Federalization or Balkanization? Lebanese Federalism Addresses the Wrong Problem with the Wrong Solution

"The tragedy of the Lebanese federalists is not only in their diagnosis of the wrong problem but in providing the wrong solution. Lebanon needs the antidote of concentrated federal power after all the abuse received by its citizens. What the country desperately needs is for the people to retain their rights that devolve power to each citizen. What Lebanon wants is a Bill of Rights to deliver on decentralization, not more federalization, which would constitutionalize sectarian abuse and quite possibly lead to Balkanization."

 

Lately, Lebanese television has been parading Federalists to present their plan for getting the nation out of its current calamity. Contrary to its name, which tends to imply unification, the Federalists are actually proposing the cantonization of the country into as much as a dozen or more cantons based purely on religious grounds. They justified their position based on “studies” that they conducted, in which they concluded that Lebanon had different ethnic and religious “cultures”. In their minds, these are irreconcilable, because of a hegemon, Hezbollah, controlling the nation. Since they do not want conflict, they are recommending Constitutional partitioning, which they disingenuously are calling Federalism. Their hope is that it leads to nirvana. The fear of many is that it leads to Balkanization.

But before we delve into any plans, it is worthwhile to ask what exactly is the problem in Lebanon that merits their recommendation of Federalism? If the problem is a concentration of power, then federalization usually is the epitome of concentrated power not a dissolution of it. Indeed, if we look at history, federalization usually unites different regions or factions under a single governing umbrella; and it does it for different reasons: 

Federalization unites to draw economic efficiency: Differing regions might not be coordinating well, or commerce is not functioning because of absence of lack of standards, or infrastructure is not being built. A better coordination of effort and pooling of resources is therefore required, which justifies a typical federalization process. This first modern one occurred in the United Stated after independence in 1776. The ensuing loose confederation was a first attempt and did not work well with commercial issues quickly emerging with contradicting state interests. Federalism was used to address such inefficiencies and be the ultimate arbiter. The question here is: Given that Lebanon is already a united nation, but operating with gross inefficiencies, how exactly is partitioning it into several states going to increase economic efficiencies, especially at a time when the state is dysfunctional and in default as is?

Federalization leads to a concentration of power: A federation takes power from its parts and governs over all of them. Federations typically have a single army, a single foreign policy, an overarching set of laws and institutions, including a single monetary policy. This concentration of power has both internal as well as external repercussions. Internally, it creates more consistency and standardization, while externally it creates more presence. Notwithstanding the economic power of nations like Germany, France, and Italy, many in Europe half a century ago felt that they could not strategically compete against large powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, unless they established a federation that joined all of their individual but insufficient efforts together. Today the European Union has a President and Parliament that does most of the negotiations on behalf of its member states with the other global powers. If the diagnosis in Lebanon is that there is too much power in the hands of one party, Hezbollah, how exactly is concentrating more power in a federation going to help resolve the situation? In trying to federalize, will the Lebanese federalists accidentally increase the power of the central government rather than decrease it, or will I make no difference at all because de facto Lebanon is sectarian-federalized? 

The third is social cohesion: A federation attempts to pull together differing factions into a common core, delivering a sense of belonging to something bigger than one’s own. Russia and China both created a strong sense of national cohesion to withstand the centrifugal forces at the edge of their vast empires. In that sense, federation creates a narrative—regardless of it being real or concocted—which unites and brings about cohesion and nationalism. What kind of nationalist narrative would exist if Lebanon were to be divided in religious enclaves? Are the Lebanese federalists really federalizing or are they Balkanizing?

Lebanese Federalists fail to justify all three of the above key elements of federalization.

Economically, proposing to federalize Lebanon at a time when it is bankrupt is wishful thinking at best. Indeed, to establish all the required federal and state institutions is currently as impractical as it is inefficient for a nation of Lebanon’s size and economic conditions. For example, they proposed creating judiciaries in each of the to-be established dozen or so states. Who exactly is to pay for this at a time when the judiciary in Lebanon literally does not have resources to turn electricity on or buy paper? Establishing parliaments and councils, constitutions laws, etc … are all extremely costly endeavors. Who is to fund them? And even if that were to miraculously happen, there is no mention of who and how all established states would agree to pay their portions, and what happens if they don’t. Economic costs should not be underestimated or diminished, especially not in view of what recently happened post-Brexit with the UK exiting the EU costing hundreds of $Billions more than estimated, which the people would ultimately have to pay. Are the Lebanese people willing to undertake such an exorbitant endeavor when they can barely make their daily ends meet? 

Politically, what the Federalists are proposing seems to be intuitively the exact opposite of what they themselves are diagnosing to be the problem, which is a concentration of power. At this point, they admit that Lebanon’s power is split by sects, controlled by a handful of sectarian leaders. Wouldn’t federalizing cause this concentration of power to become even worse by essentially Constitutionalizing this illegal and unpatriotic practice? And even if their diagnosis of the problem is that all of Lebanon’s ills are due to Hezbollah’s imbalance of power, why would federalization change this dynamic? Some would argue that the contrary could end up happening by handing the power reigns over to them. Besides, come partition time, what guarantees that they wouldn’t claim the lion’s share? India and Pakistan are still disputing Kashmir well over seven decades after partition. Lebanese federalists might need to be asked whether they think in drawing maps, who is likely to have the upper hand: An academic pen or a keen sword?

As for social cohesion, the Federalists assume that the Lebanese people only see themselves defined as purely religious communities. In reality, the Lebanese and their ancestors are among the most socially mobile people in the history of mankind, traversing the globe for millennia, and being invaded by empires for most of history. Globalization is embedded in the DNA and so is coexistence. It is no accident that it was named a “message” by Pope John Paul II. Are we now being asked to burn this message and our social cohesion with a false notion security coming from deluded religious segregation? Are we to go back five centuries, when others in our region have started looking five ahead? If anything, Lebanon desperately needs to eliminate sectarianism not to federalize it into the Constitution. I think our youth expects more from this type of tribalized religious thinking, and indeed they are way ahead of the federalists as proven by an increase in inter-marriage occurring all over the nation among all sects.   

The tragedy of the Lebanese federalists is not only in their diagnosis of the wrong problem but in providing the wrong solution. Lebanon needs the antidote of concentrated federal power after all the abuse received by its citizens. What the country needs is for the people to retain their rights that devolve power to each citizen. What Lebanon wants is a Bill of Rights to deliver on decentralization, not more federalization, which would constitutionalize sectarian abuse and quite possibly lead to Balkanization. Watching the kaleidoscopically colorful maps of the proposed religious enclaves, along with the proposal that it would drive social cohesion, was as surreal an experience as I've ever had. The only thing missing from the maps shown were the inevitable thirty-foot walls, which unfortunately appears to be what is equally separating Lebanese federalists from reality.

The Issue of the Hour in Lebanon

The controversial issue of the hour change in Lebanon should not be made trivial or sectarian and should be resisted by all Lebanese regardless of religion. On what premise? 

First for this type of decision to be taken, it usually involves different elements of society and takes time and consensus to build and a law to be passed, typically in parliament, advising people how to prepare for it. It has taken years in some nations (US ...) and is still in the process. That is what happens in states that respect their people and their rights. 

Second, such a transcendental decision certainly cannot be taken so cavalierly and so precipitously with so much disregard to the disruptions and divisions it may cause to the people and their business. Sadly, if one sees the leaked video of how the decision was taken by Speaker Berri and PM Miqati, it is indeed intoxicating how such rulers are toying with the lives of the Lebanese people. 

Third, this unilateral decision is really no different than other unilateral decisions such rulers are taking on truly critical issues such as Banking deposits, Presidency, Explosion, Oil and Gas etc ... It is a pattern that shows they think they own the country. They don't and it is left to the people to resist them and tell them they don't, on this and every other issue.

Fourth, on Constitutional grounds, it is actually illegal as it goes against what is typically referred to as "social harmony", which ironically Berri himself has invoked on so many occasions to get himself elected as Speaker. Clearly, there are communities in Lebanon who have rejected this decree, therefore why is he not applying the same "social harmony" ruling in this case?

And finally, this seemingly silly ruling actually weakens respect for an already declining state and causes divisions as it evidently has ... and instead it moves Lebanon away from agreed- to international norms into the orbit of a pariah state ruled by incompetent and inconsiderate rulers.

For all the above justifications, all Lebanese should oppose the decision and resist it ... As for members of the Muslim community complaining about the extra hour of fasting, maybe we should man it up, as Muslims with time changes all over the world have. Plus I'm sure the Almighty would consider counting the extra hour of fasting in favor of the good nationalist deed ... 😉

Lebanon’s Constitutional Reform: Transition or Clean Slate

There is a growing belief in Lebanon that something is seriously wrong with the nation’s dysfunctional system at whose core lies the Ta’ef Constitution. The reason for this bleak picture is fairly self-evident: The stricken country finds itself in a tailspin towards an abyss, with no institution or constitutional breaker of sorts capable of pulling it back. Some continue to argue that Lebanon needs to make sure the Ta’ef Constitution of 1989 is implemented posthaste to help the nation transition. Without such a transition, they contend, the country risks falling back into yet another civil war. Countering them are those who are convinced that Ta’ef has had enough of a transition period to prove itself and that it’s time for a clean slate social contract to overcome the design flaws of Ta'ef. The assertion is that it is the only way to do away with all the systemic faults, abuses, and instability of the current Constitution.

Assuming for a moment that Constitutional change has become inevitable, several key questions emerge. First, towards what kind of Constitutional reform should the Lebanese be driving? In previous articles, I have made the case for a Constitution based on a Bill of Rights (2021), which takes away some of the institutional powers and gives them back to the people—after all, according to the Lebanese Constitution, they are the “Ultimate source of all power vested in the state.” I have also argued that such a step could actually save Lebanon from utter Constitutional chaos and vacuum (2021), that sovereignty without such change will remain elusive (2021), and that many communities (2022) in Lebanon can benefit from such fundamental reform, and to a larger degree than what the current model offers them. But there is a key question yet unanswered, similar to the one I posed which in my book, A Decade of Turmoil and Hope (Morisken Verlag, 2013): “Should we pace change, or should we change pace?”. In other words, should Constitutional change be transitional, or should it be swift and starting from a clean slate?

First, let us define the main differences between the two: On the one hand, transitional Constitutions are ones that generally offer tweaks in the original Constitutions in the hope of some final settlement. They are implemented piecemeal and usually over a period of years. Transitional Constitutions typically occur in societies that are fairly stable and to a large degree uniform, such as Canada, the European Union, and Colombia. These transitional Constitutions are meant to offer meaningful change, but not a complete overhaul, because the nature and size of the problem does not merit it. Clean slate Constitutional reform, on the other hand, usually emerges within nations in flux: The United States after its revolution is one example, so are Japan’s Meiji restauration, Germany's post-Third Reich, Turkey under Ataturk, Post-Tzarist Soviet Union, Iraq after Saddam, and Tunisia beyond-Ben Ali. All these nations witnessed a break from their past and an emergence of an entirely new social contract.

What is interesting to note here is that some transitional Constitutions meant to be small steps in the right direction, end up falling short, most notably the US Confederate Constitution of 1777. It failed to unify the fledgling independent nation and actually needed a more robustly engineered replacement 12 years later at the hands of James Madison. It broke away from the past and introduced bold changes that empowered the nation forward for the next two and a half centuries. In contrast, other transitional Constitutions, like that of the European Union succeeded in taking small steps because the post-World War groundwork needed to be laid over decades with each European state building its respective stable democracy, which in turn Constitutionally transitioned into the federation that is Europe today. The transition however occurred under steady and democratic circumstances. Similarly, Canada’s Constitutional changes in the late 1960’s introduced citizen and equality rights across the board to temper the Federal Constitution. Like Europe, this Constitutional did not follow any instability or revolution; rather, it had been inspired by the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It’s meager steps were criticized for not being enough and would be bolstered a couple of decades later with other amendments.

The above historical demonstrations are meant to make the point that transitional Constitutional changes do not necessarily guarantee failure or success. Rather, underlying conditions are generally the determining factor. Stable conditions seem to be more aligned with transitional Constitutions that take small steps, whereas more acute conditions tend favor full remakes. The problem occurs when the two mismatch—meaning acute conditions being matched with small changes that don’t change the underlying causes of instability. The case of Lebanon’s Ta’ef Constitution tends to provide evidence for this argument. Transitional in nature, and not a clean break, Ta’ef is credited with ending the sixteen-year Lebanese civil war. And yet, it could not circumvent two other wars (1993, 2006), several insurrections and revolutionary bouts (2005, 2015, and 2019), dozens of assassinations (2005-2021), a financial meltdowns (2020), and what many are beginning to call a failed state (2022-2023). One could argue that the transitional nature of the Ta’ef Constitution may have been its weak link and a mismatch with the size of the conflict that preceded it. Hard decisions that needed to be taken were diluted with uncertain transitional steps that while well-intentioned were never implemented, leading to the current impasse.

In contrast, starting from a clean slate with some clear breaks with previous Constitutions have been relatively successful at accomplishing true reform, most notably the Japan Meiji Constitution post war defeat in 1868 that broke away from the nation’s Samurai entrenchment and moved it into the industrial age; the Atta Turk Constitution in 1921 that secularized and modernized Turkey away from its Sultanate post World War I; the individual European state Constitutions post World War II (Including Germany, Italy, and Hungary), which moved these away from nationalist dictatorship; the South African Constitution of 1996, which ended Apartheid and unified the races of the nation ; and most recently the Tunisian Constitution post Arab Spring Constitution, which did away with all the privileges given to the Ben Ali regime. All of these examples took the hard decisions, which often accompany Constitutional clean slates, and yet none of them led to further bloodshed or catastrophe, as some in Lebanon warn might happen.

Historically, it can therefore be shown that transitional Constitutions seem to work optimally under stable conditions, as in the cases of Canada and the EU, but they don’t do as well following tumultuous times. Whereas clean slate Constitutions usually do better after turbulent times (e.g., war), but don’t seem to be called for during peaceful times. Lebanon is certainly not stable at the moment. In fact, one could easily argue that it has been tumultuous since Ta’ef was passed; and there is little reason to believe that all of a sudden, it is likely to stabilize itself. And while it is understandable that some may garner fears that a clean slate approach to Lebanese Constitutional reform during such unstable times would be risky, there is no historical proof that it might lead to more instability or bloodshed. To the contrary, there is ample proof to refute this point as societies all over the world including the American post revolution, the Japanese and German pre-Industrial age defeats, the French and Turkish post World Wars, the South African post-Apartheid, and the Tunisian post-Arab spring— all had clean slate starts for their Constitutions without any notable regression into mass violence*.

In conclusion, those who believe in reforming the Lebanese Constitution—but who question whether the optimal approach should be through transition or clean slate—would be well served to study comparative Constitutional history. By doing so, they will conclude that slow transition need not mean stability (It could actually cause the contrary, as the case of Lebanon under Ta’ef clearly shows); while a clean slate Constitution need not imply instability. Indeed, it has proven to have the exact opposite effect in nations around the world who have been brave enough to put their past behind them and entrust their people with build their own better future.

Making the Case for International Intervention in Lebanon

I have to preface by saying that ever since the first bout of revolution in Lebanon in 2015, I have personally argued on multiple occasions, private and public, against international intervention in Lebanon. My basic premise was that internationalization would lead to an internal dynamic akin to the early 2000’s, which saw a harsh split in the nation, resulting in instability and assassination. ‘The Lebanese have to learn to resolve their differences through their own democratic elections and state institutions,’ I would argue repeatedly; and together with a group of well-meaning Lebanese and expats drew up the Lebanese Bill of Rights as an instrument that shifted the focus of the Constitution from the rights of the sects to the rights of the individual precisely to circumvent more such conflict. 

It was an effort to bring about serious change and reform to some key elements of the Constitution that had been destabilizing the nation for nearly half a century. We published the Bill of Rights and its deployment plan and took the time to present it to the Lebanese government, parliamentary representatives, traditional parties, and organizations within civil society. More importantly, we toured many cities and towns to share it with the people, most of whom expressed support for what it meant to them as citizens. Other reform initiatives were launched as well around the same time with equally good intentions. Unfortunately, none of these were seriously pursued by the country’s powers that be, with the de facto ruling junta preferring to prolong the status quo and milk the system to the last drop.

As a result of this intransigence, sadly the fortunes of the nation would continue in a nose dive, going from bad to worse to unfathomable: Financial meltdown was soon followed by an economic depression only to be surpassed by a massive explosion that destroyed half the capital city of Beirut. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s corruption would reach unprecedented levels, with the nation not only defaulting on its obligations for the first time in its history, but it would also become energy-less, poverty-stricken, politically in a vacuum, environmentally a disaster, and militarily ruled over by an iron fist junta ready to smash any form of serious political dissent with impunity.

Today, Lebanon's case is no longer about any individual case of abuse or specific incident. It is about the collective dominance over and terrorization of an entire populace, the trampling of their human rights and personal well-being, the disturbance of their peace, and the systemic destruction of their state. Lebanon and its people have essentially been forced into an abysmal pariah nation where constitutional abuse reigns supreme and common citizens have no legal recourse to demand their rights. Property has been usurped, lives lost, and bodies maimed with not a single trial held, let alone conviction issued. The ugly truth starring us all in the face is that Lebanon has ceased to be what was once a liberal democracy in the middle east, showcasing the will of its multi-denominational people. Instead, it has become a failed state, as evidenced by its catastrophic political, socio-economic, judicial, and security meltdown.

Recognizing this has become an imperative. So has accepting the fact that the Lebanese people are unable to bring about change democratically. Lebanon's recent elections must not be seen as a democratic exercise, rather as a mere reflection of a broken sectarian system, which is gerrymandered to keep in power at all costs the same corrupt and incompetent junta and to rubber stamp its fake legitimacy time and again. With millions of protestors on the streets in Lebanon and across the world these past few years, the latest parliamentary elections still yielding a shocking 90% of parliament in the hands of the same junta that got Lebanon to its calamitous state is but an indication of the current population's inability to bring about systemic reform democratically.

And yet encouragingly, we know what the majority of Lebanese want (as expressed through multiple scientific polls) and that is fundamental reform. They are expressing that they are done with the old system, even though they may not know what system it should be replaced with. We also know that the ruling junta is refusing (and indeed has little incentive) to give in, since it means ceding many of the privileges built over the past few decades. Evidently, the junta is fine seeing more than 85% of the Lebanese population fall under the poverty line; fine with the murderous and corrupt roaming free, while the innocent victims are being interrogated and placed in horrid jails; and fine with state institutions breaking down with literally no ink or paper to print on; but the buck stops at citizens protesting for justice against corruption and mass murder. 

It is all these factors and so many more that have led me to turn 180 degrees from my previous non-interventionist stance. I now believe that the dangerous path that the ruling junta has put Lebanon on is a massive risk to the future of the nation and its people as well as to international peace. Only international intervention can turn the tide. The key question at this point is what form of international intervention are we talking about? I see three options:

The first option is the one being peddled in Lebanon by the ruling junta and traditional political parties in parliament. This option would see a national summit held somewhere to agree on the next steps needed to reactivate the country politically (and implicitly to beg the international community for economic support). This would be more or less a similar approach to the Doha Agreement of 2008. The positive element of this approach is that it is expedient and doesn’t alienate those in power. The problem with this approach, however, is that it fundamentally changes nothing and keeps in power the same folks who got Lebanon to its current catastrophic state. With so few locally or internationally willing to trust the junta anymore to do any reform, let alone curb corruption, many believe that this option won’t change much except extend a lifeline to the junta itself. Therefore, to many in Lebanon and abroad, this has become a non-starter.

The second option is diametrically opposite to the first one and aims to invoke the UN’s Chapter 7, calling for the complete dismemberment of the Lebanese state (together with the ruling junta) and to replace it with transitional UN guardianship. This would be followed by a Constitutional Assembly that creates a new Lebanese social contract meant to get the nation back on track with a new system and a new set of leaders. This option is increasingly being discussed within Lebanese expat circles and has been promoted by prominent expats like Ralph Nader and James Zoghby. The positive element is in its clear cut and dried approach that does away with the old and ushers in the new. The downside is that it may face stiff opposition from within Lebanon as well as from outside. Inside of Lebanon, many fear it could recreate the violent dynamics of the early 2000's. Others fear that a Constitutional Assembly would take away sectarian community privileges. Others still would likely oppose its legitimacy, citing recent election results as the true will of the Lebanese people. Internationally, opposition may come from the UN proper and particularly members of the Security Council who may not want to go as far as Chapter 7 just yet on grounds that no UN members will be willing to foot the bill of any form of military or administrative presence or guardianship at a time when COVID and the war in Ukraine have emptied most coffers.

There may be a third option-one that takes elements from both previous options. This option would have the UN offer to mediate to reform the Lebanese state through an instrument that circumvents a Constitutional Assembly (eg. a Bill of Rights) with Constitutional amendments that deliver the needed reforms. This would necessarily have to be presented and passed by the current Lebanese parliament with the acquiescence of all current parties, lending it unquestionable legitimacy. But what would be the incentive for the locals to do this? Primarily, it would be a “nuclear” economic threat of a full financial embargo on Lebanon that puts a stop to any expat remittances, international aid or loans. Invoking this threat would immediately checkmate an already teetering ruling junta into accepting because without expat remittances, Lebanon would not be able to survive. Significant pressure would quickly pile up for any hangers on within the ruling junta, with most realizing the unsustainability of the regime to stay in power. Even the thorny issue of Hezbollah arms would be put on the table as part of the once-and-for-all resolution that the UN could table, providing protection to Lebanon whilst giving equal rights to the citizens whom Hezbollah claims to protect. Essentially, by providing protection and rights, the Lebanese state would render intermediation by these internal actors unnecessary. Why would the international community accept to undertake this "nuclear" economic option? Because it may be  the simplest option and one that has been tested successfully in other nations like South Africa. Without firing a single bullet, the international community brought about the downfall of apartheid. This option would therefore not cost much to implement, and limits the ruling junta's option to a UN-sponsored reform plan; or else for it to face an international blockade coupled with the wrath of the local population. This option could also more likely garner general assembly support, circumventing the Security Council and any potential vetoes on the case of Chapter 7.

Over the past few years, crisis after another have provided clear evidence that the Lebanese people are powerless to face up to the unscrupulous sectarian ruling junta that has taken over their nation. Lebanon now needs the international community, in as much as the international community will need a Lebanon that is peaceful, liberal, and multi-denominational—emitting a message of peace and co-existence to the world. Lebanon being situated a mere 90 miles away from European shores, the international community needs to ask itself the following question: Does it want the Lebanon that has influenced the world through its co-founding of the UN, the drafting of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, through Nobel laureates, authors, teachers, engineers, doctors, designers, dancers, and musicians? Or does it want a Lebanon that is a pariah failed state, which exports misery, drugs, violence, and terrorism? Regardless of the world’s preoccupation with other conflict regions, leaving things to chance or to the goodwill of the ruling Lebanese junta would be callous and irresponsible.

In conclusion, it is now time for the international community to step up and step into Lebanon, demanding a hard reset in the stricken nation. It is time to impose the will of the Lebanese people and the international community to help shift the disastrous trajectory to one that brings Lebanon back to its former ideals. It is time to reform its Constitutional system, giving equal rights to all its citizens, eliminating divisive sectarian intermediation, which fuels the junta. It is time to rejoin Lebanon to the international community and for citizen rights to align squarely with the UNDHR. That is what the majority of Lebanese citizens have expressed that they want. Will the international community help them realize it and in the process regain the Lebanon the world wants?

What no judiciary means to Lebanon

Disturbing scenes have been surfacing on TV with protesting parents of the victims of the Aug 4, 2020 Beirut explosion, being roughed up by Lebanese police and security agencies. This was coupled by the Lebanese minister of justice himself accusing the parents of the victims as being agents receiving money in order to protest against the lack of truth and justice in the killing of their own families!? All the while, former ministers and officials who have been subpoenaed to appear in front of the investigating magistrate have flouted the law and refused to appear, with the magistrate himself now being condemned as ineffective. Efforts appear well underway to replace him.

At first view, this may appear to be the Lebanese ruling regime simply trying to save its own from prosecution. “It’s just a couple of ministers. It’s just politics, what’s the big deal?” they ask. But is it really? Or is what’s at stake much larger, like ripping the fabric of the democratic nation of Lebanon and risking its entire existence?

Let us start with the structure of modern democracies. As we have grown to know them, they typically  have three key elements to them. The people themselves, who are the source of all power. Then we have those they elect to represent them to create laws on their behalf in a chamber of deputies or parliament. And then there is the elected executives tasked with implementing these laws in a cabinet. These three elements while necessary, are insufficient because in themselves they do not answer the question of what would happen when differences arise within society, or between society and the elected bodies of government? For that, there is a fourth critical element meant to pull the fabric all together: The judiciary. Its job is to make sure it adjudicates rights when conflicts emerge. The judiciary makes its rulings based on the law of the land applying it equally to all affected citizens or parties. In so doing, the judiciary essentially allows society to feel that come what may, fairness and justice will prevail hence keeping the democracy intact.

The question that begs itself is what happens when this judicial “fabric” rips or ceases to be? In some cases, people will feel inclined to take the law into their own hands (resulting in anarchy or chaos). In other cases, leaders or regimes no longer have any checks over their power, doing away with any form of legal accountability, hence becoming an autocracy. This means the powers will be able to do as they please to the people, which includes usurping their rights, stealing their hard-earned savings, and even taking away their lives when it suits them. This sounds hauntingly similar to what is currently transpiring in Lebanon. 

When such seismic change occurs, it ceases to be an isolated case relating to this judge or that procedure. It becomes systemic; and its implications reverberate at all levels, in all sectors of society, and even internationally. No matter how much the ruling regime tries to paint over it, the rip in the fabric, is there for everyone to see, and react to. As an example, if some ministers refuse to appear in front of a magistrate in contempt of court orders, and they go unpunished for a perpetrated crime, what stops a bereaved citizen of taking the law into their own hands and imposing injury on such a minister or any other citizen? Would they be in their right to do so or not? Could they be held accountable, while the minister responsible for the original crime is rejecting to appear in front of justice? Similarly, if a governing regime violates its own people and their rights, can they legitimately have claims against third parties (local or international) who may do the same?

In the case of the explosion of Beirut, many sectors were affected, not least of which the insurance sector, the financial sector, the security sector, the transportation sector, the agricultural sector, among many others. If such a massive calamity were to go unresolved, how will the liabilities of such sectors be resolved? Who will assume responsibility for the lives lost? Will affected asset owners be compensated appropriately by insurance companies, or will their unjustified failure to pay be held also in contempt of the court? What about the destruction of the business livelihood and employment? And what of any economic contracts that may have been broken due to the destruction of the ports? 

Beirut’s calamity being among the largest non-nuclear explosions in the history of mankind occurred at such massive dimensions that it simply cannot be swept under a rug as if nothing has occurred. Aside from the lives lost, and the bodily injuries incurred, there are tens of billions of Dollars at stake and awaiting judicial adjudication. If Lebanon’s judiciary is not allowed to proceed unhindered, it will send the strongest of signals to all the Lebanese, the Lebanese expats, as well as the international community that Lebanon has completely lost its rule of law and as such is a failed democratic state. What then? Would anyone be willing to enter into any form of a contract with a Lebanese firm or the Lebanese government? And if they aren’t willing to, then where does it leave the nation as a whole and its ability to claw itself back from the abyss?

At a time when the Lebanese people have lost their livelihood, their savings, and their economy, they are desperately trying to grasp for any last straw of hope. Unfortunately, what the Lebanese ruling regime is doing by undermining the judiciary is essentially ripping among the nation’s last remaining fabric lines that could knit a viable state; and instead is driving Lebanon heads-on into a failed status. Bottom line, if there is no judiciary, there can really be no Lebanon.

Policies not Politics- What The Lebanese People Really Want to Hear

In a recent debate on Lebanese television, the host had a representative from the Change Movement (Change) facing off with one from the regime. The incumbent representative responded most questions with answers that hid behind political jargon and excuses, such as “the broken political system has not allowed us”, “there is too much corruption”, or “we are actually reformists and are on the side of change”. The Change representative tried to argue using a little of political history and a somewhat light dose of policy. It quickly became clear the strengths and weaknesses of each of their positions.

On the one hand, the regime representative found it hard to defend their record; and under current circumstances, it is not hard to see why. Lebanon’s multiple disasters in the past handful of years speak for themselves: An economic calamity that has seen the economic output fall by more than 50% and the currency by more than 90%, was soon followed by a financial collapse, bankrupting the entire banking sector with depositors unable to withdraw their funds. This in turn caused a social deterioration with more than 80% of the population falling into poverty, and hundreds of thousands migrating to safer shores. As if that were not enough, a nuclear sized explosion destroyed a third of the capital city Beirut, killing hundreds and destroying tens of thousands of homes—the crime has so far gone unpunished without a single regime leader held responsible. With such an indefensible record, the tactics being used by the regime seem to focus on politicizing any debate and clobbering audiences with wild evasions of any sort of policy, let alone record.

On the other hand, in the above-mentioned discussion, the Change representative’s debate strategy at times seemed reticent and at others too polite, delving unnecessarily into irrelevant political science and ideology (left versus right), while not having clear and concise messaging to differentiate positions or establish audience trust. At no time did the Change’s representative attack the incumbent on the regime’s record; and very little was given in the way of policy. Worse yet, the representative fell into the trap of a cynical political discussion against an opponent who seemed vastly more versed and experienced at it.

In the end, the entire debate seemed unnecessary or relevant, particularly for the elections. If anything, it probably became confusing to the audience, who may be forgiven for drawing equally negative conclusions about both sides. In this sense, the winner of the debate would have to be seen as the incumbent regime, not for winning the debate, but rather for not losing it, having managed to drag the Change’s representative down into an opaque and muddy swamp.

An important lesson can be drawn here: If Change is to have any breakthrough results in the elections, it has to come more prepared to counter the regime’s primarily political strategy. To do that, it needs to deploy debate tactics that don’t cheaply give away two very important tactical advantages, while simultaneously making sure to circumvent at all costs a third, which is to the advantage of the regime. What are these three tactics that could make up a winning election for Change?

The first tactic is to stay on message by attacking the regime for its failed record. There is no policy maker on this earth capable of defending the incumbent regime’s disastrous state of affairs, corruption, and incompetence. Common political excuses to such a record are falling flat on voters who are struggling and need to hear solutions not excuses. Failed policies hidden behind political jargon don’t feed mouths, and Change needs to highlight this. This tactic should be considered as “low hanging fruit”, and all that is needed is preparation to have specific talking points and discipline to stay on message.

The second tactic has to be to present a program and a plan that are clear, concise, consistent, and achievable. There is no need to over promise or exaggerate. Everyone with reasonable knowledge knows that Lebanon’s economic and social problems cannot be resolved overnight. Sticking to policies that focus on the most essential and the most doable should be enough to establish trust with the voters. Striking a balance between being candid and being optimistic will sway voters from incumbents who have been promising for decades while achieving nothing.

The third tactic is to avoid engaging on a battleground that is clearly to the advantage of the regime—and that is Lebanese politics. Considering that the country has been under the rule of the same incumbent clique for well over 30 years, it is quite implausible for anyone to expect new candidates to be able to beat these entrenched politicians at their tried and tested game—that of sectarian politics. Rather, the tactic here should be to evade any such engagement, refocusing on the first two tactics, meaning questioning the record and presenting alternative policies. Falling into a trap of endless circular political debate is pointless, laden with risks, and presents no benefits for the Change movement.

The combined strategy can therefore be thought of “Attack the policy record”, “Present achievable policies”, and “Avoid murky politics”. Unfortunately, after listening to the debate earlier this week, Change failed on all the three tactics: First, it did not attack the regime enough on its record, second it did not present clear or concise policy alternatives, and third it fell into the trap of political mud slinging against a regime that has been at it for 30 or more years. The net result is one of a lost debate, or in the very least one that was not won.

As parliamentary election season heats up, the Change candidates will have to up their game quickly and deploy a winning strategy through smarter tactics that make voters want to support them. For that to happen, the voter’s bottom line is this: They want to hear achievable policies not murky politics. The sooner Change realizes this and can show the people that it does through clear debate, the sooner will it be given their vote of confidence.

Sunni Community Might Be Pathway to Lebanese Nationhood and Citizenry

There are some in Lebanon who would like to believe that the Sunni leadership situation in the country is precarious, potentially leading the community to disorganization and disarray. They somehow equate the declared exit of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri from public life to a vacuum in the “traditional Sunni leadership” (Za3ame Suniyye). While they point to other known figures within the Sunni community and others emerging, they claim that none rise to the level; and they evidence recent polls, which found that no one had favorability ratings higher than 3%, except for Saad Hariri at a paltry 18%.

Several questions beg themselves. 

First: What does “traditional Sunni leadership” (Za3ame Suniyye) really mean? To answer this question, perhaps we need to look at Lebanese post-independence history and the main figures from the community. Interestingly, what we find is that the Sunni community does not have as much static or enduring “zaim” figures as other communities. As an example, Lebanese Maronites have had only 12 Presidents, Shiites 7 Speakers, while Sunnis have had 26 different Prime Ministers—18 of them from totally different families, most of whom have exited politics altogether. Families that had more than one figure, like the Solh, Salam, and Karame families, barely lasted more than a generation. Arguably, Rafik Hariri attempted to become a Za'im, but since his assassination, much of that leadership has dissipated. His son and successor Saad recently exited the scene; and his other son, Bahaa, who now seems to aspire for a community leadership role recently polled at less than 2%. The lack of political dynasties and the shuffling of leadership in the Sunni community both cast a shadow on the notion --or even existential importance-- of a “traditional Sunni leader” or Za’im.

It is as telling to try and understand why there hasn’t been dynastic dominance within the community as say in the Druze or Shiite communities. Several reasons may explain this, among which is the community’s relatively diversified centers of power between the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida (all of which has now expanded to other regional cities like Dubai, Riyadh, and Doha). The abundance of educated families from mercantile and banking backgrounds has been a fertile ground for leaders, which stood in stark contrast to feudal backgrounds in some Lebanese communities in the mountains and rural areas, restricting options. Related to this is the fact that traditional existential insecurity, present in other Lebanese communities never really existed within the Sunni community, given the Turkish and Arab hinterland, both of which are Sunni. This basically negated the need for "protection" strongmen, replacing them instead with institutions and traditional families. With the exception of Rafik Hariri, who tried for a limited time but was hindered, no single family or figure could truly claim dominance over the Sunni community since independence.

And so, when people warn of the absence of “traditional Sunni Leadership” as an existential threat to the community, they are actually breaking away from the more politically diversified and somewhat egalitarian history of the community, which could be seen as a source of strength not weakness. The diversity and security of the Sunni community has permitted its transitory leaders to carry a nationalist agenda, first in the establishment of the state, then in its development, and ultimately in trying to keep it together. Several would pay the ultimate price for doing so. The first post-Independence Prime Minister Riad Solh was assassinated for his Lebanese nationalist stance against the Syrian Social Nationalists. Rashid Karame paid with his life because he refused to allow projects to be built at a time when they could have fractured the nation further. And Hariri himself met the same fate because of his wish to disengage Lebanon from regional conflict.

Yet all the while, the Lebanese Sunni community carried on forward, never needing to establish ideological parties, carry arms, fight during the civil war, or carry sectarian cleansing in any of their coastal cities.

And so, at a time when the entire nation finds itself in flux and traditional community leadership models (za3amat) are beginning to fall by the wayside, is it the time for Sunnis to attempt to search for one of their own, who might carry the Sunni banner into the future? Or is it perhaps time to double down on the more diversified nationalist approach, tapping the educated resources within the community and putting it at the disposal of the entire nation?

More than ever before, it seems Lebanon is in dire need today of a paradigm shift that takes the nation from a failing divisive sectarian state to one that unifies all citizens, giving them equal rights and privileges regardless of sect, gender, region, or race. Surely, the more democratized representation model of the past century of the Lebanese Sunni community can be put to good use to attempt this and serve the entire nation. 

Indeed because they don't have the same constraints as other communities, emerging Sunni leaders may find themselves upon a historic opportunity to change the discourse from that of sect to that of nation, serving as an example to all the other communities. 

What this also means is that much more so than needing a “traditional Sunni leader”, what the community and indeed Lebanon truly needs at the moment are community leaders that can help move them away from their ever-dwindling sectarian privileges and rather guide them towards a nationalist approach that eliminates privileges altogether, focusing instead on the citizen’s needs and rights. 

Will such leaders be given a chance by the community? Lebanon’s future might very well depend on it.