Democratizing a nation while facing hardline regimes has never been easy. As the Syrian, Yemeni, and Libyan regimes seem entrenched and not willing to let go of power to the people, perhaps they can benefit from recent experiences from Eastern Europe, of which Hungary stands out as a good example.
As the Soviet Empire began disintegrating in the late 1980’s, stifled Hungarians, who had been ruled by the Communists for far too many decades had grown tired of the single-party system. While democratic opposition groups were splintered, by 1989 most agreed that the priority was seeing their political system opened. They began pressuring the communist regime and succeeded in coalescing thousands of demonstrators in the streets to pressure the incumbent communist regime. The communist government tried to control and channel the emerging dialogue, but failed as the democratic parties refused to acquiesce to a multitude of political offers, bribes, and divide and rule tactics. Ideologically disparate, the opposition parties decided to maintain a united democratic front.
Over the next several months, the communist regime itself began feeling the pressure from within with some party members taking a more reformist position. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the split ended up occurring within the ruling party. A posterior shuffle within the communist party eventually led to a more reformist party leadership, and this in turn paved the way for a roundtable discussion with the opposition.
In her insightful book, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, Gale Stokes writes, “By mid-1989, free elections were no longer an issue in Hungary, but almost everything else was. During the roundtable discussions the [ruling] party concentrated on economic problems, hoping to get the opposition to share responsibility for a deteriorating economic situation and for unpopular reforms that would be needed to correct it. The opposition insisted on presenting political demands, such as eliminating Workers Guards, which were an armed force in every factory, and getting party cells out of the workplace. After three months of difficult negotiations, in September 1989 the conferees agreed to overhaul the legal system, depoliticize the army, and cut the size and competence of the Workers Guards.”
One contentious issue did remain and it was whether Hungary would have a strong
President voted for by the people- which the Communists wanted- or whether it would have a weaker one voted for by the parliament. This issue could not be solved by the roundtable discussion, but rather saw a referendum called for, which out of four million votes, saw the latter group come on top by a mere 6,100 votes! The parliamentary elections that followed early in 1990, saw the people massively vote against the Communists giving them only 8.5% of the parliamentary seats. The new parliament proceeded to vote for a non-communist President.
Hungary’s brief case provides several lessons to the impending transformation occurring throughout the Middle East. First, the ruling regime as expected tries to maintain its powers by attempting to institutionalize the single party rule [communism for instance] and other trickery, such as the “Workers Guards”, who typically are not there to protect the workers as much as to spy on them. The opposition groups did not fall for it and insisted on political reform before any economic reform under the single party system. This was smart for two reasons. The first is it kept the pressure on the regime. Second, if the economic situation got any better the incumbent totalitarian regime would feel even less likely to leave power.
Secondly, as a reaction to firm political opposition, the ruling regime itself began to see different strands emerge within its own rank and file. Hardliners were left with an impossible dilemma. If they imposed their power, it aggravated the situation on the streets as is happening in Syria and Libya. If however they allowed to reformers to emerge within the party, then they knew there was no hope either. Their days became numbered one way or the other.
Thirdly, once the ruling regime realized that change was imminent, it preferred to negotiate with the democratic proponents than stamp out the protests. This saved Hungary from an even larger calamity. In Libya, it appears Gadhafi has issued an “over my dead body” edict. His end may be near as a result of it. In Syria, Assad still has the chance to remedy the situation if he introduces some reformers, but even then, in all likelihood his regime’s days are numbered.
And finally, if negotiations with democratizers are launched as they have been in Egypt, while they may be difficult and will take time, they will inevitably lead to the peaceful emergence of liberalization and democratization as they did in Hungary against a regime must more powerful than any of the Arab ones.
The people are on the right side of history. Patience and perseverance will pay off… inevitably.
As the Soviet Empire began disintegrating in the late 1980’s, stifled Hungarians, who had been ruled by the Communists for far too many decades had grown tired of the single-party system. While democratic opposition groups were splintered, by 1989 most agreed that the priority was seeing their political system opened. They began pressuring the communist regime and succeeded in coalescing thousands of demonstrators in the streets to pressure the incumbent communist regime. The communist government tried to control and channel the emerging dialogue, but failed as the democratic parties refused to acquiesce to a multitude of political offers, bribes, and divide and rule tactics. Ideologically disparate, the opposition parties decided to maintain a united democratic front.
Over the next several months, the communist regime itself began feeling the pressure from within with some party members taking a more reformist position. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the split ended up occurring within the ruling party. A posterior shuffle within the communist party eventually led to a more reformist party leadership, and this in turn paved the way for a roundtable discussion with the opposition.
In her insightful book, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, Gale Stokes writes, “By mid-1989, free elections were no longer an issue in Hungary, but almost everything else was. During the roundtable discussions the [ruling] party concentrated on economic problems, hoping to get the opposition to share responsibility for a deteriorating economic situation and for unpopular reforms that would be needed to correct it. The opposition insisted on presenting political demands, such as eliminating Workers Guards, which were an armed force in every factory, and getting party cells out of the workplace. After three months of difficult negotiations, in September 1989 the conferees agreed to overhaul the legal system, depoliticize the army, and cut the size and competence of the Workers Guards.”
One contentious issue did remain and it was whether Hungary would have a strong
President voted for by the people- which the Communists wanted- or whether it would have a weaker one voted for by the parliament. This issue could not be solved by the roundtable discussion, but rather saw a referendum called for, which out of four million votes, saw the latter group come on top by a mere 6,100 votes! The parliamentary elections that followed early in 1990, saw the people massively vote against the Communists giving them only 8.5% of the parliamentary seats. The new parliament proceeded to vote for a non-communist President.
Hungary’s brief case provides several lessons to the impending transformation occurring throughout the Middle East. First, the ruling regime as expected tries to maintain its powers by attempting to institutionalize the single party rule [communism for instance] and other trickery, such as the “Workers Guards”, who typically are not there to protect the workers as much as to spy on them. The opposition groups did not fall for it and insisted on political reform before any economic reform under the single party system. This was smart for two reasons. The first is it kept the pressure on the regime. Second, if the economic situation got any better the incumbent totalitarian regime would feel even less likely to leave power.
Secondly, as a reaction to firm political opposition, the ruling regime itself began to see different strands emerge within its own rank and file. Hardliners were left with an impossible dilemma. If they imposed their power, it aggravated the situation on the streets as is happening in Syria and Libya. If however they allowed to reformers to emerge within the party, then they knew there was no hope either. Their days became numbered one way or the other.
Thirdly, once the ruling regime realized that change was imminent, it preferred to negotiate with the democratic proponents than stamp out the protests. This saved Hungary from an even larger calamity. In Libya, it appears Gadhafi has issued an “over my dead body” edict. His end may be near as a result of it. In Syria, Assad still has the chance to remedy the situation if he introduces some reformers, but even then, in all likelihood his regime’s days are numbered.
And finally, if negotiations with democratizers are launched as they have been in Egypt, while they may be difficult and will take time, they will inevitably lead to the peaceful emergence of liberalization and democratization as they did in Hungary against a regime must more powerful than any of the Arab ones.
The people are on the right side of history. Patience and perseverance will pay off… inevitably.
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