Lebanon Doesn't Need to Make Peace with Israel. It Needs to Make a Deal with America.

There is a logic embedded in the current diplomatic moment that Lebanon is being asked to accept without question: that the path to stability runs through Tel Aviv. That to secure its borders, its economy, and its sovereignty, Lebanon must eventually normalize with Israel. This logic is worth interrogating — not because peace is undesirable, but because it may be the wrong peace, with the wrong partner, on the wrong terms.

There is another path. And it runs through Washington.

The American Footprint Is Already There

Lebanon is not a country where American influence needs to be built from scratch. The United States Embassy in Awkar is among the largest American diplomatic missions anywhere in the world. American military assistance has flowed to the Lebanese Armed Forces consistently, even through periods of political turbulence. American universities, NGOs, and cultural institutions are woven into Lebanese civil society in ways that have no parallel elsewhere in the region. The question is not whether America is present in Lebanon — it is whether that presence can be deepened, formalized, and made mutually beneficial in ways that serve Lebanese sovereignty rather than erode it.

What America Needs — And What Lebanon Can Offer

American strategic interests in Lebanon are substantial and underappreciated. The Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most contested maritime zones on the planet, with hydrocarbon discoveries reshaping the geopolitical calculus from Cyprus to Gaza. Lebanon sits at the center of this new map. A stable, aligned Lebanon offers Washington a reliable eastern Mediterranean anchor — and with it, access to offshore energy resources, potential pipeline corridors extending from Iraqi fields, and an enduring foothold as American bases across the Gulf have been degraded or rendered politically complicated. Lebanon, with its Mediterranean coastline and institutional resilience, represents a different kind of strategic asset — one that does not depend on the durability of any single monarchy.

Senator Lindsey Graham floated publicly the concept of a mutual defense agreement between the United States and Lebanon. The implications are profound. A mutual defense pact does something no Lebanese political faction has managed domestically: it makes Hezbollah's weapons strategically redundant rather than requiring their defeat. If Lebanon is covered by an American security umbrella, the argument that an armed non-state actor is necessary to deter Israeli aggression collapses on its own terms. The weapons become unnecessary not because they were defeated, but because the threat they were built to address has been addressed by other means.

Avoiding the Impossible Negotiation

Direct peace negotiations with Israel carry a structural risk Lebanon would be unwise to ignore. The history of such processes in the region shows that negotiation itself can become a tool — a mechanism to extract concessions, manufacture delay, and ultimately assign blame for failure to the weaker party. Lebanon, with its fractured politics and limited capacity for sustained diplomacy, would be particularly vulnerable to this dynamic. A partnership framework with the United States sidesteps this trap entirely. It does not require Lebanon to recognize Israel, resolve the Palestinian refugee question, or negotiate over territory and water under conditions of profound asymmetry. It repositions Lebanon as a partner of the dominant external power rather than a supplicant before a regional one.

There is also a deeper compatibility that rarely surfaces in strategic analysis. Lebanon's constitutional commitment to multi-confessional coexistence is structurally more legible to American political culture than the governing arrangements of most regional states. Israel, despite its close relationship with Washington, lacks a written constitution, has pursued policies of legal discrimination increasingly difficult for American audiences to defend, and has grown culturally isolated from the liberal democratic norms that once made it a natural American ally. Lebanon's pluralism — imperfect, contested, often dysfunctional — resonates with American constitutional ideals in ways that matter for the long construction of durable partnerships.

The Iranian Equation: A Grand Bargain No One Has Dared Name

And then there is the Iranian enigma — the variable that haunts every regional calculation. Iran has proven more resilient than its adversaries predicted, increasingly imposing its geopolitical weight across the Persian Gulf in ways that American pressure alone has failed to reverse. Sanctions have not broken Tehran. Military posturing has not altered its regional calculus.

Which raises a question that serious strategists are only beginning to ask: what if the United States and Iran were to negotiate not merely a nuclear arrangement, but a genuine regional quid pro quo — one that redraws spheres of influence in ways that leave both sides better positioned than today?

The architecture is not impossible to imagine. If the United States committed to a structured withdrawal from its most exposed Gulf bases — strategically compromised in any case — in exchange for robust international security guarantees for Gulf Arab partners, the reduction in regional tension could be substantial. Those partners have themselves been quietly hedging toward Tehran for years and might find such an arrangement more stabilizing than permanent confrontation. In exchange, Iran could accept a reorientation of American strategic presence toward the Eastern Mediterranean. An American anchor in Lebanon is far less threatening to Tehran than carrier groups in the Gulf. And if that reorientation came with Lebanese commitments to disarm Hezbollah within a new security framework, Iran would relinquish an asset that has become as costly to manage as it is valuable to deploy. A Hezbollah rendered unnecessary — because Lebanon is protected by other means — is a concession Iran could make without humiliation. Israel, meanwhile, would gain a quieter northern border without requiring Lebanon to sign anything.

A Lebanese Choice, Not an American Imposition

None of this works if it is perceived as American diktat dressed in Lebanese clothing. The partnership must be pursued by Lebanese actors, articulated in Lebanese terms, and ratified through Lebanese institutions. Its legitimacy depends on internal consensus — something that requires political courage and public communication of a kind Lebanese leaders have not always been willing to provide.

But the opportunity is real. Lebanon does not need to make peace with Israel to secure its future. It needs to make a clear-eyed, sovereign decision about which partnership best serves its people. That decision, if made wisely, may render all other difficult questions moot.

Peace Process with Israel: Opportunity, Trap, or Both?

There is a moment in every peace process when hope and suspicion are indistinguishable. Lebanon may be approaching such a moment. Before this moment arrives fully, it is worth studying the map left by those who walked this road before us — some who found stable ground, some who found quicksand, and some who were handed a document designed to be refused.

The Egyptian lesson: peace requires a state that can decide

The Egyptian-Israeli peace of 1979 has held for nearly half a century — not because it was loved, but because it was built on something real. Egypt had a functioning state, a unified military command, and a leader, however authoritarian, who could make a decision and implement it. Sadat knew precisely what he was trading: the Sinai for recognition, sovereignty for normalization. The deal was legible. The sacrifices were named.

Lebanon today is not Egypt in 1979. It is a country where no single authority controls its borders, its arms, or its political narrative. At times it appears the Lebanese government wants peace to bring it a state, as opposed to the usual state bringing peace. Any peace process that does not first reckon honestly with this reality is not a peace process — it is a performance.

The Syrian lesson: process without purpose

Syria's intermittent negotiations with Israel across several decades produced nothing, partly by design on both sides. Damascus used the talks to manage international pressure; Israel used them to signal moderation without ever conceding occupied territory. Neither party may have entered the room with genuine intent to exit transformed. The lesson from Syria is blunt: a peace process without political will on both sides is simply diplomacy cosplaying as diplomacy.

Lebanon must ask, with clear eyes: what does Israel, which is being run by the far right, actually want from this process? Security guarantees? Aimless diplomatic maneuvers to establish photo ops for its beleaguered leader that deliver international legitimacy? Normalization that reshapes the regional order in its favor? Or a genuine, durable arrangement that requires it to give something of weight in return? The answer to these questions could alter substantially the strategy and purpose of the negotiations. 

The Palestinian lesson: the danger of the impossible offer

This is where the stakes become existential. At Camp David in 2000, Yasser Arafat was presented with what was described in Western capitals as a "generous offer." History has been more honest. What was placed before him — no contiguous Palestinian state, no meaningful resolution of the refugee question, no full sovereignty over Jerusalem — was an offer structured to be refused, so that the refusal could become the story. Arafat walked away and was made to carry the blame for the collapse of peace. The occupation continued and expanded. The framing succeeded.

Lebanon must understand that this playbook exists, that it has been used, and that it can be used again. If the current process is designed to extract a Lebanese "no" to an impossible set of conditions, then the goal is not peace — it is legitimization of whatever comes next, with Lebanon cast as the obstacle to peace, not unlike Arafat once was.

What a serious process would look like

A genuine peace process has identifiable features. It requires internal Lebanese deliberation — not just government signatures, but a national conversation that includes all communities and addresses the question of Hezbollah's arms within a broader security framework, on Lebanese terms. It requires thorough preparation: legal, technical, and political clarity about what Lebanon can and cannot accept, and why. It requires communication — with the Lebanese public, with Arab partners, with the international community — so that no deal can be signed in a room and then disowned on the street, as the May 17 agreement was back in 1983.

Most critically, it requires that Lebanon enter any negotiation knowing its own red lines with the same precision it expects of the other side. A country that does not know what it is willing to accept or reject is not negotiating — it is waiting to be told.

The question Lebanon must answer first

When asking whether Israel is serious in the peace process, Lebanon must also ask whether it is serious. Not about peace as an abstraction, but about the specific, difficult, internally divisive work of building support and the institutional capacity that a real peace process demands.

The road taken by Egypt required a state. The road taken by the Palestinians was mapped for them by others, unfavorably. Lebanon must draw its own map — or risk walking into someone else's.

The Next Great War in the Middle East Will Not Be Fought with Bombs

As the Middle East stands on the edge of yet another potential regional conflict, global attention is fixated on drones, missiles, and the shifting alliances of armed actors. But beneath the noise of military escalation lies a quieter, far more consequential struggle — one that will determine the region’s future long after the last drone is grounded.

The next great war in the Middle East will not be fought with weapons. It will be fought with ideals and systems.

For decades, the region has been trapped in a cycle where political crises are met with force, and force produces only temporary calm. But the real contest — the one that will shape whether societies collapse or flourish — is unfolding in the realm of governance, rights, and the values that animate them.

Ideals are the moral compass: equality, dignity, pluralism, religious freedom, citizenry, inclusivity, and the belief that every citizen belongs.

Systems are what would hold these ideals up, meaning the architecture of a nation: constitutions, bills of rights, judicial frameworks, electoral laws, and the institutions that translate public will into public life.

One without the other is hollow. Ideals without systems remain aspirations without impact. Systems without ideals become instruments of control.

Across the region, we see the consequences of this imbalance. States with elaborate bureaucracies but no shared ideals fracture along sectarian lines. Movements with powerful ideals but no institutional grounding fade or are co opted. And in the vacuum left by failed governance, armed groups rise — not because they offer better futures, but because they offer immediate order.

To a large extent, the Middle East’s crisis is not only a crisis of identity, but also of civic design.

The nations that will emerge strongest from this era of turmoil will not be those with the most advanced drones or the largest arsenals. They will be those that build systems capable of managing diversity, distributing power fairly, and protecting the rights of all citizens — not just the dominant sect, tribe, or party.

This is the real battlefield.

It is the battle between systems that entrench fear and systems that cultivate trust. Between ideals that divide and ideals that unite. Between governance built on exclusion and governance built on citizenship.

History offers powerful lessons. Japan rebuilt itself after World War II not through military resurgence but through a constitution grounded in peace and human dignity. Germany’s postwar transformation was anchored in democratic institutions and a commitment to rights. Rwanda emerged from genocide by constructing systems based on ideals that prioritized reconciliation and national unity.

These examples are not perfect, but they reveal a truth the Middle East has long resisted: lasting stability is engineered, not imposed. And sheer power seldom triumphs over ideals and systems in the long term, even when it comes to empires, with the Indian Independence movement triumphing over the British Empire, the Eastern European over the Soviet Union, and South African over Apartheid.   

In Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and beyond, the question is not whether another war might erupt. The question is whether these societies can foster ideals and build systems strong enough to prevent the next war from even mattering.

The region’s youth — its greatest resource — are not demanding weapons. They are demanding dignity and opportunity. They are demanding a social contract that treats them as citizens, not sectarian subjects. They are demanding systems that reflect ideals worthy of their aspirations.

If the Middle East is to have a future beyond perpetual conflict, it must fight — and win — this war of ideals and systems. The drones may dominate today’s headlines. But constitutions will determine tomorrow’s headlines. Bills of rights will shape the next century. Religious freedom will decide whether diverse societies coexist or unravel.

The great war ahead is not a military one. It is a moral, institutional, and civilizational one. And beneath the surface, it is already underway.

Lebanon’s Electoral Lifeline: Voluntary Expat MPs for Every District

Lebanon stands at a critical juncture. As whispers grow louder that expatriates may be stripped of their right to vote in the upcoming elections, the country risks alienating one of its most vital lifelines: its global diaspora. This is not just a procedural debate—it is a question of Lebanon’s identity, resilience, and future. The Lebanese diaspora has long been a source of economic support, intellectual capital, and international advocacy. To exclude them now would be a catastrophic misstep.

But there is a way forward—one that requires no legislative overhaul, no constitutional amendments, and no drawn-out political battles. It is a simple, elegant, and voluntary solution: the parliamentary candidate lists in each of Lebanon’s 15 electoral districts should nominate an expatriate candidate.

Lists would not be legally obliged to nominate an expat candidate, and in most likelihood many won't. However, the lists that do will be sending a strong message to the electorate that they progressively wish to engage and partner with their global expat community.   

Why This Matters Now

The Lebanese diaspora is not a peripheral constituency; it is an integral part of the nation’s fabric. With millions of Lebanese living abroad, their remittances have sustained families and propped up an economy in freefall. Their voices matter—not just because they send dollars home, but because they carry Lebanon’s story to the world. To silence them now would be to sever a lifeline.

Unfortunately, political maneuvering threatens to do just that. There is talk of eliminating expat voting altogether, under the guise of logistical challenges or constitutional ambiguities. But let’s be honest: this is not about logistics. It is about power. Certain factions fear the influence of expats—educated, globally connected, and often less beholden to sectarian patronage networks. They fear change.

The Voluntary Expat MP Proposal

Here’s the idea: Electoral lists in every district would voluntarily include one expatriate candidate. No law needs to change. No constitutional crisis looms. It is a gesture of goodwill, a strategic move, and a democratic innovation- all rolled into one.

This approach offers five major benefits:

No Legal Obstacles: Unlike proposals to create dedicated expat seats or amend electoral laws, this solution sidesteps bureaucracy. It is entirely voluntary. Lists can simply decide to include an expat candidate—today. Nothing really stops them.

Pre-Empt Political Shenanigans: By integrating expats into the electoral process now, we neutralize efforts to marginalize them later. Politicians who seek to shrink expat influence will find themselves outmaneuvered.

Signal Genuine Inclusion: Lebanese abroad often feel like second-class citizens—valued for their dollars, ignored in decision-making. This proposal flips that narrative. It says: We want you. We need you. You belong.

Inject Fresh Ideas: Expat candidates bring global perspectives, professional expertise, and reformist energy. They can help craft policies that reconnect Lebanon to the world—on trade, technology, education, and governance.

Challenge the Status Quo: Including expats sends a clear message to entrenched political elites: the era of insularity is over. Lebanon cannot afford to be a closed shop. It must be a global network.

A Win-Win for All

Critics will ask: what’s in it for the lists? The answer is simple—votes and credibility. Lebanese voters, weary of recycled faces and empty promises, crave authenticity and competence. An expat candidate signals openness, progress, and seriousness. It differentiates a list from its rivals. It says: We are not afraid of new ideas.

Moreover, expats themselves will rally behind lists that embrace them. They will mobilize their families, their networks, their resources. In an election where margins matter, this could be decisive.

The Bigger Picture

This proposal is not just about elections. It is about redefining Lebanese citizenship for the 21st century. Lebanon’s survival depends on its ability to leverage its diaspora—not just as donors, but as partners. By voluntarily nominating expat MPs, we take a bold step toward a more inclusive, innovative, and globally connected Lebanon.

An Immediate Call to Action

To the leaders crafting electoral lists: seize this moment. Do not wait for laws to change or courts to rule. Show courage. Show vision. Nominate an expat candidate in your district. Make history.

To the Lebanese diaspora: demand your place at the table. Engage with parties. Offer your expertise. Make your voice heard. Brave it up, get out of your comfort zone in exile, work with a local list, and submit your candidacy to serve your ancestral homeland.

Lebanon cannot afford to turn its back on its greatest asset—its people, wherever they are. The voluntary expat MP proposal is not just a workaround; it is a wake-up call. It is time to prove that Lebanon is bigger than its borders, stronger than its crises, and wiser than its politicians.

A Pragmatic Path for Lebanon: Halting Rearmament Instead of Chasing Disarmament

The United States has reportedly placed an ultimatum on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): disarm all paramilitary groups in Lebanon before year’s end. On paper, this demand may sound like a decisive step toward stability. In practice, however, it is an impossible task. Lebanon’s army has spent the better part of a year attempting to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 south of the Litani River—a region that represents less than a fifth of the country’s territory. Even there, progress has been partial and painstaking. To expect the LAF to replicate this effort across the entire nation in a matter of weeks is to ignore both the realities of Lebanon’s political landscape and the limits of its military capacity.

Disarmament is not a technical exercise; it is a political project. It requires consensus among Lebanon’s fractious political class, sustained resources, and time. None of these are currently available. The Lebanese state is grappling with economic collapse, institutional paralysis, and a citizenry exhausted by years of crisis. To impose a sweeping disarmament deadline under such conditions risks setting the army up for failure, undermining its credibility at home and abroad.

Yet doing nothing is equally untenable. The international community, and particularly Washington, would interpret inaction as shirking responsibility. The Lebanese army, already dependent on foreign assistance, cannot afford to appear passive in the face of mounting pressure. Lebanon needs a third way—an approach that acknowledges the limits of the possible while demonstrating seriousness of intent. That alternative lies not in disarmament, but in halting rearmament.

The Case for Halting Rearmament

Paramilitary groups in Lebanon are not static entities; they are dynamic organizations that replenish their arsenals through smuggling networks and external support. Attempting to strip them of existing weapons is a Sisyphean task, particularly in light of an ongoing occupation and incessant Israeli violations. But preventing the inflow of new arms is a more attainable goal—one that the LAF, with international backing, could credibly pursue.

Halting rearmament would not resolve the problem of armed non-state actors overnight. It would, however, freeze the balance of power and prevent further escalation. By cutting off supply lines, Lebanon could begin to contain the proliferation of weapons and demonstrate to its partners that it is taking concrete steps toward stability. This approach reframes the challenge from an impossible demand to a manageable objective, on which to start building trust for the more challenging next steps.

The Role of the Lebanese Army

The LAF is uniquely positioned to lead such an initiative. Unlike Lebanon’s political institutions, the army retains a measure of public trust across sectarian lines. It has shown resilience in the face of crisis and has proven capable of coordinating with international forces in southern Lebanon. With proper support, the army could extend this role to border security, focusing on the eastern frontier with Syria and the northern frontier with smuggling routes into the Bekaa Valley.

This is not a call for the army to wage war against paramilitary groups. Rather, it is a call for the army to act as a gatekeeper, preventing the inflow of arms that regrow these groups. By shifting the emphasis from confrontation to containment, Lebanon can avoid internal conflict while signaling to the world that it is serious about curbing militarization.

The Role of the International Community

Halting rearmament is not a task Lebanon can achieve alone. Smuggling networks are sophisticated, and the country’s borders are porous. The international community, particularly the United States and European partners, can play a decisive role by providing the LAF with advanced surveillance equipment, drones, sensors, and training in border interdiction. Just as importantly, they can help build the logistical infrastructure needed to sustain such operations over time.

This assistance would not only strengthen Lebanon’s capacity to enforce its sovereignty but also reinforce the credibility of the LAF as a national institution. It would demonstrate that international support is not limited to rhetoric but extends to tangible investment in Lebanon’s stability.

Political Significance

A proposal to halt rearmament would also carry political weight. It would allow the Lebanese government to present a proactive counter-plan to Washington—one that acknowledges U.S. concerns while rejecting unrealistic demands. It would show that Lebanon is not shirking responsibility but is instead offering a pragmatic alternative. Such a move could buy the country time, reduce external pressure, and create space for internal dialogue on the broader question of disarmament.

Moreover, this approach could serve as a confidence-building measure. By demonstrating that the LAF can effectively monitor and secure borders, Lebanon could lay the groundwork for future steps toward disarmament. It would be a gradual trust-building process (internal and external), but one rooted in achievable milestones rather than unattainable ultimatums.

From Inevitable Failure to Pragmatic Success

Lebanon stands at a crossroads. To accept the U.S. ultimatum as stated is to embrace failure. To do nothing is to invite isolation and possibly war. The only viable path forward is to propose a third option: halting rearmament. This strategy is realistic, attainable, and politically defensible. It leverages the strengths of the Lebanese army, invites constructive international support, and reframes the debate from impossible demands to achievable goals.

In a country where paralysis has become the norm, halting rearmament offers a way to move forward. It is not a panacea, but it is a step toward stability—a step that Lebanon can take now, with the help of its partners, to preserve its sovereignty and credibility. The choice is not between disarmament and inaction. The choice is between inevitable failure and pragmatic success. Lebanon should choose pragmatism.

Lebanon the Message: A Muslim Welcome to Pope Leo

As Lebanon awaits Pope Leo’s historic visit, our nation endures profound suffering. Israeli bombardment ravages parts of our land, while economic collapse grips the rest. These hardships do not discriminate—they strike at the heart of Lebanese life. Muslim and Christian families alike have lost loved ones, homes, livelihoods, and sacred spaces. The pain is shared.

When recently asked by an Arab queen if he felt safe visiting Lebanon, the Pope replied without hesitation: “Well, we’re going.” As a Lebanese citizen of Muslim faith, I welcome Pope Leo with deep respect and hopeful anticipation. His presence is not merely a gesture of solidarity with Lebanese Christians—it is a national moment that transcends sectarian lines and speaks to the collective aspirations of all Lebanese. In a region often fractured by intolerance and foreign interference, Lebanon remains a rare mosaic of coexistence. Pope Leo’s visit affirms this exceptionalism and offers a chance to reclaim our sovereignty, renew our unity, and reimagine our future—not as sects in competition, but as citizens with a common purpose.

The Pope’s visit will cast a global spotlight on Lebanon—not as a religious battleground, but as a multi-faith homeland. His moral authority can amplify the voices of the bereaved, displaced, and wounded, calling for accountability and a renewed commitment to peace. His message will carry the weight of humanity—and in Lebanon, in stark contrast to other neighbors in the region, humanity always needs to come first.

At a time when foreign powers, particularly the United States, exert growing pressure on our institutions, Pope Leo—himself the first American pontiff—can help shield Lebanon from undue influence. These pressures, often cloaked in diplomacy, threaten our fragile confessional balance and democratic foundations. Defending the state is not about defending a sect; it is about defending the republic. Institutions like the presidency and the army must remain symbols of national unity, not sectarian privilege. The Pope’s presence will send a clear message: Lebanon’s leadership must answer to its people, not to external agendas. Sovereignty is sacred. Lebanon’s future must be shaped by the Lebanese.

Familiar with America’s model of religious diversity and freedom, Pope Leo will recognize Lebanon’s pluralism not as a sectarian compromise, but as a national achievement—enshrined in a century-old Constitution. While neighboring states have marginalized or expelled religious minorities, Lebanon insists on a different path: one of mutual respect and constitutional protection. In our mosques and churches, our neighborhoods and schools, we live a daily miracle of coexistence. The Pope’s visit will honor this legacy and remind the world that Lebanon is not a failed state—it is a pluralistic republic that needs help as it reforms, and is worth defending. He will emphasize that religious diversity is not Lebanon's weakness; but its strength.

By following in the footsteps of Pope Francis’ 2021 visit to Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf, Pope Leo would be endorsing a framework of equal rights—not minority privilege. His presence would affirm that religious leadership can champion civic equality. By preaching faith as a bridge to justice, not a barrier, he can help Lebanon move from confessional protectionism to a republic grounded in a Bill of Rights—where every citizen, Christian, Muslim, Jew, or other, is equal under the law. This would not only be a political shift—it would be a moral one.

Ultimately, Pope Leo’s visit is a call to all Lebanese—regardless of faith—to recommit to unity, sovereignty, and human dignity. It is a moment to rise above sectarian divides and embrace a shared future rooted in justice, pluralism, and peace. But it is also a reminder to the world that Lebanon is not a broken state, but a beacon of moral courage, that should not be tampered with or allowed to falter. Therefore, to Lebanese Muslims, the Pope should never appear as a foreign religious figure, but as a fellow human being committed to justice and peace.

I invite all Lebanese—Christians, Muslims, and minorities—to welcome Pope Leo not because we share his faith, but because we share his values. Let his visit place Lebanon’s ideals at center stage once more. Let it be the moment the world remembers Lebanon the Message: a nation that embraces all faiths and excludes none. Above all, let this be the moment when the Pope prays for Lebanon to become not a land of divided minorities, but a united, multi-faith republic of equal citizens.

A Grand Bargain in Baabda? Lebanon’s Crossroads Between Sovereignty and Strategy

The recent visit by U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Lindsey Graham to Lebanon’s Presidential Palace together with Presidential envoys Tom Barrack and Morgan Ortagus and Congressman Jim Wilson has stirred cautious optimism and deep skepticism in equal measure. Their proposal—an ambitious framework involving potentially a Mutual Defense Agreement, reconstruction and economic revitalization in the South, banking reform, and reintegration of paramilitary actors—hinges on one condition: the disarmament of Hezbollah, even before Israel vacates its remaining positions in southern Lebanon.

This is not just a diplomatic overture. It’s a tectonic shift in how Lebanon might reimagine its sovereignty, security, and regional role. But is it a genuine lifeline or a geopolitical trap?

The American Perspective: Strategic Leverage in the Levant

From Washington’s vantage point, Lebanon represents a critical node in the Levant—a region where U.S. influence has waned amid rising Russian and Iranian assertiveness. A foothold in Lebanon would offer the U.S. a strategic counterbalance to Tehran’s proxy network and a stabilizing presence near Syria and Israel.

The Mutual Defense Agreement would formalize U.S. military support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, potentially deterring external aggression and internal fragmentation. Economic investment, particularly in the underdeveloped South, would serve dual purposes: reducing Hezbollah’s grassroots appeal and showcasing American soft power.

But the linchpin is disarmament. For the U.S., Hezbollah’s military wing is not just a domestic Lebanese issue—it’s a regional threat. Washington wants to see the Lebanese state reclaim its monopoly over arms and decisions of war and peace, a principle enshrined in the Ta’if Agreement but never fully realized.

The Lebanese Perspective: Sovereignty, Skepticism, and Survival

Lebanon’s skepticism is not unfounded. The U.S. has long been perceived as a partisan actor in the region, with unwavering support for Israel—even during periods of aggression against Lebanese territory. Asking Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah before Israel withdraws from disputed areas like the five points feels, to many, like putting the cart before the horse.

Moreover, Hezbollah is not merely a militia. It is a political party, a social welfare provider, and—rightly or wrongly—a symbol of resistance. Disarming it without a comprehensive national consensus risks civil unrest and political fragmentation.

Yet Lebanon is at a breaking point. The banking crisis has hollowed out the middle class. Youth unemployment is soaring. Infrastructure is crumbling. The Lebanese Army, though respected, is underfunded and overstretched. In this context, the U.S. proposal—if genuine and enforceable—could be a lifeline.

Negotiating the Grand Deal: A Path Forward

Lebanon must approach this proposal not as a passive recipient but as a sovereign negotiator. Here’s how:

1. Sequence, Not Surrender

Lebanon should insist on a phased approach. Disarmament of Hezbollah must be contingent on:

- A formal Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Lebanese territories

- A binding U.S. commitment to the Mutual Defense Agreement, ratified by Congress

- A UN-backed verification mechanism to ensure compliance on all sides

This sequence respects Lebanese sovereignty and avoids unilateral concessions.

2. Economic Guarantees

The proposed economic zone in the South must be more than a promise. Lebanon should demand:

- A multi-year investment plan with benchmarks and oversight

- Inclusion of Lebanese diaspora investors and regional partners

- Job creation programs targeting former paramilitary members, with vocational training and psychological support

3. Security Reform

The Lebanese Army must be empowered as the sole legitimate military force. This requires:

- Expanded U.S. military aid, including equipment, training, and intelligence sharing

- A national dialogue on integrating Hezbollah’s non-military assets into civil society

- Legal reforms to ensure transparency and accountability in defense spending

4. Diplomatic Balancing

Lebanon must maintain its delicate equilibrium. While engaging the U.S., it should also:

- Reaffirm its commitment to Arab League principles

- Engage with European and regional actors to diversify support

- Avoid becoming a pawn to regional or global rivalries

From Proxy to Partner: Lebanon’s Bid for Strategic Autonomy

Ultimately, the question is not whether Lebanon should trust the U.S. blindly. It is whether Lebanon can leverage this moment to reclaim its agency. A Lebanon where the state—not factions—controls arms. A Lebanon where economic opportunity replaces archaic loyalties. A Lebanon that is not defined by its past wars but by its future peace. This grand bargain, if negotiated wisely, could be the beginning of such a transformation. But it must be rooted in mutual respect, verifiable commitments, and a clear-eyed understanding of the risks.

Lebanon stands at a historic inflection point—not merely between war and peace, but between paralysis and possibility. The U.S. proposal, if real and reciprocal, offers Lebanon a rare chance to rewrite its strategic narrative: from a fractured state defined by proxy conflicts to a sovereign actor shaping its own destiny. But this transformation cannot be coerced—it must be earned through principled negotiation, ironclad guarantees, and a phased roadmap that respects Lebanon’s dignity and complexity. If the United States truly seeks a foothold in the Levant, it must first prove it can be a partner in Lebanon’s rebirth—not just its containment. And if Lebanon dares to seize this moment, it must do so not with blind trust, but with bold vision. The world is watching. So are the Lebanese. Let the next chapter be written by patriotic statesmen, who have vision and resolve, not by ghosts of old wars.

Lebanon’s Crossroads: Going for a Third Choice- From Standoff to Engagement

Lebanon stands at a perilous crossroads. Two entrenched positions—each armed with legitimate grievances—continue to clash, while the country itself teeters under the weight of failed policies, foreign aggression, and internal paralysis. If Lebanon is to survive and thrive, both camps must loosen their grip on absolutism and begin engaging with one another constructively to find a third choice.

The Case for Defense

For decades, Lebanon was left defenseless—invaded, plundered, and its citizens killed. Even today, the international community undermines its right to arm itself. Those in power have failed to reassure the people living in the direct line of fire. When the enemy violates truces or launches attacks, the response has been tepid at best—mere words in the face of existential threats.

The Resistance’s Dilemma

The Resistance, for its part, while undeniably inflicting damage on the enemy and halting its advances; it could not prevent the devastation of the South, Beqaa valley, and Beirut. Acting outside the framework of the Lebanese state risks playing directly into the enemy’s hands—justifying another brutal campaign by a regime that lacks both moral compass and legal restraint. The cost of unilateral action will be borne not just by the Resistance and its community, but by Lebanon as a whole.

A Nation Fractured

This is not a binary issue. Lebanon cannot afford to fracture itself with endless, intransigent debate over arms at a time when there is a regional genocide occurring. Nor should it fall into the trap of having to choose between either disarmament by force through a foreign war or one that leads to a civil war. Instead, it must find a third way to unite—huddle, think, plan, and then act assertively. The question at hand is not merely tactical; it is existential. Who do we want to be as a nation? How do we protect ourselves in times of crisis without losing our soul? And how do we solve complex differences through the understanding and respect of all citizens and their legitimate concerns.

Five Proposed Steps to Break the Deadlock

Here are five actionable steps that could help Lebanon move forward:

1. Reframe the Arms Debate
   This should not be about “disarming” but about “transferring” heavy weaponry to the Lebanese Army. Lebanon is barred from purchasing arms, and the army needs them. Small arms—like in the U.S. and Israel—should remain a domestic matter. Given what disarmed populations face in the West Bank, Southerners have every reason to be cautious.
   
   
2. Integrate the Resistance
   The Resistance’s military discipline and intelligence capabilities are invaluable. Rather than dismantling it, Lebanon should incorporate key elements into a new unit—perhaps the Lebanese Defense Forces (LDF)—under the national army’s command.
   
   
3. Engage the Real Power Broker
   Israel may have pulled the trigger, but the U.S. supplied the weaponry. Lebanon should engage directly with Washington. A bold diplomatic package—tariff-free trade, gas exploration rights, infrastructure partnerships, even a U.S. base in the South—could be exchanged for Israeli withdrawal, military support, and reconstruction aid. A symbolic gesture, like offering Trump the Holiday Inn to transform into a Trump Hotel, might sweeten the deal.
   
   
4. Leverage Legal and Diplomatic Channels
   With a former ICJ judge as Prime Minister, Lebanon should build a legal case against Israeli occupation and pursue it at the International Court of Justice. Simultaneously, a diplomatic tour across Europe and the UN should advocate for reparations, elevate the UN’s role in Lebanon, and facilitate the safe return of Syrian refugees—followed by a comprehensive environmental recovery plan.
   
   
5. Rebuild to Reconnect
   The Lebanese state must commit to rebuilding every city and village destroyed by Israeli aggression. This is not just about infrastructure—it’s about restoring trust and permanently binding these communities to the state.

Lebanon’s future depends on its ability to transcend entrenched narratives and forge a unified path forward. The stakes are too high for division. It's time for a third choice that circumvents standoff and instead offers national reconciliation, attending to the grievances of all citizens. It's time to think boldly, act strategically, and reclaim our sovereignty with wisdom and resolve. It's time to have a single vision for the country that all Lebanese can agree on.

A National Choice: Why Lebanon Must Pursue a Plebiscite to Disarm Hezbollah Peacefully

Lebanon stands at a precipice, teetering between a fragile stability and the abyss of renewed civil strife. At the heart of this delicate balance lies a question that has haunted our nation for decades: how do we address the enduring militarization of Hezbollah, an armed group that, while deeply rooted in Lebanon’s history, presents profound challenges to state sovereignty, national security, and social cohesion?

Calls to disarm Hezbollah have grown louder, particularly as Lebanon struggles with economic collapse, political paralysis, the recent destructive war, and widespread public discontent. Yet, any proposal to forcibly strip the group of its weapons risks igniting the very conflict we seek to avoid. As history has shown, the specter of civil war looms large over such an approach, threatening to fracture our nation along sectarian lines. Instead, we must embrace a democratic, peaceful path forward—one that gives the Lebanese people a direct say in their collective destiny. A plebiscite, or nationwide referendum, on disarming Hezbollah offers the most viable and unifying solution.

The Risks of Forceful Disarmament

Lebanon’s past is a testament to the devastating consequences of internal conflict. The civil war from 1975 to 1990 scarred generations, leaving deep divisions that persist to this day. Forceful attempts to disarm Hezbollah could easily reignite these wounds, particularly given the group’s significant support base within the Shia community and its portrayal of itself as a defender of Lebanon against external threats.

Moreover, Hezbollah’s ties to regional actors complicate any forceful disarmament strategy, especially at a time when it could be pointed out that Israel continues to occupy a sizeable portion of South Lebanon. Such a move would not only provoke internal backlash but could also draw Lebanon further into the geopolitical struggles of the Middle East. The risks are manifold: sectarian violence, regional escalation, and the potential collapse of the Lebanese state.

The Case for a Plebiscite

In contrast, a plebiscite represents a peaceful and democratic approach. By involving all Lebanese citizens in this critical decision, a referendum would reinforce the principles of national unity and collective responsibility. It would provide an opportunity for open dialogue, fostering a sense of ownership over the outcome among all communities.

A plebiscite also aligns with international democratic norms. Around the world, referenda have been used to address divisive issues, from Brexit in the United Kingdom to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. While not without challenges, these democratic exercises have provided a mechanism for resolving disputes without resorting to violence. And moreover, they tend to fend off foreign meddling, by making the Lebanese people decide for themselves what is in their own best interest.

In Lebanon’s case, a plebiscite would allow for a nuanced debate about Hezbollah’s role in the country. It would give citizens the chance to weigh the group’s historical contributions, such as its resistance to Israeli occupation, against the challenges posed by its continued militarization. Importantly, it would shift the conversation from one of coercion to one of consensus. And it would show the world whether most Lebanese wish to fight one another or whether they wish to collaborate on solving transcedental issues.

Ensuring Fairness and Transparency

For a plebiscite to succeed, it must be conducted in a manner that is fair, transparent, and inclusive. This requires robust preparations, including:

1. A Neutral Oversight Body: Establishing an independent national commission to oversee the process, ensuring impartiality and credibility.

2. Public Awareness Campaigns: Educating citizens about the implications of their vote, fostering informed decision-making.

3. International Support: Inviting international observers to monitor the referendum, bolstering its legitimacy on the global stage, and at the same time encouraging the international community to understand the difficult decision, and to press upon Israel to withdraw from all occupied lands to facilitate a peaceful conclusion.

Additionally, the plebiscite must be framed not as an attack on any single group but as a step toward strengthening state institutions and ensuring equal security for all Lebanese citizens.

A Call for Leadership and Courage

Lebanon’s leaders must demonstrate the courage to pursue this democratic path. It will not be easy. Hezbollah’s leadership and supporters may resist the idea, fearing that a referendum could undermine their position. But a plebiscite offers a way to address their concerns through dialogue, rather than confrontation. It provides a platform for all voices to be heard, laying the groundwork for a more inclusive and stable Lebanon.

The Lebanese people have shown remarkable resilience in the face of adversity. From the October 2019 protests to the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion, they have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to justice, accountability, and reform. A plebiscite on disarming Hezbollah would be a continuation of this struggle—a chance to reclaim agency over the nation’s future.

Lebanon cannot afford another civil war. The stakes are too high, and the costs too great. By pursuing a plebiscite, the government can offer a peaceful, democratic alternative to forceful disarmament—a solution that respects the will of the people and strengthens the foundations of our fragile state.

It is time to choose dialogue over discord, ballots over bullets. Only by coming together as a nation can we overcome the challenges that divide us and build a Lebanon that is unified, sovereign, and secure.

The Lebanon Wars of 2024, Who Won, Who Lost, Costs and Implications

Many in Lebanon have been quick to declare winners and losers in the recent war. Some have claimed that Israel won the war by obliterating Hezbollah's leadership, and destroying much of the Dahyeh, the Bekaa, and the South. Those who oppose this view see things differently. While they are forced to recognize Hezbollah's losses, they argue that it won against Israel because it kept both its projectile arsenal intact and indeed was able to fend off Israeli advances in the South.

These two views appear irreconcilable and are being fought in Lebanese media and street protest scenes in the hope that they be translated into political gains or losses in the local Lebanese political arena.

Objectively speaking, both views appear to be right to some degree; but both are also wrong. Hezbollah may have actually both won and lost the war at the same time. But how could the same side win and lose in a war? The answer may be in considering that this was not one single war but two overlapping wars being fought simultaneously by the different parties. The two wars were: First a war of regional domination and the second a war of local  occupation.

The war of regional domination was the one in which the United States faced off Iran (Global players such as Russia played a minor role because of Ukraine; and China was barely engaged but for some minor diplomatic initiatives). The two regional powers essentially battled it using local proxies, primarily Iran through Hezbollah and the United States through Israel. This war for regional domination was the one where massive firepower, intelligence, and technological equipment and capabilities were on display from aircraft carriers, to 2000 pound bombs, to hypersonic missiles, drones, F35's, Artificial Intelligence ... The winner of this war was clearly the United States. Iran's firepower while impressive on occasion waned in comparison to what the United States mustered. 

This was the war that Hezbollah leaders did not want to fight and warned against. Notwithstanding their enmity towards the US, Hezbollah suspected a trap that would yield an unfavorable outcome, not unlike what had happened to the likes of Saddam. Alas, willingly or not, the Lebanese group was led to an undesired regional escalation that gifted the United States the reason to provide its proxy Israel with all the aforementioned firepower and carte Blanche to pull the trigger. This is the very reason why this war and specifically the US role was so very different than either Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon or that of 2006, when Israel for the most part was left to its own devices and ended it swiftly. In this war, the stakes and risks were deemed clearly way higher, which forced the United States against the hopes of either Iran or Hezbollah to put all its chips on the table. 

What were these bigger aims that would make the United States do this? The first aim was to reduce the massive mounting pressure on Israel by the Iranian axis, which threatened its actual survival like never before. The second was the reduction of the Iranian regional influence once and for all. The third was the control of the East Med Basin. The fourth was to remove any Russian presence in Syria and the Mediterranean (most likely in exchange for the Caspian). The fifth was the control of Syria. And the sixth was to fend off any talk of a future Chinese Silk Road that exits through the East Med. 

Such lofty geopolitical goals cannot be accomplished easily or cheaply. Enter expenditures in the $ Billions and massive US firepower, unseen in modern history in volumes surpassing those of World War 2 (If we include Gaza, the amounts of firepower exceeded 6 Hiroshima bombs!), coupled with automation, artificial intelligence, communications and military  equipment. This was very much in line with Eisenhower and later Shwarzkoff-Powel military doctrines of applying maximum power in any conflict as seen in the Gulf Wars and then in the wars after 911. This is  US doctrine not Israeli doctrine, which tends to be much more localized.

What occurred after the war clearly shows that the United States, which was not a declared party to the war, accomplished all of its goals. It reduced the influence of Iran and Russia substantially, it now controls both Lebanon and Syria, it took control of the East Med and it will be fending off any potential Chinese commercial designs on the region. Whereas Iran accomplished nothing in this regional war of domination  against the United States. In fact, it's two most valuable assets, Syria and Lebanon's Hezbollah have been severed  or depleted. Hezbollah as the proxy in this war clearly lost, and paid a very hefty price through assassination and destruction.

What about the second war: The War of Local Occupation, which occurred on the heels of the first one and which Israel probably  thought it might gain as a value-add,  invading Lebanon and occupying the South all the way up to the Litani. Why it would choose this specific delineation was circumspect because Hezbollah's rocketry range by far exceed the limits of the Litani. This has led some to explain that Israel wanted to take advantage of the group's weakened condition to acquire access to the valuable water resources. What ensued was essentially a stalemate close to the Lebanese Israeli border, with Israel invading but unable to occupy a single Lebanese village by force. It's rising casualties and waning US support for such an ineffective campaign led it to hastily request a ceasefire. Of course, according to military convention, in this specific war, Hezbollah was the victor because it did not allow Israel to accomplish any of its goals, whereas Hezbollah accomplished all of its own, foremost of which was to deny Israel any occupation as had been the case back in 1982. In fact, Lebanese people are already returning to their homes with only a few villages left to be evacuated by the Israelis. Also, Israel was unable to claim any water resources. 

Why is understanding the dynamics of these two wars so crucial in Lebanon? Because it will have both regional and local policy  implications. 

Regionally, Lebanon and all its internal parties have to come to grips that they cannot fight the United States, which has now moved to become the dominant regional player. Accepting this could present great opportunities for peace and prosperity. Rejecting it may have disastrous implications at a scale unimagined, military, political, and economic, as seen recently ... Essentially, there is no interest for Lebanon in such a conflict. There is also no interest for any of the Lebanese communities of allying with any other regional forcing them to oppose the United States now. It will prove to be as futile as it is destructive to their community.

What about Israel? There are those in Lebanon who think that Israel's interests are one and the same as those of the United States; and clearly Israel would like the world to believe so. This is not always the case, and the latest wars and Israeli moves in the Middle East have shown clear demarcation. Their interests converge and diverge. In particular and as it pertains to Lebanon, they may actually diverge, if Israel insists on occupying a chunk of Lebanon. If this happens, the Lebanese, uniting to oppose any Israeli designs over Lebanon is not only the right thing to do from a Lebanese perspective, but it is also necessary for the internal stability of the nation. This means that if Lebanon were to continue with its resistance within a purely national framework, one that does not ally with any regional players, but rather one whose aim is purely the national liberation of all 10,452 KM2 of Lebanese territory and not a single inch more, accompanied with an explicit national proclamation, such a goal should not oppose the hopes of most Lebanese people any more than it should raise fears for any neighboring countries or threaten the interests of the United States. 

If such a policy were to be multi-faceted to include diplomatic, economic, as well as military resistance, whenever necessary, and if Lebanon makes clear its intentions of not harboring any regional designs beyond its borders, this should send a strong signal to the international community and to the United States. If Lebanon follows this with moves to clean it's own house and begin democratic and constitutional reforms, this will only make Lebanon's interests more and more aligned with the United States. The second largest US embassy in the world being positioned in Beirut is no coincidence. It could be an opportunity for the Lebanese, ALL  Lebanese to seize.

Can a contiguous foreign and defense policy that prioritizes the relationship of Lebanon with the West, particularly the US, Europe, and the Gulf, whilst not threatening any other nation on globe be attained? Should such a policy parallel calling for a purely national agenda that supports the liberation of all 10,452 KM2 of the nation for the benefit of all Lebanese citizens therefore cementing the internal political scene? This is the pretty much the challenge on the table for the new class of emerging Lebanese leaders. 

Carpe Deum! 

When Indiscriminate Bombing Hits Home- Literally

Today is a very sad day for my maternal family whose neighborhood, full of old homes dating almost 100 years was targeted and destroyed turning them into a pile of rubble. While we are fortunate that none of our family members were there, the family home with its traditional tile, its thin alleyways, its garden, its traditional fountain, its palms, and its Guava tree are all gone.

My grandfather had built the place from scratch in the 1930's. It was in the peaceful and sleepy southern suburbs of Beirut, which was full of houses and orchards back then. He would open up his house for his Lebanese American bride, my grandma, and for their subsequent five children- my mom being the first to arrive. She has the oldest memories of all the neighborhood. All the houses around were of uncles and cousins. It was like a family village in the suburbs of Beirut. Most who had worked there were judges, teachers, and people who believed in their nascent Lebanese nation.

Years later, when my sister and I were born, mom would take us to Burj and we would play in the garden and swim in the fountain at its center. We would climb the fruit trees and then we would have a nice family barbecue. The war did not stop mom from taking us there on weekends to drink from its sweet water and absorb the unconditional love and humor of our Burj family.

When my grandparents passed away, my uncles each inherited a portion of the house and they soon added a couple of stories above the main house to accommodate their families. It remained a small building and it kept its traditional style. My cousins were all born and raised there and their childhood memories are all in that neighborhood.

All these years, the Minshiyyeh neighborhood survived war after war and battle after another; and it was never targeted because for the most part, it still housed the traditional families that were not involved in anything sinister ... We all thought it would be safe forever, until that is, some random bloke in a speeding metallic object in the sky decided to press a button and destroy it. 

What strategic purpose would such an indiscriminate bombing serve? It certainly hasn't made people more favorable to the bomber whom they see as marauding genocidal murderers that are trigger happy and have no appreciation for culture or history. It certainly won't eliminate the will of any resistance to their actions. They are unaffected by the destruction of a neighborhood that was irrelevant to them to begin with. And it will certainly not make the residents leave. Everyone we spoke to wants to rebuild. It is there home albeit there houses are no more.

It leaves one questioning what possible purpose does destruction for destruction's sake serve? Is it to satisfy the whims of a few blood thirsty criminal politicians? Is it to terrorize by showcasing the power of steel over tradition? Is it insatiable greed? Whatever it is, only the innocent seemingly pay the price these days, as the world watches on and does little to stop it.

Is a Lebanese national spirit emerging from the ashes of Israel's destruction?

The past week has been a painful one for Lebanon and the Lebanese people. More than 1,500 have been killed and thousands more wounded or maimed through indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated by the Israeli state against Lebanon. This has been followed up by assassinations and massive bombing campaigns in the South, in the Bekaa, and in Beirut.

Notwithstanding the national tragedy, it has been heartening to see the Lebanese come together to deal with the dire consequences of the Israeli aggression. They have welcomed hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Lebanese. From as far afield as Tripoli, Mount Lebanon, the Shouf, and Beirut's Achrafieh, Lebanese people opened their homes, churches, and mosques. They donated blood, provided aid, hospitals, and medical services free of charge for those coming from the affected regions. Others visited bereaved families in the Beirut suburbs, bringing flowers and gifts. A towing company owner decided to support any car needing help along escape routes. Another who owns one of the most famous night clubs in the country, decided to host hundreds of displaced in the club. Even folks from usually politically opposing areas such as Tariq Jdeedeh paid respect to the fallen and the injured. The Lebanese people from all walks of life are helping their fellow Lebanese. 

Could an emerging Lebanese national spirit be emerging? It seems clear to everyone inside and outside the country.  Perhaps this citizen empathy and coexistence is the very one on which the Lebanese founders bet more than a century ago when they brought different and disparate religious groups together under one flag with a tree. While over the ensuing decades, Lebanon did have internal conflicts due to political constitutional intransigence and quirks, Lebanon has largely maintained this inter-communal coexistence without any genocidal intent and without any form of apartheid or segregation.

This said, Lebanon is far from perfect. The state has been weakened by years of corruption, and centrifugal forces for decades have pulled some of its communities away from its core mission. And yet throughout its history, it has remained accommodating to the Lebanese and even to neighborly refugees. And so, it is not in the least ironic that the West has opted to sanction Lebanon--which is a liberal democracy-- and punish its people who are peacefully hosting almost 2 million Syrian and Palestinian refugees; while not holding Israel to any account for the unrelenting killing rampage against 2 million Palestinians, the illegal and violent expansion of settlements in the West Bank, and the indiscriminate bombings of Gaza and Lebanon.

The juxtaposition of the two states cannot be of more contrast. On the one hand, Israel finds itself today sinking deeper and deeper into a moral abyss, needing to commit more and more atrocities in the name of defending itself. In the process, it has become to many in the world a pariah rogue state run by extremists, and committing a genocide against civilians in Gaza, with cases already raised in the International Court of Justice as well as the International Criminal Court against its actions and its leaders. Meanwhile in Lebanon, which has been standing against genocide, has indeed paid a very hefty price in lives and in material, but maintains its place quite intact among the civilized family of nations. 

And yet contrary to expectations, and notwithstanding different views towards the war, the Lebanese people have come together to empathize and support each other. Could it be that Lebanon deep inside has a hidden treasure of national spirit, based on morality, human dignity, and rights, overriding any other consideration, including deeply held political differences? Could it be that the Lebanese people are finally looking at each other and saying: We are all Lebanese; we love our country; we have all been hurt and suffered; we have to be be there for each other; we want to live together as one people; and we want this country to be the home for all of us? 

Once this storm blows over, the Lebanese will also be asking the world: Can this small and insignificant nation on the Mediterranean shoreline be given a chance to just be left alone to mend its wounds, and reestablish itself as a nation for all its citizens equally with no regard for race, religion, or gender? If so, then perhaps any sacrifices being paid now, as painful as they may be, may finally prove to be worth it, and the vision of the Lebanon of our forefathers may finally be realized ...

By Attacking Lebanon Israel once more Violates International Law

Against International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Convention, as well as several International trade and transportation laws, Israel launched an indiscriminate act of state-sponsored terrorism last week aimed at Lebanese people they could not identify, in places that they could not pinpoint, and in the vicinity of civilians that they could not gauge or exclude. It is estimated that more than three thousand explosions occurred in a span of less than three minutes across Lebanon, killing, maiming, or blinding thousands of Lebanese citizens. 

While not admitting the crime, the Israelis indirectly stated that they had been “targeting” individuals affiliated with Hezbollah. However, their argument has been found to be lacking of any legal context or justification for several reasons. 

Firstly, Israel failed to identify who they were targeting, given that Hezbollah as an organization and its activities span more than just the military, and rather delve into political, socio-economic, and medical areas with civilian servants numbering in the tens of thousands of thousands all over Lebanon, and many of whom are not at all involved in any military activity. As such, the attack can be considered indiscriminate and not “targeted” as Israel claims and therefore illegal under international humanitarian law. 

Secondly, the Israelis also failed to determine the estimated collateral damage, resulting from such an attack, which is another rule imposed by agreed-upon conventions of war. Nations engaged in war are expected to make such calculations in order to minimize civilian casualties. The fact that the exploding pagers killed or maimed thousands of passersby, women, and children, which Israel could have never estimated from the outset, proves that the order to commit this crime in itself was an illegal act of war and those who took it should be prosecuted for it. And even if Israel argues that the pagers were expected to be in use by Hezbollah operatives, how could such an attack have known that an operative carrying such a pager was not in respite from the battle field, grocery shopping, or visiting family, or driving a car, or any other scenario, which could have led to more deaths of innocents. Is Israel trying to set an example that any operative anywhere is a target; and if so, does that mean its own reservist soldiers, when they are back home from the front lines and with their families are now also legitimate targets at any time, in any place, regardless of collateral damage to their own families? If so, then Israel is setting quite a dangerous precedent for the world. 

Thirdly, as for the bombs themselves, the Israelis appear to have used a highly explosive chemical called PETN, which the New York Times estimated at 28 to 56 grams of explosives per device for a stunning sum total of more than 280 KG of high explosives. For reference, a mere 50 grams of chemicals were said to have been used to poison a former Russian military officer in London. At the time, the United Kingdom, supported by 28 countries unleashed a massive  investigation by Theresa May's government, blamed Russia for violating international law, and announced a series of punitive measures against Russia, including the expulsion of diplomats. The two poisoned victims did not reportedly die. In contrast, Lebanon's 3,000 explosions killed more than thirty people, seriously injuring more than 400, with many of them cruelly losing their eyes, and a total casualty list reaching almost 3,000 wounded per Lebanon's ministry of health. And yet, the ensuing UK statement at the UN Security paid lip service to Israel's breaking of international humanitarian law, weighing it against the old adage of Israel's right to defend itself, as if that gave anyone the right for committing what amounts to no less than state-sponsored terrorism.

And finally, even way before the explosions occurred, the fact that Israel concocted such a cowardly act, by using harmless civilian technology devices for nefarious reasons, illegally converting them to bombs using commercial fronts not connected to the manufacturer, set a very dangerous precedent to criminals and terrorists all over the world. Has Israel now provided a blueprint for how to install such explosive devices in mobile phones, ship them on planes or trains, for them to pass security undetected, and explode at will, indiscriminately killing hundreds, if not thousands? It is indeed a commercial precedent that has many nations shuddering at the potential consequences as stated by the Chinese representative at the UN Security Council.

For all the above reasons, Israel and its leaders should be held to account by the international community and brought to justice by the appropriate legal bodies. In the very least, Lebanon's case should be appended to the cases already in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to further substantiate and evidence Israel's departure from civilized and lawful conduct within the international community.

The Economics behind why Israel will not dare start a war with Lebanon

In his latest speech, Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah delved into an interesting topic that not many others in the region talk about;  and that is the cost of a potential war in Lebanon for Israel. Basically, he cited economic studies, which placed the value of Israel’s northern industrial, agricultural, technological, facilities, factories, technology, and research centers in the range of $150 Billion. He warned that if Israel were to venture into a war with Lebanon, this industrial north would be obliterated in an hour or less. From an economic perspective of course, Nasrallah may have been citing the actual value of the assets, not the overall economic value that they generate, which would be a multiple of this number. 

This raises the key question of what the cost to Israel would be if it declared a war on Lebanon. What better way of gauging this than to look at what cost the current war in Gaza has so far meant to Israel. According to a recent report by the American think tank, Rand, the total costs to Israel of the Gaza War are expected to total about $400 Billion Dollars. This can be split into 10% of direct war costs, such as military expenditures, lives lost, compensation for lifetime disabled, housing of the displaced, and the destruction of property. The other 90% includes indirect costs, such as businesses closed, unemployment, reduction in investment, currency or stock market valuation, wasted agriculture due to lack of workers, lost industrial production and export, immigration of talent and high value workers to safer shores … etc.

What is important to keep in mind here is that the Gaza War is between Hamas and Israel; and by all objective measures Hamas is a much weaker opponent to Israel than Hezbollah. In fact, most military analysts have Hezbollah’s capabilities quantitatively at least five times the firepower (rocketry) and manpower of Hamas. Qualitatively, however, Hezbollah’s capabilities are far more advanced than Hamas’ rudimentary methods and tools. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has been directly involved in highly advanced warfare in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It has shown its military capabilities and  technology to be state-of-the-art, and much more precise. Its intelligence is more developed; and most importantly, its supply lines extend to the Arab and Iranian hinterland. 

The quantitative and qualitative military differential is therefore substantial; and the damage it can heap on Israel would be many folds more than Hamas'. Here we could also look at both the direct and indirect costs. 

In terms of the direct costs, Nasrallah’s estimate, if anything, could be considered conservative as he only took into account northern Israel. He did not allude to what his group is quite capable of destroying in the heart of Israel, which includes both Tel Aviv and Haifa. In fact, most Western and Israeli military analysts agree that Hezbollah’s missiles can now reach any part of Israel and with pin- point accuracy. One recent Israeli report estimated that the group could lob as much as 3,000 rockets per day for a period exceeding a month, which they stated would overwhelm any defense system that Israel can muster. The costs of all this direct damage would be substantially higher than even Nasrallah himself estimates.

As for the indirect costs, the Gaza war has reportedly caused Israeli business investment to plummet by 67.8%, consumption to contract by 26.9%, exports to drop by 18%, and the Israeli budget deficit to rise to 6.6%, with 46,000 businesses shut down, and an impending downgrading of debt rating. At the height of the war with Gaza, in the last quarter of 2023, the Israeli economy shrank by a stunning 20%, which is double a depression rate. 

The key point here is if Hamas—whose direct war reach was for the most part distant from the Israeli economic centers and limited to the areas surrounding the Gaza strip—was able to inflict on Israel such an economic toll, what would be the indirect costs of a full-blown war with Lebanon, which would entail a sizeable expansion of operations.

In geographic scope, the war would be at least twenty times as large as Gaza. After all, Gaza is a very small strip, whereas Hezbollah operates in large swathes of Lebanon and can hit anywhere in similarly-sized Israel.

Quantitatively, in military terms, it could be at least five times as intense, simply due to the larger size of Hezbollah’s forces and firepower. Qualitatively, destruction inside of Israel would be expected to be substantially more because of the advanced intelligence and guided weaponry. 

In grosso modo terms, if one were to multiply the expected direct cost of the Gaza war (Estimated at $40 Billion) by a factor of five to account for the above intensity and accuracy, the direct costs of a Lebanon war could reach as high as $200 Billion. In indirect cost terms, if we multiplied the Gaza war costs (Estimated at $360 Billion by Rand) by a factor of three to account for the nationwide disruption in wider Israel with such a massively expanded war, the indirect costs could very well top $1 Trillion. Adding both, the total cost of such a war could exceed $1.2 Trillion for Israel (This assumes a single war front with Lebanon, without the continuation of the Gaza war, which so far does not seem likely to end anytime soon). Under such a scenario, all the Western economic support is unlikely to save Israel’s government from bankruptcy, circumvent a massive economic calamity, and culminate in the massive exodus of people and businesses to safer shores. 

Interestingly, most objective strategists and military analysts do not believe there would be much to gain from such a war. Almost none believe that Hezbollah could be overcome; and none believe that Israel can invade Lebanon and occupy it as it did back in 1982. If anything, some military experts point to the possibility that Israel itself could potentially be invaded in the north by Hezbollah. Regardless, most objective analysis points to a strategic loss for Israel in such a war. 

Has Israel reached a point where it is willing to allow its extremists to throw away trillions of Dollars, cause massive destruction, and exodus, and all without any strategic gain? Rationally, one should think not, which may explain why Israel hasn’t launched a war on Lebanon yet, and indeed may never dare to.

Only the ICJ Can Save the Holy Land Now

The world witnessed an extraordinary event last week. South Africa presented a genocide case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to many experts, the case presented by the African nation is very strong, having provided ample and hard-to-refute evidence. In fact, most of what was cited was based on UN figures showcasing the dimensions of the tragedy as well as statements made by the Israeli officials themselves, proving intent. Israel countered the allegations with the expected self-defense argument; and that it was actually the one on the receiving end of genocide. The sheer numbers of Palestinian civilian deaths, physical destruction, medical calamity, and famine conditions tended to dilute the Israeli counterargument.

Notwithstanding South Africa’s solid case for genocide, some have pointed to geopolitics potentially playing a role and ultimately influencing the decision of the ICJ. As the court is now tasked with mulling over the evidence to make a fairly quick but transcendental decision, let us look at the two possibilities and the implications under each scenario.

Starting off with the scenario of the ICJ ruling in favor of Israel, the immediate implication will likely be an emboldening of Israel’s far right-led military actions inside of Gaza. Quite simply, this means more bombs, more death, more destruction, more injury, more famine, and more tragedy on the Palestinian side. Even on the Israeli side, more soldiers will be maimed or killed; and the hostages will likely face their end. Israel itself will continue to struggle politically to get itself out of the quagmire, with opposing political forces unable to provide solutions or wrangle away decision-making power from Netanyahu’s far-right coalition. 

Globally, a chasm emerging between Judaism and Zionism will only widen. Many Jews all over the world will continue to protest against the hijacking of their very religion by the Zionists, who seem intent on occupying and killing in their name—ironically akin to what some see as Islamist jihadi organizations having done in the name of Islam, with the only difference being that Israel is a state that is a party to the Genocide Convention and can be held to account. Regardless, because Israel’s democracy appears to have been hijacked by its very own extremists, global Jews will increasingly distance themselves from all those seemingly not bound by any Conventions, let alone a sense of humanity. Israel will find itself progressively isolated from its very own global community.

Meanwhile, the region will continue to boil, especially in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, and possibly extending to Jordan and Egypt, who have warned against any genocide or transfer. Regional peace will become more distant, putting at risk the entire global supply of oil and other goods passing through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The Middle East will drift further and further away from what will be seen as a criminally hypocritical West.

Under such a scenario, it is highly likely that the West, particularly the United States, and the world order it created post World War II, will be in shatters, as no country will take the Genocide Convention, let alone ICJ’s rulings, seriously anymore. The global South will feel that the ICJ itself is nothing more than an instrument hypocritically used by the powers that be whenever it serves their interests. Any talk of human rights, will be meaningless; and Western diplomacy will find it impossible to carry out an agenda based on civilized principles, like democracy and justice. All this would also give free reign to nations who have genocidal tendencies to act with impunity. They will argue that if Israel can get away with it, why can’t they?

Such a world will indeed be a dire one. Few winners would emerge from this scenario, except that is for extremists intent on going at each other’s throat;  or dictators disregarding any semblance of international law. Humanity and peace would be its ultimate victim.

Of course, there is the alternative scenario, in which the International Court of Justice decides in favor of South Africa. What would be the implications of such a ruling? They are equally immense. First and foremost, it would send a strong message to the world, that any nation that crosses the line set by humanity under international law, will be held to account—even nations with powerful friends or even if they were once ironically on the receiving end of genocide.

Secondly, and depending on the urgency set by the court, such a ruling could put an immediate stop to the hostilities, ordering Israel to stop its bombings and invasion of Gaza, hence ceasing and desisting the massacres, destruction, and inhumane treatment of Palestinians, and instead bringing back food, water, medicines, and power into the Gaza strip. While the far right in Israel may protest such measures, Israel as a state cannot and will not risk becoming a pariah state, and will be forced to comply.

Aside from saving countless Palestinian civilian lives as well as those of Israeli hostages, who could be released back to their families together with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, such an ICJ ruling will also highly likely diffuse the regional situation as hostilities in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq will cease. All of them have already explicitly stated that they would stand down once Israel stopped its attacks on Gaza.

Within Israel proper, this scenario will have serious reverberations. The fact that Israel—which ironically as a nation came about due to the genocide against Jews—is found guilty of genocide will mean that the entire narrative of the nation will have to change from that of being a victim of an injustice to that of being a perpetrator itself, hence on par within international law with all other nations, with no special treatment. Israeli society will indelibly have to shift blame from outsiders to those within its midst who caused this calamity to befall the nation. It is highly likely the finger will be pointed to Israel’s far-right for all its excesses—be they during this war, with the settlers, or for generally being against peace. One could even contemplate that some salient politicians may be banished altogether from the political scene, not unlike other extremists in the history of other nations. The same could occur within Palestine, especially if a peace process is kicked-off and culminated quickly. The Palestinians will want to embark on the reconstruction of their lives at the earliest. It would be unlikely that their extremist elements would survive a comprehensive peace agreement either politically or ideologically.

But why and how could peace emerge from a simple ICJ decision; and who could push for it? It could emerge simply because it is the only dynamic that would allow the region to stabilize. Without it, the region will continue to teeter; since Israel would have been weakened by the indictment, and no nation can come to its rescue or continue to support it without potentially facing the threat of legal action within the respective country—indeed there is already talk of potential lawsuits being brought against American Secretary Blinken and President Biden for aiding and abetting Israel in their excessive retaliation in Gaza.

The only way to reverse this dynamic, is for the West, led by the United States, to push for a comprehensive peace plan, even if it needs to be imposed. Some might say that this is too idealistic a scenario. In fact, it’s the least costly of alternatives for all those involved, including the United States, which has been desperately trying to keep a leash on Israel. Meaning, an ICJ order could serve to get the United States off the hook, providing an off-ramp with the desired outcome, but without the potential political price to pay. Some may say that this is too late; and that the United States is too implicated. Perhaps, but things could change if the United States were to lead a serious peace effort that culminates in regional peace. This would essentially transform a hefty liability into a regional victory. 

Encouragingly, the United States has been calling lately for comprehensive peace and “regional integration”, a term never before heard, but which showcases the opportunity to all the parties involved. Since, under this scenario, the world will have seen that the West and the United States in particular did not oppose the ICJ, it would dampen the hypocrisy charge. It could also serve to once more lend credence to the world order and specifically the multilateral institutions, namely the UN, which itself has been a victim of this war, with hundreds of its own staffers killed.

A final word on Iran, who some may argue might oppose such a peace deal. Bottom line, a comprehensive peace cannot be attained without Iran being party to it; and indeed, on no less than two occasions in the past 3 months, Iran has explicitly indicated that it is willing to sign up for comprehensive peace talks together with the rest of the Gulf States. It did so with a peace proposal submitted in October by Lebanon and one submitted by the Palestinians in December. As hard as some may find it to believe, Iran has no interest in being left out of a peace deal, especially a regional one that sees all the Arabs, including Palestine, potentially making peace with Israel.

The stakes have arguably never been higher for all those involved and indeed the world. Since democracy seems to have failed the two societies in circumventing mortal conflict, it is now left to the International Court of Justice to decide whether it’s time to put a stop to the violence and provide a sliver of hope for peace in the Holy Land. If the right choice is taken by the Court, who knows, perhaps the Almighty in his great wisdom might very well have decided that two peoples, on the receiving end of genocide, in the end needed to peacefully co-exist on his most Holy of Lands.