Building a Bridge Between Constitutional Trenches

Lately some prominent Lebanese politicians have been vehemently rejecting—and on several grounds—the suggestion of a new constitutional assembly meant to introduce a new constitution. First, in light of the current political gridlock, they state that it would not be the right time. Second, they raise fears that it would likely come at the expense of minorities and may lead the country into an unknown. Third, they assert that no fair constitutional settlement can come about when one party is privy to weapons, while the others are not. And finally, they use the argument that the post-civil war constitution has yet to be implemented to begin with; and until it is, it would be pointless to discuss another constitutional assembly.

On the other side of the debate, those calling for a Constitutional assembly maintain that the country has fared disastrously for seven decades under the current constitution, so have the minorities. They point to an endemic lack of governance and accountability as being symptomatic of a deficient social contract, which needs ripping and replacing. They claim that a constitutional assembly drawing a new constitution is in fact the only way to fend off any of Lebanon’s communities who are trying to usurp power through an edict of “fait acompli”. And finally, they conclude that waiting for any previous constitution to be implemented is a fool’s errand adhering to an old Lebanese proverb, “If it were going to rain, it would have clouded”.

Of course the backdrop to all this debate is that Lebanon is seeing one of the worst constitutional crises in its history, with parliamentary elections postponed twice (and already talk of a third postponement), a Presidency seat vacant for more than 2 years, a gridlocked ministerial cabinet barely able to govern, and an inconsequential constitutional high court system. All the while, the nation is faced with immense security challenges, a massive national debt, uncontrollable fiscal deficits, water, energy and service delivery shortages, and a protracted influx of refugees that many fear will be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

In light of all the above, are either of the two sides in a position to win the debate and somehow convince the entire nation of a transcendental step in either of the polar opposite directions? Or is there perhaps a third way—a compromise of sorts?

On the one hand, the Anti-New Constitutional Order are implicitly arguing that the current system is the best anyone can get. Theirs is a somewhat strategically weak position, considering the deteriorating state of the nation. The primary question these Antis have to face, though, is whether it would be better to look at options now or to wait. If they wait and gridlock persists, they risk seeing a calamity unfold (financial or otherwise) placing them in an even weaker negotiating position. On the other hand, those in the Pro New Constitutional Order find themselves in a slightly less precarious strategic position, because facts generally support their argument of system dysfunctionality: Nothing seems to be working. The problem for the Pros, however, is that they face an opposition which sees itself in a zero sum game. This means the more the Pro-Constitutional Assembly group over-reaches in its demands, the more entrenched the Anti-group will become, having little to lose. Delays leading to systemic breakdown and chaos do not really help the Pros either, whose entire reasoning one assumes is to act to strengthen the state.

And so the question that emerges is can a compromise be reached; and is there an alternative Constitutional instrument that could possibly help bridge the emerging chasm?; and whose primary purpose would be to allow sufficient reform to get the wheels of government moving, while simultaneously allaying the fears of the Antis? The answer is yes, there is a constitutional instrument that can provide a middle ground; and it is what is typically referred to as a Bill of Rights.

A Bill of Rights essentially introduces certain basic rights that the Lebanese people are demanding to compensate for salient Constitutional deficiencies, while re-affirming the current Lebanese Constitution. It would aim to shift the focus of the Constitutional debate to that of protecting citizen rights. Of course, those rights that are already in the constitution, would remain the law of the land, whereas the new rights assure further protection from abuse. A Bill of Rights properly elaborated would also introduce mechanisms for guaranteeing that the Lebanese Constitution as well as amendments found in the Ta’ef accord, not only are properly respected, but thoroughly implemented. The overarching goal of a Bill of Rights would be to strengthen the Lebanese state by introducing the necessary tools to avoid gridlock, while balancing it with an eternal check on its power by the citizens themselves.

How are the Pros and the Antis likely to react to the concept of a Bill of Rights? Since there would be no constitutional assembly, the Antis should no longer be fearful of entering discussions. Indeed, a Bill of Rights could prove to be exactly the tool needed to strengthen the rights they so fear losing. Whereas the Pros who favor constitutional changes would also be satisfied, as such a Bill could bring the needed ingredients that can add stability and strengthen the state, without risking the entire enterprise. A Bill of Rights means both sides end up net beneficiaries: The different communities in Lebanon would find a way to protect their individual rights and their way of life, while the state is reformed and fortified.

As the Lebanese state sees a steady decline, can the Lebanese afford to sit idle and remain polarized in their Constitutional trenches? Or is it time for opposing communities to unite and try to build bridges towards a more positive future? If so, it appears there may be no other solution that represents an opportunity for a fair compromise, except for a Lebanese Citizen Bill of Rights.