Does Lebanon’s economic plan represent true reform?

 Published on Annahar on 10-05-2020 | 16:34 

Lebanon’s cabinet recently announced an economic plan that focused on lifting Lebanon out of its current financial meltdown. Welcomed by some as an effort to at least do something, serious questions remain as to whether such a plan is capable of addressing the country’s mounting problems.

That Lebanon needs a reform plan is unquestionable. The Lebanese have been demanding it; so has the international community as a precondition for any support. It is therefore understandable that the government would want to present such a plan in an effort to provide a semblance of policy. The problem with the plan however is that it is focused uniquely on economic aspects and barely addresses underlying problems. As economists are paraded on TV and social media to analyze the plan, there is a more basic question that is not being asked: Does economic reform equate to the true reform needed? To answer this question, we need to look at three factors.

Political Will

Economic reform without a political will to reform is like trying to fly a plane without an engine- it won’t be going anywhere soon; and if it were already flying, it will come crashing down at some point. True economic reform requires political will. In most cases, this means that those in power for decades would be willing to give up privileges that they’ve enjoyed at the people’s expense. As a small example, curbing the fiscal deficit means the political class would cease corrupt contracts, appointing cronies, running institutions dry, or insisting on policies that may hurt the plan (nationally or internationally). At this point, there is no evidence whatsoever that Lebanon’s political class is willing to do any of this. In fact, it appears that they are quite content at keeping the status quo, continuing tried and failed methods, and leaning on a desperate population to pay for the mismanagement.

Comprehensive Multi-disciplinary Reform

The economic plan is primarily focused on financial restructuring and only pays lip service to other key necessary components that solve underlying problems. Let us remember that previous economic plans, as this one, were also written by heavyweight consultants from Booz Allen, McKinsey, as this latest one by Lazard. All contained good ideas; and arguably few technical economic glitches. What they lacked is a multi-disciplinary reform approach that would have brought the necessary political, economic, social, judicial, institutional, and perhaps even environmental factors to buttress the reform plan. After all, how does one solve the electricity problem, without reforming social, judicial, and institutional elements? How does one turn Lebanon into a net exporter if the wrong educational, labor, and judicial elements are missing? The current economic plan was not designed to provide comprehensive reform; and as a result, will inevitably live in isolation and be constrained by Lebanon’s political idiosyncrasies.

Popular Support

The dilemma with popular support is while it is direly needed for any and all types of serious reform, it is inversely proportional to the degree of pain that the population will have to bear. Meaning, the more fundamental and painful the reform, the less likely popular support would be given. As it stands, the government is demanding a laundry list that will most likely include devaluation, capital controls, haircuts, and taxes—all without giving the population anything in return. The single most important question that the people need to ask this government and the political class standing behind it is: What are you giving the people in return for all the pain and what are the underlying institutional, let alone constitutional, guarantees? If one considers that in Lebanon the historical average life of a cabinet is about eighteen months; and that there is almost no continuity, one would quickly conclude that the value of this plan is hardly worth the ink on its paper. This plan at face value is nothing more than a plan.

In conclusion, Lebanon’s problems are deep, and the solutions required will need to reach the very same level of depth to have any effect. Government’s economic varnish no longer covers Lebanese political class rot. Lebanon’s current meltdown is so calamitous and will be so costly on the Lebanese population that it makes any swift economic plan and PowerPoint presentations futile. This plan, as the ones before it, have all led to little, if any, execution or fulfillment of promises. In this, I would echo the Prime Minister’s words when he said “Mabrouk Lebanon” (Congratulations Lebanon). But I would not do it based on expected results; rather the hope that in all the hopelessness, the Lebanese will finally realize that only true comprehensive reform, which includes political, economic, social, and judicial structural changes can turn the tide and bring the nation back to safe shores.

Wissam Yafi is an author, technologist and economic development practitioner. He has written books on democracy in Lebanon and the Middle East, with "Inevitable Democracy in the Arab World" published by Palgrave MacMillan. Yafi has lectured at Harvard, Stanford, and Georgetown. His latest research centers on how a Bill of Rights can serve as a counterweight instrument to correct dysfunctional constitutions in Lebanon and the Middle East. Yafi is a Lebanese expat and graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

The Rise of Citizenry: The emerging philosophy behind the Lebanese revolution

Published by Annahar 10-06-2020 | 16:37 

What best describes the philosophical underpinnings of the Lebanese Revolution? Is it some traditional ideology akin to Capitalism or Communism? Or perhaps it is some form of re-emerging Nationalism, possibly at odds with unrelenting Globalization. What about age-old dichotomies such as democracy and autocracy, both being challenged by Populism? In this context of utter ideological confusion, it is not hard to see why some analysts have struggled to determine a precise ideology to pin onto the Lebanese Revolution. 

But why haven’t any of these traditional ideologies been able to serve the Lebanese Revolution? Some introspection shows that unbridled Capitalism has failed the Lebanese people by leading to endemic corruption and seizure of public goods. Demanding more of it would be nonsensical and unsustainable . It is equally out of the question that a people with such a deeply enterprising history would harken back to Communism, whose train left the station decades ago. As for Globalization, the Lebanese people are arguably among the most far-reaching in the world with a disproportional Diaspora. And yet, the Lebanese identity has held steady and indeed has been growing steadily. While roaming the world, culturally the Lebanese wish to remain proud of their flag, art, cuisine, architecture, music, jokes, and more ... Politically, the Lebanese are among the most democratic in the region, but have paid the price for such openness in a violently autocratic neighborhood. ‘If only we had a dictator to clean things up!’ some like to say. Questionable at best, if one considers that the last three Presidents have all been army generals—all failing to reverse the country’s dwindling fortunes. 

So, where does this leave the Revolution’s philosophical foundation? While there are a variety of focus areas among different revolutionary groups, there is one underlying theme that has been unifying everyone: Elevating the Lebanese citizen and their rights above all else in the state. This can be summarized succinctly as Citizenry. Citizenry basically aims to pull everyone together under the aegis of equality and fraternity—unlike Populism, which aims to divide populations along ethnic or religious lines. Also unlike Sectarianism, which typically elevate the leader to cultish proportions, Citizenry raises the ordinary citizen above any other consideration through the equal application of the law. Aiming to lift the Lebanese citizen through Citizenry is perhaps the ideology that best represents the motivation driving the Lebanese Revolution from South to North, East to West. 

Citizenry is a philosophy that may not always oppose the traditional ideologies. Rather, it sees them through the prism of how they may or may not help the citizen. As an example, the Revolution has been against corruption and against the corrupt, not against any Lebanese citizen for being a capitalist. The Revolution has been for free enterprise, but against the theft of public or citizen property. It has been for the rule of law but against those who apply justice sporadically for their own benefit. It has been for the freedom of religion, but against using religious sectarianism to usurp power or use it to apply unequal citizenship. It has been for the right of self-defense, but against those who intimidate other fellow citizens with arms. To its credit, while elements of the Revolution have tried to take it in certain undesirably dogmatic directions, in its collective wisdom, the Lebanese Revolution has maintained a consistent line not to exclude anyone and to focus instead on demands that empower citizens to get their rights back. From this perspective, the primary objective of Citizenry is based on assuring ALL the Lebanese of equal rights. Any vision, strategy, or policy contrary to this ideology is considered anathema to the Lebanese Revolution’s ideology.

But if the ideology of the Lebanese Revolution is that of Citizenry, how to demand it and later apply it? Citizenry happens through peaceful, democratic, and legal means by demanding a list of rights that the citizens wish to assert on themselves and those they elect to govern. This list of rights is typically referred to as a Citizen’s Bill of Rights, which is a constitutional tool that fundamentally shifts the balance of power of any nation in favor of the citizen along multiple fronts: Political, economic, social, judicial, and even environmental. A Bill of Rights is generally the primary tool that Citizenry uses to elevate the citizen to a level capable of holding their state accountable. As a tool, it can also provide serious reform helping the state eliminate archaic institutions such as sectarianism, replacing it with equal opportunity and justice. 

Detractors of the Lebanese Revolution who represent the traditional parties have been incapable of understanding the Lebanese Revolution’s philosophy of Citizenry because their context and ideas are those of an age of corruption, cynicism, division, and violence—all of which shackle them to an undesirable past, while blinding them of the potential future. The Lebanese Revolution represents an alternative future. Its Citizenry ideology places the Lebanese citizen at the apex of the state, not at its bottom. It can protect and indeed empower the Lebanese citizens to overcome existing challenges while preparing them to face a globalized future. Citizenry provides the Lebanese a framework based on absolute equality and fairness; and a tool such as a Citizen Bill of Rights to effectuate the change. By fortifying its nucleus, the common citizen, Citizenry promises to strengthen Lebanon at a time when all other failed ideologies have been doing nothing less than destroy it.

To Form or Not to Form a New Lebanese Government- That is the Question

As the economy continues to deteriorate precipitously in Lebanon, many are expecting Prime Minister Diab’s government to collapse. It garners little support from the people, from the international community, and recently barely much from those who put it in power in the first place. Considering that this government, like those before it, has been unable to present any convincing solutions to Lebanon’s predicament, what will be the options? Short of an outright coup leading to civil war, there appears to be three peaceful alternatives being discussed.

The first is basically more of the same. Already there is talk of bringing back former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to power. What exactly he would do that is different from a handful of months ago is not clear. After all Hariri’s government repeatedly failed to deliver on promises made to both the people and the international community. Furthermore, he and his party have held the Premiership for the better part of thirty years; and few could dispute the economic mismanagement that ensued. Objectively, there is plenty of blame to spread around the entire political class not just his lot. However, his primary credentials used to be mustering economic support from the Gulf and the International community. Unfortunately, even during better times, it proved to be insufficient to plug the economic suction by an insatiable establishment. What would be the likelihood of success now? Slim at best.

The second alternative involves a temporary reduced military government, akin to that of 1952 when Army General Fouad Chehab took the helm to keep the peace. In the midst of a global cold war, the reasons back then were more ideological than economic, and Chehab’s firm but fair presence subdued matters until elections could be held. But the general didn’t have to deal with anything near as economically challenging as today’s crisis. Considering that the protests have been mostly peaceful and related to living conditions, the root problem does not seem to be that of security to be dealt with as such. Plus, one needs to keep in mind that the latest three Lebanese Presidents have all been army generals; and none have managed to solve the economic slide. So how exactly would having more military thrown into the mix help diffuse Lebanon’s current predicament, except as it were to call for new elections?

This brings us to the third option. The revolution has been proposing an independent government that is capable of presenting to the Lebanese people and to the international community an alternative future for the nation based on true reform. In most democracies, considering the state the country is in, this would have been considered a no-brainer. Not so in Lebanon, where those in power still seem to be in denial. Since they control the Presidency and the parliament—the two institutions necessary to bring forth a desired shuffle in cabinet—their preference has been a beholden cabinet keeping their interests intact, as per Diab’s government now and Hariri’s before him. Of course, the level of deterioration has them worried because by controlling all elements of the government, they also shoulder all the responsibility. Therefore, somewhat counterintuitively, there is a chance that the incumbents could opt to take a calculated risk, bringing independent elements spread their mounting liability.

A national unity government is likely to be there first go-to, as it has been for generations. If the revolution or independents acquiesce and join a unity government, there is nothing to suggest that they would fare any better than previous ones, which witnessed incoherence, delays and corruption. Meaning, such a government would not likely muster enough of the necessary reform, and ultimately would fail. However, unlike previous governments, which the revolution did not want, support, or participate in; the cost of participation in failure for independents or affiliates of the revolution would be substantial, because now they have to share responsibility. This is therefore unlikely to be a choice for the Independents.

What if the Revolution is all of a sudden allowed to form its own government without any prior agreements or conditions by the incumbents? In such a surprise scenario, those in power, through their control of the Presidency and parliament, could still block it at every curve, causing it to fail to meet the aspirations of the people. In fact, one might expect that incumbents may try even harder to force it to fail, because success would expose further their bad practices during all these past decades. Under this scenario, while initially it could diffuse tensions, in the medium term the cost of failure to the Lebanese revolution would be incalculable—and incumbents will pounce.

Is there a solution then to forming the next government to avoid the above failure traps? And how to signal to the world that Lebanon is genuinely capable of reforming itself, and hence merits international support? What if the revolution were ceded cabinet power, with pre-negotiated terms and tangible commitments made by powerful incumbent elements with oversight by the international community? What if only after these commitments had been accepted and fully committed to, would the independents accept to form a government and begin their marathon reformist agenda? And what if parliament monitored this government as opposed to beholding it? Is this perhaps worth a try? If not, the current political class is welcome to continue holding onto power. History will gladly give them all due credit for all that ensues.

Wissam Yafi is an author, technologist and economic development practitioner. He has written books on democracy in Lebanon and the Middle East, with "Inevitable Democracy in the Arab World" published by Palgrave MacMillan. Yafi has lectured at Harvard, Stanford, and Georgetown. His latest research centers on how a Bill of Rights can serve as a counterweight instrument to correct dysfunctional constitutions in Lebanon and the Middle East. Yafi is a Lebanese expat and graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

Separating Fact from Fiction—Lebanon’s Train ... Backward

Published on Annahar on May 24,2020 |16:34

Lately it seems, whenever Lebanese politicians find themselves in a bind, the go-to has become to take their audience on a wild train ride of fanciful fiction. Some have promised metro transportation systems, others grand-scale highway projects, and some the elusive grand treat of 24-hour electricity! More recently the laundry list of fanciful projects has expanded to wilder claims, including massive touristic developments, offshore islands, and maglev trains—all transporting Lebanon to a prosperous future. At a time when Lebanon is in a tail-spin dive due to economic mismanagement, one first and foremost must wonder whether any of the fiction that they are peddling is justified. I should know … 

Last year, I published a new book, a novel titled Fina (KDP, 2019). My previous books on Lebanon had all been non-fictional and of a political economy nature—firmly chained to either evidence or contemporaneous analysis. For Fina, my first novel, I wanted to let my imagination roam. And so, I started chronicling the fictional life of Raja, a young Lebanese expat who left his homeland at the beginning of this century, swearing never to return. Decades later, in his golden years, he suddenly feels compelled to return home to bid a final farewell to someone he had held dear. What follows is a trip through a utopian futuristic Lebanon, utterly disassociated from the one he had left. Everything from agriculture to industry to educational institutions, historical monuments, parks, highways, tunnels, train systems, robots, all the way to responsible citizens and, yes, caring leaders governed by a bill of rights! It would leave the novel’s main character—and through him hopefully the reader—in utter astonishment, making ironic mockery of a pretty dismal present.

 Some have asked me whether it was easier to write such a whimsical science-fiction than a factual book. It was harder and took longer. The reason for this was perhaps most eloquently described by Mark Twain when he once famously said, “The difference between fiction and nonfiction is that fiction must be absolutely believable.” Meaning, while fiction could be imagined or even exaggerated, it still must be based on some facts that the reader can somehow believe or relate to. It is this intricate interlacing of fiction with fact, which makes the genre more challenging.  Presumably the same applies to all art pieces, including those being expressed by verbose Lebanese politicians. Therefore, when one hears them speak, the first question that should come to mind is whether they are touting works of non-fiction or fiction. 

If on the one hand, it is a non-fiction, then the suggestion would be for it to be presented with a healthy dose of factual evidence. As an example, if the politician presents 24/24-hour electricity plans, they should delve into the details of what, how, when, and where. And if they happened to be somehow involved in that sector before, they must explain why they had failed their nation then; and what could possibly be different now for them to merit being re-entrusted. More generally, anyone who is or has been in leadership positions has to be able to explain what exactly has changed to suddenly permit them to embark on grandiose visions, given their failures in executing much smaller tasks before.

If on the other hand, their art form is purely fictional, then out of common courtesy, they should start by noting it to their audience. They should then buildup a selection of credible facts to buttress their work of fiction. Yes, it would be nice to imagine having Caribbean islands facing the Lebanese shore, but is it climatically and architecturally viable? Is it environmentally friendly? Is it ecologically sustainable? Is it even touristically advisable? And is it financially even possible? The suspension of any such forms of justification risks shattering their illusory visions and making the whole exercise nothing more than fictional escape, kind of like my book! 

Unfortunately, it seems the more Lebanon has been deteriorating, the more detached the politician’s visions have become and the higher the balloon of fantasy, leading to a complete suspension of reality not befitting any respectable work of fiction. But why this disconnect between fact and fiction? Is it the laziness of genius—would anyone dare question Picasso for simply drawing silhouettes and challenging his viewers to fill in the colors with their imagination? Is it some naivety or the loss of touch with any semblance of reality most common in moments of psychological despair? Or is it perhaps some narcissistic survival mode switch that is willing to peddle any fictional account to cruelly detract the people from their impending hunger instead of attempting to do something about it?

Regardless of the reasons behind all their fiction, there is one irreconcilable fact in their story: No matter how much Lebanese politicians try to sell imaginary maglev trains transporting Lebanon into the future, the only trains they are leaving behind are rusted steam trains, which stopped working decades ago.

Wissam Yafi is an author, technologist and economic development practitioner. He has written books on democracy in Lebanon and the Middle East, with "Inevitable Democracy in the Arab World" published by Palgrave MacMillan. Yafi has lectured at Harvard, Stanford, and Georgetown. His latest research centers on how a Bill of Rights can serve as a counterweight instrument to correct dysfunctional constitutions in Lebanon and the Middle East. Yafi is a Lebanese expat and graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.