Wissam S. Yafi, February 17, 2011
Throughout the Egyptian uprising, President Obama and his administration played a balancing act trying not to alienate their autocratic regional allies, while simultaneously not opposing the will of the Egyptian people. So far, this approach seems to have worked. The Egyptian regime fell, other allies in the region didn’t (not yet at least), the popular revolution remained relatively peaceful, and the US did not come out on the wrong side. The question now is: Will this approach continue to work as the Egyptian democracy begins the more challenging process of building itself?
Throughout the Egyptian uprising, President Obama and his administration played a balancing act trying not to alienate their autocratic regional allies, while simultaneously not opposing the will of the Egyptian people. So far, this approach seems to have worked. The Egyptian regime fell, other allies in the region didn’t (not yet at least), the popular revolution remained relatively peaceful, and the US did not come out on the wrong side. The question now is: Will this approach continue to work as the Egyptian democracy begins the more challenging process of building itself?
The answer to this question depends on the assumption being made. If, for instance, one assumes that the source behind the revolutions was simply ideological- a desire for freedom- then the fence approach may indeed be sufficient. In this case, the Obama administration would best not take center stage and instead deploy more subtle policies and behind the scenes support. This ideological assumption, however, appears incomplete at best as it fails to explain why there is still discontent on the streets of Cairo and Tunis even after the autocrats have left?
A more compelling assumption perhaps is that the source of the revolution was a tipping point reached due to several deteriorating conditions- most salient of which is the economic situation (Unemployment, poverty, corruption…). If this were the case, one is bound to reach a different policy prescription since things are likely to get worse before they get any better, threatening the whole enterprise.
For instance, businesses that were once associated with the regime may close their doors in the short term; and the hated economic oligarchy could flee with its money- a lot of it (Both things recently occurred in Tunisia). In an effort to curtail inefficiencies, the government is likely to cut down on its spending and its employment (In Egypt alone there are more than 6 million public employees, which is twice the size of the US federal government). And so, many jobs are likely to be shed before new ones are created. Poverty conditions are probably not going to improve in the short term either. Manifestations over work conditions continue to occur in Egypt’s airport and Suez Canal aggravating the situation. If this situation is allowed to spiral out of control, people may soon begin to question what they got themselves into. The fledgling Egyptian democracy may find itself at risk of leaving an ideological void ripe for the picking. For all those fear mongers, it may lead to the nightmare scenario.
What should the US administration do about it? For one thing, it must recognize that sitting idle or making subtle moves will not help. Once a regime has fallen, euphoria may indeed carry the nation for a few weeks, months at most. The business of building democracy and reforming, however, will take years as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown. Unfortunately, between euphoria and a consolidated democracy lies a big chasm full of uncertainty and violence. Doing nothing during this period is a risky policy if not foolhardy- especially if we consider Egypt to be the Arab world’s centerpiece.
What the US needs to introduce is nothing short of a Peaceful Transition to Democracy Doctrine acting as a safety net for those democratizing Arab nations who request it. It needs to be honest and overt, showing Arab masses that the United States stands behind its democratic principles. This doctrine needs to provide substantial economic and institutional aid to help democratizing countries like Egypt, while simultaneously carrying a big stick against any sinister movements or coup attempts.
The Doctrine will serve multiple key US interests. First, it will secure these nations and keep them as strong allies. Second, it will keep the extremist elements at bay. Third, it will serve to consolidate success stories for others in the region to emulate at a fraction of what a potential war might have cost. Fourth, it would help win the hearts and minds of many Arabs and change the age-old perception that the US is hypocritically only for the autocratic regimes and Arab resources and against the Arab people.
Truman and Reagan’s anti-communism doctrines once helped Europe face a much more menacing and dangerous foe. In their day, these doctrines were all that stood between the free world and a red one. Today, a Doctrine of Peaceful Transition to Democracy supported with generous economic and institutional aid may be what stands between true democracies in the Arab world and a chasm into a dangerous unknown.
If ever there was a time for the United States to be positively engaged within the region, now is that time. Let us not shirk away from the opportunity to help, not when it is firmly in our interest to do so.
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