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, they vigorously condemned America. Even before the first bullet had been fired, typewriters banged away in New York, London, and Paris finding America guilty of warmongering, oil robbing, and colonization.
What is ironic is that the intelligentsia is by definition enlightened and hence liberal in its inclination. Recently though, the Arab intelligentsia accidentally found itself in the unorthodox position of defending one of the most repressive regimes in the world against one of the most liberal. How did this twist of fate come about? There were several reasons. With the war almost over, it is important to understand them, for they will affect the development of some of the liberal ideas being propagated.
The first reason for this twist is chronic disenchantment. Arabs over the past several decades have become disillusioned with lack of economic opportunity, political representation, and social stability. Pan Arabism failed. Autocracies failed. Military dictatorships failed. Being at the forefront of some of these movements, it is not surprising that the Arab intelligentsia has turned skeptical. The key questions to be asked here are therefore: Has the intelligentsia become so disenchanted that it will give up at the moment when real liberal reform may finally be emerging? Will they no longer preach for the one social ideal that has yet to be tried in their region -democracy- because it was forcefully brought in by America, even if it is closest to their principles?
This brings us to the second reason: Arab pride. After centuries of military defeat and humiliation by external powers, some Arabs perceive their pride to be all that remains and obstinately take counterintuitive positions and ones in apparent self-disinterest- Palestinian suicide bombings of Israeli civilians as opposed to Israeli military targets being a case in point. While pride is good, unbridled pride risks blindness and perhaps even ridicule, such as met the declarations of Sahaf, the Iraqi information minister. While for it to occur within a very closed and isolated Baathist Iraq may be understandable, for it to also occur to Arab thinkers living in much less repressive environments points to a more serious problem. There comes a time when humility, national interest and the desire to learn from mistakes must be made more expedient than pride. Germany and Japan after World War II are good examples to learn from, having risen from humiliation by sheer hard work, intelligence; and yes why not, a bit of national pride.
The third reason for the Arab intelligentsia’s apparent misalignment may be their misunderstanding of the Arab street. While it may be easy to blame the intelligentsia, in reality does anyone in the Arab world truly know what the Arab street wants? Everybody was saying that Iraqis loved Saddam Hussein until the images of them trampling on his fallen statue’s head emerged. While some may point to polls, what is it exactly that these polls are measured against when little if any institutionalized opposition exists to come up with alternative ideas; when political process for the most part is imaginary, generating chronic apathy; and when clientelism reigns supreme? Could it be that all the Arab street wants is practical solutions and freedom to think and work, perhaps?
The fourth reason is simply geopolitical miscalculation. Pre-Sept. 11, 2001 Cold War intrigue was overutilized, post-Sept. 11, 2001 realities ignored, American intentions and interests misunderstood, and Iraqi power and regime allegiance overestimated. Nevertheless, it was surprising to see some renowned expatriate Arab thinkers sticking to over-simplistic and outdated conspiracy theories when indications pointed to fundamental shifts in US policy toward the region.
With all this said, what does it all mean to the future of the region? Essentially, it means one of two scenarios. One is that the Arab intelligentsia puts the past behind it, sets pride aside, and searches for a flicker within itself to light a torch that carries a liberal message. Another scenario is that it could bury itself under a heap of past disappointments, emerging only to regain what little pride it perceives still remains through futile and unconstructive attacks on any reform initiative coming to the region.
Recently, many typewriters have fallen silent. My hope is that it is a sign of introspection and not surrender, because a difference can yet be made. Arab intelligentsia, Carpe diem!