'Iran Cyber Army' Hits Azerbaijan State TV Site: AGP via Naharnet

An interesting article from Agence France Press pointing to technological cyber warfare developments in the region.

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/31033-iran-cyber-army-hits-azerbaijan-state-tv-site

Lebanon's Faulty Democracy Desperately Needs Re-engineering

At different junctures over the past few months (years actually), Lebanon's cabinet has found itself at a standstill. This time it was triggered by one minister refusing to sign a bill approved by the cabinet. At others times, it has been for other reasons. There are some who regard this simply as Lebanon's political system balancing itself through partisanship. Is it or is it perhaps due to a faulty democratic design, which essentially allows anyone of the three branches of government (Presidency, Cabinet, or Parliament- the Judiciary unfortunately is currently too weak to make a difference) to have a veto effectively putting a spike in the wheel of government? Unfortunately, strong evidence seems to point to it.

Lebanon's democratic design has been in effect (with some constitutional tweaking) for about seven decades. During this time, one would assume that being a democratic system, it would have established some self-correcting mechanisms. Unfortunately it hasn't, and the political system has proven to be quite unstable with civil strife recurring in the 1950's (under the Presidencies of Khoury and Chamoun), 1970's (under Franjieh), 1980's (under Gemayel), and this last decade (under both Lahoud and now Suleyman). On average, cabinets get shuffled every 18 months. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the Lebanese political system at times seems more in tuned to instability than stability.

At the heart of the issue may be the multitude of divisions and segmentations enshrined in the Lebanese parliamentary democracy. These cross-sections may be sectarian, regional, and even economic class. And while these rigid political divisions and quotas are seen by some as a way to protect one portion of the population against the other, in effect it does the opposite by weakening all portions of the population and even more so the state itself. Constant fear mongering has perpetuated these divides, and what has resulted is a constant and relatively easy hold by some leaders. Ironically, the leaders themselves, while perhaps able to split some spoils, are also weakened by their weakened constituents. No leader in Lebanon- even while holding a national office- can truly claim that they represent all of Lebanon, because no leader in Lebanon has ever been voted in by all of Lebanon. As surprising as it may seem to some readers, political leaders in Lebanon- with the exception of parliamentarians- do not run for office and rarely have to compete for their job. Lebanon's President is typically chosen at the last minute without the population having ever heard of his plan. The same applies to the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President through parliamentary consultation. The choice of cabinet has lately turned into a painful tit-for-tat negotiation rendering it as a weakly glued unit that is ready to burst at the seams at the slightest challenge.

It is therefore no wonder why lately some popular leaders- who boast of strong parliamentary representation- act in ways that pre-empt both the President and the Prime Minister. Intrinsically, they are questioning the true support those in power actually wield. And while their question and behavior in a normally-functioning democracy may be legitimate, in Lebanon it may be missing the point, because Lebanon's system was not built to support mass support. Rather, it is what some in Lebanon like to sell as a "consociational democratic" design. In other words, it is a design, which needs everyone’s tacit approval. Unfortunately, history has proven once and again that consociationalism is useless when the parties do not agree. Just ask the common citizen if they would prefer consociationalism with no electricity or electricity with no consociationalism. Of course, we are also assuming here that the so called consociational democratic system itself is stabilizing, when Lebanon’s history proves everything but.

It is easy to blame this party or that for the current Lebanese gridlock. I prefer to take a step back and study things objectively. What is happening now has little to do with electricity or wages. Rather, it is symptomatic of a much deeper problem with the overall system, which desperately needs some fundamental re-engineering. Lebanon’s democracy may continue to limp along, but it does no Lebanese any good to close their eyes to the possibility of re-thinking a system while safe-guarding each of Lebanon’s community needs and attending to their fears. We are all Lebanese after all, and if we truly love this nation, we should aspire to constantly be thinking of new ways to improve how society works and functions. And if we were to fail in our social experiment, well then I suppose we would have this rotten system to fall back on after all, wouldn't we?

Bashar Assad Could Have But Didn’t

It has been interesting to see that so far in the Arab Spring, most of the deposed leaders have had to be pried away forcefully from their perches. Not one has decided to peacefully negotiate a settlement with his people. Not one has managed to transfer power seamlessly to successors. To some this may come as a surprising. To others it may come as irrational behavior. It is neither; for if one looked at it from the point of view of the dictator himself, there are really two choices. One is to peacefully surrender power and leave under a negotiated settlement. The other is to stay and fight.

If we look at the first option, leaving in peace and with all the riches would be an ideal scenario for the dictator. The problem, however, for most incumbent dictators in the Arab World knowing what they know about their regime’s past (which in most cases has left a trail of blood and carnage) is that this scenario is nothing but a pipe dream. Their true calculation is what would happen if those who agreed to the settlement and took control of the state resources eventually reneged on their settlement and persecuted the dictator. It has happened in the past- Pinochet in Chile had to fight until his death for his impunity clause years after he had left power peacefully under a negotiated settlement. Most dictators are survivors who know very well how to employ tactics themselves; and so it is a scenario that the typical dictator may romanticize about, but is unlikely to bet his life on.

The second choice for the dictator is to stay and hold out. By the actions of all the Arab dictators thus far, this appears to have been their choice, which is not irrational for three reasons. The first is it gives them a chance at actually defeating the insurgency. From an ex-ante perspective, the dictator cannot ascertain victory or defeat, but they may very well see it as a chance worth taking- not unlike the chance they once took decades ago when they themselves usurped power. Unfortunately, as they are not trying to defeat a coup, but rather a popular uprising, defeating an entire population is a human endeavor that is doomed to fail. The Egyptian and Tunisian Presidents for all their military might, state resources, and support simply could not stand against the masses of the people. The second reason is that under such a scenario, the dictator hopes to postpone what deep inside they may very well know is inevitable. Still, in their eyes, if they could hold out long enough, conditions may become more favorable. Unfortunately, “postponing the inevitable” by forcefully trying to subdue the masses tends to have the exact opposite effect- speeding up the revolutionary process. While the Libyan revolution started after the Yemeni one, its level of violence was ever higher that the people’s reaction was stronger and more swift. Gadhafi fell before his Yemeni counterpart. And the third reason is the notion of going down with one’s head held high. Unfortunately, seeing Mubarak on a stretcher, Yemeni Saleh’s bandaged head, and Gadhafi’s corpse strewn on the floor pretty much answers it.

This brings us to the perplexing case of Bashar Assad in Syria. Unlike the other Arab dictators, Assad himself is a derivative of the Syrian Baath regime, not its creator. Arguably, while his father ruled Syria with an iron fist for almost three decades, almost everyone understands that Bashar’s rule was serendipitous and generally speaking not violent. Bashar not having blood on his hands, begs the following question: What did Assad have to lose by stepping down, or in the very least promising to step down at the end of his term?

The answer here is not as easy as in the other cases. In none of the other cases was there occupation (The Golan Heights). In none of the others was there existential geopolitical support coming from an outside state (Iran). And in none of the other cases, was a sizeable portion of the population supportive or as Bashar himself stated in a recent TV interview not opposing. Is it for these three reasons that Bashar has decided to stand and fight? Perhaps, unfortunately, by doing so he has also caused the single most important condition that was in his favor to turn against him, and that is not having the blood of his people on his hands. For in the ongoing 10 month insurgency more than 6000 Syrians have reportedly been killed.

What happens now? It is increasingly unlikely that the Syrian conflict could be brought to a peaceful end. If the deaths continue to rise, internally the emerging civil war may intensify, and externally more sanctions if not outright genocide charges may be brought against Bashar Assad and the regime. But did this really have to happen? It appears that Bashar’s end game is increasingly becoming a zero-sum game where either his regime wins or the entire Syrian nation will be made to pay. Unfortunately, in this game no one in Syria wins.