As the economy continues to deteriorate precipitously in Lebanon, many are expecting Prime Minister Diab’s government to collapse. It garners little support from the people, from the international community, and recently barely much from those who put it in power in the first place. Considering that this government, like those before it, has been unable to present any convincing solutions to Lebanon’s predicament, what will be the options? Short of an outright coup leading to civil war, there appears to be three peaceful alternatives being discussed.
The first is basically more of the same. Already there is talk of bringing back former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to power. What exactly he would do that is different from a handful of months ago is not clear. After all Hariri’s government repeatedly failed to deliver on promises made to both the people and the international community. Furthermore, he and his party have held the Premiership for the better part of thirty years; and few could dispute the economic mismanagement that ensued. Objectively, there is plenty of blame to spread around the entire political class not just his lot. However, his primary credentials used to be mustering economic support from the Gulf and the International community. Unfortunately, even during better times, it proved to be insufficient to plug the economic suction by an insatiable establishment. What would be the likelihood of success now? Slim at best.
The second alternative involves a temporary reduced military government, akin to that of 1952 when Army General Fouad Chehab took the helm to keep the peace. In the midst of a global cold war, the reasons back then were more ideological than economic, and Chehab’s firm but fair presence subdued matters until elections could be held. But the general didn’t have to deal with anything near as economically challenging as today’s crisis. Considering that the protests have been mostly peaceful and related to living conditions, the root problem does not seem to be that of security to be dealt with as such. Plus, one needs to keep in mind that the latest three Lebanese Presidents have all been army generals; and none have managed to solve the economic slide. So how exactly would having more military thrown into the mix help diffuse Lebanon’s current predicament, except as it were to call for new elections?
This brings us to the third option. The revolution has been proposing an independent government that is capable of presenting to the Lebanese people and to the international community an alternative future for the nation based on true reform. In most democracies, considering the state the country is in, this would have been considered a no-brainer. Not so in Lebanon, where those in power still seem to be in denial. Since they control the Presidency and the parliament—the two institutions necessary to bring forth a desired shuffle in cabinet—their preference has been a beholden cabinet keeping their interests intact, as per Diab’s government now and Hariri’s before him. Of course, the level of deterioration has them worried because by controlling all elements of the government, they also shoulder all the responsibility. Therefore, somewhat counterintuitively, there is a chance that the incumbents could opt to take a calculated risk, bringing independent elements spread their mounting liability.
A national unity government is likely to be there first go-to, as it has been for generations. If the revolution or independents acquiesce and join a unity government, there is nothing to suggest that they would fare any better than previous ones, which witnessed incoherence, delays and corruption. Meaning, such a government would not likely muster enough of the necessary reform, and ultimately would fail. However, unlike previous governments, which the revolution did not want, support, or participate in; the cost of participation in failure for independents or affiliates of the revolution would be substantial, because now they have to share responsibility. This is therefore unlikely to be a choice for the Independents.
What if the Revolution is all of a sudden allowed to form its own government without any prior agreements or conditions by the incumbents? In such a surprise scenario, those in power, through their control of the Presidency and parliament, could still block it at every curve, causing it to fail to meet the aspirations of the people. In fact, one might expect that incumbents may try even harder to force it to fail, because success would expose further their bad practices during all these past decades. Under this scenario, while initially it could diffuse tensions, in the medium term the cost of failure to the Lebanese revolution would be incalculable—and incumbents will pounce.
Is there a solution then to forming the next government to avoid the above failure traps? And how to signal to the world that Lebanon is genuinely capable of reforming itself, and hence merits international support? What if the revolution were ceded cabinet power, with pre-negotiated terms and tangible commitments made by powerful incumbent elements with oversight by the international community? What if only after these commitments had been accepted and fully committed to, would the independents accept to form a government and begin their marathon reformist agenda? And what if parliament monitored this government as opposed to beholding it? Is this perhaps worth a try? If not, the current political class is welcome to continue holding onto power. History will gladly give them all due credit for all that ensues.
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