In the spring of 2000, Israel still occupied a large part of my homeland Lebanon’s southern territory, following its invasion in 1982. Local communities resisted the occupation; and as a result, many were killed by Israel, while others were jailed in the notorious Khiam prison. They fought back with the attacks focused on Israeli troops. During those nineteen years of occupation, more than 1,300 Israelis died in what some term as Israel’s “Vietnam”.
That very spring of 2000, while attending Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, several Lebanese and Israelis happened to be taking a negotiation’s class with Ambassador Dennis Ross. On the first day introductions, I recall one of the Israelis, an older mid-career student named Ram, stood up proudly in class to say he had been an Israeli fighter pilot during the siege of Beirut in 1982. When my turn came, I retorted that I had been a child civilian on the receiving end of his bombs for the three-month siege. This apparently made it up through the school’s echelons; and a group of us were asked if we would like to hold a public Lebanese-Israeli school debate with American intermediation.
The day of the event, the hall was full of anticipation as the two sets of negotiators sat parallel to each other, with the American moderators perpendicular to both. The Israelis drew first; and argued that Israel was occupying the south of Lebanon because it “provided Israel with a safety zone”, without which they would be constantly under attack from Lebanon. We retorted that the best way for Israel to achieve its safety is to stop occupying Lebanese land and retreat behind its own borders. The counter-retort by the Israelis was that our hypothesis was wishful thinking; and that a sovereign state needed to defend itself from “terrorists” on its border denying its very existence. We argued that, if once they left Lebanon, our “resistance fighters” continued attacking, they had the right to defend themselves, while currently they were breaking international law and could not claim self-defense. They said what we were proposing was too risky. Our final retort was that there was really only one way to find out: For Israel to leave. And if things didn’t work per our hypothesis, I looked at Ram, “You may get the chance to fly over Beirut once more!”
As it happens, less than three months later, Israel did decide to exit unilaterally from Lebanon, in fulfillment to what was PM Ehud Barak’s campaign promise. What ensued was a flood of Southern Lebanese villagers returning to their homes after years of exile. The exit of Israel was hailed as a divine victory by the Lebanese, particularly the resistance. In Israel, the exit came as a relief to most Israelis who had come to see its futility. What ensued is worthy of highlighting.
In the 23 years since Israel’s exit from Lebanon, the deaths to Israeli soldiers dropped by a jaw dropping 97.6% (from 1,303 during the two decades of occupation to a mere 28 post exit). This excludes the only flare up that occurred in 2006, as a result of the hijacking of two Israeli soldiers, which was perpetrated by the Lebanese resistance to release all the Lebanese prisoners still held in Israeli jails six years after their exit (they were subsequently all released). But even if we include the 2006 war, the reduction in Israeli deaths still fell sharply by 85.1%. Currently, there remains a fairly small, disputed area and no prisoners. While not quite at peace, there is now a de facto détente with most skirmishes within an acceptable framework (which is holding up even at the height of the Israel-Gaza war). In fact, the two nations inked an oil and gas exploration deal last year.
In retrospect, it might be worthwhile to ask what lessons that conflict and its resolution teach us? First, occupations lead to higher deaths on all sides. Our hypothesis at Harvard was indeed correct: Deaths were substantially reduced after the Israeli occupation ended. Second, taking and keeping prisoners also increases conflict, while releasing them will reduce from it. This would seem obvious to some, but in the Middle East the bravado of tried-and-failed policies seems to pervade with some trying to convince the world that violence is the only way. It isn’t. And third, US intermediation is key to clear up the space for rational discussion and to keep things together when the going gets tough.
Bottom line, the land for peace formula is still very much alive and paying dividends in Jordan, Egypt, and arguably even Lebanon. It has saved countless lives and delivered relative regional stability. Why not try it in Palestine? And in light of all the pointless death and destruction on all sides, especially the Palestinian, what proof do extremist war mongers have that their brute force, occupation, and imprisonment works better?
No comments:
Post a Comment