What does Saad Hariri’s Recent Presidential Endorsement Say about Him?

After two years of vehemently opposing it, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri yesterday did an about face endorsing the candidature of Michel Aoun for the Presidency of Lebanon. In his endorsement speech, Hariri stated that his choice represented a “risky political move for himself”, which he was willing to take as a “sacrifice for the sake of the country”. Three questions beg themselves: What choices did Hariri have? Why did he make his choice? And what does it all say about him?

The first question is what choices did Hariri have? In his own coalition, he had several, among whom were candidates such as Harb and Gemayel—the first a prominent lawyer and politician, the latter a former President. A third and more extreme choice was of course Samir Gaegae, the head of the Phalange party. Having been jailed for many years, Gaegae remains a polarizing figure, who garners the admiration of few and the disdain of many. Of the three, Hariri chose Gaegae as his first Presidential candidate. The most salient explanation, at the time, was that it was his attempt to counter the endorsement for the presidency of another polarizing figure, Aoun, by Hezbollah.

Not surprisingly, Gaegae’s endorsement didn’t pan out; and Hariri felt compelled to find another candidate. To the chagrin of Gaegae, in place of finding a more suitable candidate within the coalition, Hariri decided to endorse one of the opposing camp’s candidates, Suleyman Franjiyyeh who happens to be one of Gaegae’s most bitter enemies (And whose family it is said were ordered to be killed by Gaegae during the civil war!). The fact that Franjiyyeh barely has a high school degree, did not seem to have deterred Hariri from making his choice. In his mind, in no way did it represent a depreciation of the highest office in the land. The explanation at the time was that Hariri was attempting to split the opposing camp by endorsing one of their two candidates. They did not budge, and Franjiyyeh’s candidature eventually fared as well as that of its predecessor.

Feeling compelled yet again to search for a third candidate, Hariri once more overlooked his own coalition members. This time, however, he decided what would have been unthinkable to him and his coalition only a few days earlier: He endorsed Aoun. In his endorsement, Hariri justified it by stating that all his previous candidates had not had “luck on their side” and that the final choice had to fall on Aoun. Putting “luck” aside for a moment, the fact that the candidate is an octogenarian, highly polarizing, and an ally of his political enemies did little to phase Hariri. In his mind, there was no other choice. But what about Harb and Gemayel? What about centrists and highly qualified alternatives-men like Helou, Obeid, Baroud, and Domianos? For some reason, to Hariri, they did not seem to exist; or they were deemed unworthy of the highest office.

Why did Hariri make these seemingly erratic choices? In his announcement, Hariri mentioned the need to “sacrifice for the sake of the nation”. But what exactly was Hariri sacrificing; and why didn’t he have the foresight to realize the importance of this sacrifice two years earlier and not waste the nation’s time and energy with his opposition to Aoun’s candidature? Some say it is due to new developments in the Syrian conflict; and that in nominating Aoun, Hariri was trying to salvage something … anything. If that were the case, one must pause and ask what then did Hariri ask for in exchange for Aoun’s endorsement? With some claiming that it was an implicit deal for him to return as Prime Minister, they believe the only sacrifice he was making was that if his own coalition and all that it stands for, in exchange for his own interests. Is it any wonder then that so soon after the endorsement, several of his own party and coalition’s senior members came out speaking against the endorsement?

Many more questions than answers are being raised as a result of Saad Hariri’s precipitous announcement. Regardless, one final key question to ask is what does all this say about Hariri himself. After all, his choices have been undeniably erratic with little if regard to any decorum for the highest office in the land. Hariri seems to have as weak a hold on core beliefs as he does loyalty to his own coalition and constituency, let alone strategic rectitude and discipline required to uphold them. If that were the case, one last question indelibly begs itself: Is Saad Hariri himself qualified or worthy to ever again be the Prime Minister of Lebanon?