A National Choice: Why Lebanon Must Pursue a Plebiscite to Disarm Hezbollah Peacefully

Lebanon stands at a precipice, teetering between a fragile stability and the abyss of renewed civil strife. At the heart of this delicate balance lies a question that has haunted our nation for decades: how do we address the enduring militarization of Hezbollah, an armed group that, while deeply rooted in Lebanon’s history, presents profound challenges to state sovereignty, national security, and social cohesion?

Calls to disarm Hezbollah have grown louder, particularly as Lebanon struggles with economic collapse, political paralysis, the recent destructive war, and widespread public discontent. Yet, any proposal to forcibly strip the group of its weapons risks igniting the very conflict we seek to avoid. As history has shown, the specter of civil war looms large over such an approach, threatening to fracture our nation along sectarian lines. Instead, we must embrace a democratic, peaceful path forward—one that gives the Lebanese people a direct say in their collective destiny. A plebiscite, or nationwide referendum, on disarming Hezbollah offers the most viable and unifying solution.

The Risks of Forceful Disarmament

Lebanon’s past is a testament to the devastating consequences of internal conflict. The civil war from 1975 to 1990 scarred generations, leaving deep divisions that persist to this day. Forceful attempts to disarm Hezbollah could easily reignite these wounds, particularly given the group’s significant support base within the Shia community and its portrayal of itself as a defender of Lebanon against external threats.

Moreover, Hezbollah’s ties to regional actors complicate any forceful disarmament strategy, especially at a time when it could be pointed out that Israel continues to occupy a sizeable portion of South Lebanon. Such a move would not only provoke internal backlash but could also draw Lebanon further into the geopolitical struggles of the Middle East. The risks are manifold: sectarian violence, regional escalation, and the potential collapse of the Lebanese state.

The Case for a Plebiscite

In contrast, a plebiscite represents a peaceful and democratic approach. By involving all Lebanese citizens in this critical decision, a referendum would reinforce the principles of national unity and collective responsibility. It would provide an opportunity for open dialogue, fostering a sense of ownership over the outcome among all communities.

A plebiscite also aligns with international democratic norms. Around the world, referenda have been used to address divisive issues, from Brexit in the United Kingdom to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. While not without challenges, these democratic exercises have provided a mechanism for resolving disputes without resorting to violence. And moreover, they tend to fend off foreign meddling, by making the Lebanese people decide for themselves what is in their own best interest.

In Lebanon’s case, a plebiscite would allow for a nuanced debate about Hezbollah’s role in the country. It would give citizens the chance to weigh the group’s historical contributions, such as its resistance to Israeli occupation, against the challenges posed by its continued militarization. Importantly, it would shift the conversation from one of coercion to one of consensus. And it would show the world whether most Lebanese wish to fight one another or whether they wish to collaborate on solving transcedental issues.

Ensuring Fairness and Transparency

For a plebiscite to succeed, it must be conducted in a manner that is fair, transparent, and inclusive. This requires robust preparations, including:

1. A Neutral Oversight Body: Establishing an independent national commission to oversee the process, ensuring impartiality and credibility.

2. Public Awareness Campaigns: Educating citizens about the implications of their vote, fostering informed decision-making.

3. International Support: Inviting international observers to monitor the referendum, bolstering its legitimacy on the global stage, and at the same time encouraging the international community to understand the difficult decision, and to press upon Israel to withdraw from all occupied lands to facilitate a peaceful conclusion.

Additionally, the plebiscite must be framed not as an attack on any single group but as a step toward strengthening state institutions and ensuring equal security for all Lebanese citizens.

A Call for Leadership and Courage

Lebanon’s leaders must demonstrate the courage to pursue this democratic path. It will not be easy. Hezbollah’s leadership and supporters may resist the idea, fearing that a referendum could undermine their position. But a plebiscite offers a way to address their concerns through dialogue, rather than confrontation. It provides a platform for all voices to be heard, laying the groundwork for a more inclusive and stable Lebanon.

The Lebanese people have shown remarkable resilience in the face of adversity. From the October 2019 protests to the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion, they have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to justice, accountability, and reform. A plebiscite on disarming Hezbollah would be a continuation of this struggle—a chance to reclaim agency over the nation’s future.

Lebanon cannot afford another civil war. The stakes are too high, and the costs too great. By pursuing a plebiscite, the government can offer a peaceful, democratic alternative to forceful disarmament—a solution that respects the will of the people and strengthens the foundations of our fragile state.

It is time to choose dialogue over discord, ballots over bullets. Only by coming together as a nation can we overcome the challenges that divide us and build a Lebanon that is unified, sovereign, and secure.

The Lebanon Wars of 2024, Who Won, Who Lost, Costs and Implications

Many in Lebanon have been quick to declare winners and losers in the recent war. Some have claimed that Israel won the war by obliterating Hezbollah's leadership, and destroying much of the Dahyeh, the Bekaa, and the South. Those who oppose this view see things differently. While they are forced to recognize Hezbollah's losses, they argue that it won against Israel because it kept both its projectile arsenal intact and indeed was able to fend off Israeli advances in the South.

These two views appear irreconcilable and are being fought in Lebanese media and street protest scenes in the hope that they be translated into political gains or losses in the local Lebanese political arena.

Objectively speaking, both views appear to be right to some degree; but both are also wrong. Hezbollah may have actually both won and lost the war at the same time. But how could the same side win and lose in a war? The answer may be in considering that this was not one single war but two overlapping wars being fought simultaneously by the different parties. The two wars were: First a war of regional domination and the second a war of local  occupation.

The war of regional domination was the one in which the United States faced off Iran (Global players such as Russia played a minor role because of Ukraine; and China was barely engaged but for some minor diplomatic initiatives). The two regional powers essentially battled it using local proxies, primarily Iran through Hezbollah and the United States through Israel. This war for regional domination was the one where massive firepower, intelligence, and technological equipment and capabilities were on display from aircraft carriers, to 2000 pound bombs, to hypersonic missiles, drones, F35's, Artificial Intelligence ... The winner of this war was clearly the United States. Iran's firepower while impressive on occasion waned in comparison to what the United States mustered. 

This was the war that Hezbollah leaders did not want to fight and warned against. Notwithstanding their enmity towards the US, Hezbollah suspected a trap that would yield an unfavorable outcome, not unlike what had happened to the likes of Saddam. Alas, willingly or not, the Lebanese group was led to an undesired regional escalation that gifted the United States the reason to provide its proxy Israel with all the aforementioned firepower and carte Blanche to pull the trigger. This is the very reason why this war and specifically the US role was so very different than either Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon or that of 2006, when Israel for the most part was left to its own devices and ended it swiftly. In this war, the stakes and risks were deemed clearly way higher, which forced the United States against the hopes of either Iran or Hezbollah to put all its chips on the table. 

What were these bigger aims that would make the United States do this? The first aim was to reduce the massive mounting pressure on Israel by the Iranian axis, which threatened its actual survival like never before. The second was the reduction of the Iranian regional influence once and for all. The third was the control of the East Med Basin. The fourth was to remove any Russian presence in Syria and the Mediterranean (most likely in exchange for the Caspian). The fifth was the control of Syria. And the sixth was to fend off any talk of a future Chinese Silk Road that exits through the East Med. 

Such lofty geopolitical goals cannot be accomplished easily or cheaply. Enter expenditures in the $ Billions and massive US firepower, unseen in modern history in volumes surpassing those of World War 2 (If we include Gaza, the amounts of firepower exceeded 6 Hiroshima bombs!), coupled with automation, artificial intelligence, communications and military  equipment. This was very much in line with Eisenhower and later Shwarzkoff-Powel military doctrines of applying maximum power in any conflict as seen in the Gulf Wars and then in the wars after 911. This is  US doctrine not Israeli doctrine, which tends to be much more localized.

What occurred after the war clearly shows that the United States, which was not a declared party to the war, accomplished all of its goals. It reduced the influence of Iran and Russia substantially, it now controls both Lebanon and Syria, it took control of the East Med and it will be fending off any potential Chinese commercial designs on the region. Whereas Iran accomplished nothing in this regional war of domination  against the United States. In fact, it's two most valuable assets, Syria and Lebanon's Hezbollah have been severed  or depleted. Hezbollah as the proxy in this war clearly lost, and paid a very hefty price through assassination and destruction.

What about the second war: The War of Local Occupation, which occurred on the heels of the first one and which Israel probably  thought it might gain as a value-add,  invading Lebanon and occupying the South all the way up to the Litani. Why it would choose this specific delineation was circumspect because Hezbollah's rocketry range by far exceed the limits of the Litani. This has led some to explain that Israel wanted to take advantage of the group's weakened condition to acquire access to the valuable water resources. What ensued was essentially a stalemate close to the Lebanese Israeli border, with Israel invading but unable to occupy a single Lebanese village by force. It's rising casualties and waning US support for such an ineffective campaign led it to hastily request a ceasefire. Of course, according to military convention, in this specific war, Hezbollah was the victor because it did not allow Israel to accomplish any of its goals, whereas Hezbollah accomplished all of its own, foremost of which was to deny Israel any occupation as had been the case back in 1982. In fact, Lebanese people are already returning to their homes with only a few villages left to be evacuated by the Israelis. Also, Israel was unable to claim any water resources. 

Why is understanding the dynamics of these two wars so crucial in Lebanon? Because it will have both regional and local policy  implications. 

Regionally, Lebanon and all its internal parties have to come to grips that they cannot fight the United States, which has now moved to become the dominant regional player. Accepting this could present great opportunities for peace and prosperity. Rejecting it may have disastrous implications at a scale unimagined, military, political, and economic, as seen recently ... Essentially, there is no interest for Lebanon in such a conflict. There is also no interest for any of the Lebanese communities of allying with any other regional forcing them to oppose the United States now. It will prove to be as futile as it is destructive to their community.

What about Israel? There are those in Lebanon who think that Israel's interests are one and the same as those of the United States; and clearly Israel would like the world to believe so. This is not always the case, and the latest wars and Israeli moves in the Middle East have shown clear demarcation. Their interests converge and diverge. In particular and as it pertains to Lebanon, they may actually diverge, if Israel insists on occupying a chunk of Lebanon. If this happens, the Lebanese, uniting to oppose any Israeli designs over Lebanon is not only the right thing to do from a Lebanese perspective, but it is also necessary for the internal stability of the nation. This means that if Lebanon were to continue with its resistance within a purely national framework, one that does not ally with any regional players, but rather one whose aim is purely the national liberation of all 10,452 KM2 of Lebanese territory and not a single inch more, accompanied with an explicit national proclamation, such a goal should not oppose the hopes of most Lebanese people any more than it should raise fears for any neighboring countries or threaten the interests of the United States. 

If such a policy were to be multi-faceted to include diplomatic, economic, as well as military resistance, whenever necessary, and if Lebanon makes clear its intentions of not harboring any regional designs beyond its borders, this should send a strong signal to the international community and to the United States. If Lebanon follows this with moves to clean it's own house and begin democratic and constitutional reforms, this will only make Lebanon's interests more and more aligned with the United States. The second largest US embassy in the world being positioned in Beirut is no coincidence. It could be an opportunity for the Lebanese, ALL  Lebanese to seize.

Can a contiguous foreign and defense policy that prioritizes the relationship of Lebanon with the West, particularly the US, Europe, and the Gulf, whilst not threatening any other nation on globe be attained? Should such a policy parallel calling for a purely national agenda that supports the liberation of all 10,452 KM2 of the nation for the benefit of all Lebanese citizens therefore cementing the internal political scene? This is the pretty much the challenge on the table for the new class of emerging Lebanese leaders. 

Carpe Deum!