Monday, November 19, 2012

The New Frontier by Gibran Khalil Gibran (Short works ,1925)

I accidentally came across a gem written by Gibran Khalil as far back as 1925!

"There are in the Middle East today two challenging ideas: old and new. The old ideas will vanish because they are weak and exhausted. There is in the Middle East an awakening that defies slumber. This awakening will conquer because the sun is its leader and the dawn is its army... 

In the fields of the Middle East, which have been a large burial ground, stand the youth of Spring calling the occupants of the sepulchers to rise and march toward the new frontiers. When the Spring sings its hymns the dead of the winter rise, shed their shrouds and march forward ...

There is on the horizon of the Middle East a new awakening; it is growing and expanding; it is reaching and engulfing all sensitive, intelligent souls; it is penetrating and gaining all the sympathy of noble hearts.

There are today, in the Middle East, two men: one of the past and one of the future. Which one are you? Come close, let me look at you and let me be assured by your appearance and your conduct if you are one of those coming into the light or going into the darkness."

- Gibran Khail Gibran, The New Frontier, 1925

Thursday, November 8, 2012

Is Libya’s Democracy Dead or Very Much Alive?


The recent violence in Libya’s second largest city, Ben Ghazi, which led to the death of American ambassador Chris Steven, rang many an alarm bell in Western capitals—not least of which Washington—whose interests were directly targeted. Does this tragic incident represent the death knell of Libya’s nascent democracy? Is this North African nation falling into hopeless chaos following in the footsteps of its south eastern African neighbor, Somalia? Will it all be interpreted by the international community as a hopeless process, leading them to throw-in the towel on its democratization?
I will hence argue that the answer to these three questions is a resounding no. Indeed while uncertainty persists regarding the details of the tragic incident, the undeniable certainty that has emerged is that rather counter-intuitively it has led to the speeding up of the Libyan democratization process, and for increased international community engagement.
With respect to the first question, far from showcasing a nation whose democracy is dying, the recent tragic incident actually presented one whose democratization process while slow is actually cementing itself on different fronts. Elections, an open press, freedom of demonstration, and the peaceful transition of governmental have all begun transpiring—all of which are fundamental cornerstones to a well-functioning democracy. Not held for almost six decades, elections were successfully organized and won by secular parties in direct opposition to an Islamic regional trend, lending credence to their impartiality. The results were generally accepted by the Libyan population, a congress was elected, and a Prime Minister was tasked with forming a cabinet. Once the attacks transpired, local and international press reported in real time with no censorship. Stories and complaints of roaming militias paralleled those of how some Libyans had aided the stricken ambassador out of the burning building and had tried to save his life. As soon as news of the American ambassador’s death emerged, an outpouring of support followed. Massive peace demonstrations took place all over Libya in honor of what many described as a stalwart supporter of the Libyan revolution. That it came from the Libyan people was proof to the world that it was genuine. And finally, when it comes to the peaceful transition of power, since Gaddafi’s fall, several cabinet reshuffles have occurred to garner the support and allay the fears of the different parts of the country, its tribes, as well as the militias. The latest occurred when the elected Libyan congress appointed Mustafa Abu Shagur as Prime Minister. Unable to form a cabinet over the summer, he was soon replaced with Ali Zidan. All the above tend to point to an emerging Libyan democracy not one, which is about to expire.
Of course some prefer to shed light on Libya’s chaotic post-revolutionary state, claiming that it seems to be following in the footsteps of Somalia. They point to the absence of government armed forces and the preponderance of roaming Libyan militias, which have not yet been disarmed. While this is true, most regional experts understand that some of these militias are currently essential to maintaining order while the government’s armed forces—decimated under Gaddafi’s police state—ramp up. But again the recent calamity seems to have led to a positive outcome as the Libyan head of state, Mohammed Magarief, immediately announced a round-up of many of the smaller and uncontrolled revolutionary militias. In parallel, the government began negotiating timelines with the larger ones for them to join the armed forces. Furthermore, an investigation into the killing was launched and soon followed up with arrests. These are all positive signs of a government trying to take back institutionalized control, not one which is disintegrating. Things are likely to get better as unlike Somalia, the government of Libya is fortunate in that it has oil resources to support its plans, appease the different groups, and deliver on the promise of a strong central government. What Libya needs to accomplish this is time.
And finally, in terms of the international community giving up on Libya, nothing seems to be further from the truth. Indicative of this fact was the United States’ response to the tragedy. Notwithstanding the fact it had lost four members of its diplomatic corps, its measured reaction balanced a strong will to get to the bottom of what happened with an understanding of the shortcomings of the Libyan transitional government. Both the United States and Europe seem cognizant of the difficulties the Libyan government is facing reconstructing its apparatus and institutions after forty years of dictatorship. Their support remains steadfast; and less than two weeks after the incident occurred, the Libyan Prime Minister was welcomed to the United Nations and invited to the Clinton Global Initiative with arms wide open. If anything, Libya’s struggle was garnering the international community’s sympathy and support, not criticism, and certainly not blame. This global support would have been unheard of a handful of months earlier under Gaddafi’s dictatorial regime when a violent incident such as this would surely have led to strong international retaliatory measures against the entire nation.
As tragically ironic as it may seem, Ambassador Steven’s death seems to have given impulse to Libya’s democracy as opposed to weakening it. The nation he was trying to help has shown itself to be as grateful for his support as it was sorrowful for his passing.  To be sure, Libya is not yet a full-fledged democracy; but facts do increasingly point to it being on the right track nonetheless. Democratization may be slow and messy; and there may be major bumps and incidents along the way. In Libya, it won’t be any different. In the meantime, all indications continue to point to the fact that the Libyan people want democracy; the fledgling Libyan government is working on making it a reality; and the international community is committed to its support. All this leads to the conclusion that Libya’s democracy is very much alive and kicking. If anything, this should go down as Ambassador Steven’s dying legacy.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Interview on Global Voice Hall

This was a recent Arabic interview on the book held by journalist Ahmed Abdul Razzaq on Global Voice Hall. The specific topic of discussion was Lebanon and regional instability effects on its democracy.

http://www.globalvoicehall.com/al_mihak_episode_17.

Saturday, July 7, 2012

According to the attached Agence France Press article, Libya's elections will field some 3700 candidates, of which 200 will be chosen by a total of 3 million eligible constituents 80% of whom have been shown to want an election ... And all this less than 1-year from the end of an almost 40-year Gadhafi dictatorship.

Can anybody still doubt the Arab people's true desire for democracy?

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/45814-libyans-cast-ballots-in-post-gadhafi-vote-some-polling-stations-closed

Sunday, June 24, 2012

Congratulations Egypt on your election ! Here's to a better future free of corruption and nepotism ... It won't be easy any which way. Hang in there for the ride ... For now, all Egyptians should be proud of there democratic accomplishment. Go Egypt !!!

Friday, May 11, 2012

Egyptian Presidential Debate: Yet another Egyptian surprise

As the Egyptian presidential election looms, Egyptians got a rare occasion in the Arab World to witness two candidates actually go through a civilized debate based on substance and ideas. Egypt continues to surprise the Arab world and make many proud. Hopefully, this debate and others will give a chance to Egyptian voters to cast their ballots in the upcoming elections based on knowledge about the candidate and not the coersion of this or that regime. Good for you Egypt!

Here is an interesting report on the subject by AlJazeera English:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMnaXzBwQuU.

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

Monday, May 7, 2012

Syria: Unvoting with their feet

An article about Syria's recent parliamentary elections as reported by Agence France press via Annahar, Lebanon's daily described turnout across Syria:

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/39354-7-killed-as-syria-holds-election-snubbed-by-opposition

It is interesting to compare and contrast the Syrian election under its new constitution with that of Iraq's a few years ago. The recent Syrian election does not seem to have appealed to large swathes of the population; and apparently several populated cities witnessing clampdown barely saw any voting. This stands in stark contrast to Iraq's which saw millions still show up to vote- notwithstanding the sectarian violence and the American occupation occuring at the time.

The conclusion to be drawn is that it seems while regimes may force people into submission, they are still incapable of forcing them to vote for something they deem unfair and illegitimate.

People can unvote with their feet after all ...

Monday, April 30, 2012

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Kuwait's State Owned Enteprise Woes

An interesting article about Kuwait, which highlights three important trends throughout the Arab world:
1) The ever-increasing demands of state employees and their effects on Arab states. Even relatively wealthy ones such as Kuwait are having issues with their traditionally well endowed SOEs (State Owned Enterprises).
2) The potential reaction of the people when an autocratic state decides to reduce, stop, or simply not increase its payments and subsidies ...
3) Once liberalization begins- as in the case with Kuwait's powerful parliament, which has proven to be highly critical of the ruling Sabah family- it is very difficult to reverse. The people indelibly begin to demand more.

Access to to the article can be found at the following url: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/33806-striking-workers-ground-kuwait-airways-flights.

Sunday, February 19, 2012

Lebanon's Faulty Democracy Desperately Needs Re-engineering

At different junctures over the past few months (years actually), Lebanon's cabinet has found itself at a standstill. This time it was triggered by one minister refusing to sign a bill approved by the cabinet. At others times, it has been for other reasons. There are some who regard this simply as Lebanon's political system balancing itself through partisanship. Is it or is it perhaps due to a faulty democratic design, which essentially allows anyone of the three branches of government (Presidency, Cabinet, or Parliament- the Judiciary unfortunately is currently too weak to make a difference) to have a veto effectively putting a spike in the wheel of government? Unfortunately, strong evidence seems to point to it.

Lebanon's democratic design has been in effect (with some constitutional tweaking) for about seven decades. During this time, one would assume that being a democratic system, it would have established some self-correcting mechanisms. Unfortunately it hasn't, and the political system has proven to be quite unstable with civil strife recurring in the 1950's (under the Presidencies of Khoury and Chamoun), 1970's (under Franjieh), 1980's (under Gemayel), and this last decade (under both Lahoud and now Suleyman). On average, cabinets get shuffled every 18 months. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the Lebanese political system at times seems more in tuned to instability than stability.

At the heart of the issue may be the multitude of divisions and segmentations enshrined in the Lebanese parliamentary democracy. These cross-sections may be sectarian, regional, and even economic class. And while these rigid political divisions and quotas are seen by some as a way to protect one portion of the population against the other, in effect it does the opposite by weakening all portions of the population and even more so the state itself. Constant fear mongering has perpetuated these divides, and what has resulted is a constant and relatively easy hold by some leaders. Ironically, the leaders themselves, while perhaps able to split some spoils, are also weakened by their weakened constituents. No leader in Lebanon- even while holding a national office- can truly claim that they represent all of Lebanon, because no leader in Lebanon has ever been voted in by all of Lebanon. As surprising as it may seem to some readers, political leaders in Lebanon- with the exception of parliamentarians- do not run for office and rarely have to compete for their job. Lebanon's President is typically chosen at the last minute without the population having ever heard of his plan. The same applies to the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President through parliamentary consultation. The choice of cabinet has lately turned into a painful tit-for-tat negotiation rendering it as a weakly glued unit that is ready to burst at the seams at the slightest challenge.

It is therefore no wonder why lately some popular leaders- who boast of strong parliamentary representation- act in ways that pre-empt both the President and the Prime Minister. Intrinsically, they are questioning the true support those in power actually wield. And while their question and behavior in a normally-functioning democracy may be legitimate, in Lebanon it may be missing the point, because Lebanon's system was not built to support mass support. Rather, it is what some in Lebanon like to sell as a "consociational democratic" design. In other words, it is a design, which needs everyone’s tacit approval. Unfortunately, history has proven once and again that consociationalism is useless when the parties do not agree. Just ask the common citizen if they would prefer consociationalism with no electricity or electricity with no consociationalism. Of course, we are also assuming here that the so called consociational democratic system itself is stabilizing, when Lebanon’s history proves everything but.

It is easy to blame this party or that for the current Lebanese gridlock. I prefer to take a step back and study things objectively. What is happening now has little to do with electricity or wages. Rather, it is symptomatic of a much deeper problem with the overall system, which desperately needs some fundamental re-engineering. Lebanon’s democracy may continue to limp along, but it does no Lebanese any good to close their eyes to the possibility of re-thinking a system while safe-guarding each of Lebanon’s community needs and attending to their fears. We are all Lebanese after all, and if we truly love this nation, we should aspire to constantly be thinking of new ways to improve how society works and functions. And if we were to fail in our social experiment, well then I suppose we would have this rotten system to fall back on after all, wouldn't we?

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

Bashar Assad Could Have But Didn’t

It has been interesting to see that so far in the Arab Spring, most of the deposed leaders have had to be pried away forcefully from their perches. Not one has decided to peacefully negotiate a settlement with his people. Not one has managed to transfer power seamlessly to successors. To some this may come as a surprising. To others it may come as irrational behavior. It is neither; for if one looked at it from the point of view of the dictator himself, there are really two choices. One is to peacefully surrender power and leave under a negotiated settlement. The other is to stay and fight.

If we look at the first option, leaving in peace and with all the riches would be an ideal scenario for the dictator. The problem, however, for most incumbent dictators in the Arab World knowing what they know about their regime’s past (which in most cases has left a trail of blood and carnage) is that this scenario is nothing but a pipe dream. Their true calculation is what would happen if those who agreed to the settlement and took control of the state resources eventually reneged on their settlement and persecuted the dictator. It has happened in the past- Pinochet in Chile had to fight until his death for his impunity clause years after he had left power peacefully under a negotiated settlement. Most dictators are survivors who know very well how to employ tactics themselves; and so it is a scenario that the typical dictator may romanticize about, but is unlikely to bet his life on.

The second choice for the dictator is to stay and hold out. By the actions of all the Arab dictators thus far, this appears to have been their choice, which is not irrational for three reasons. The first is it gives them a chance at actually defeating the insurgency. From an ex-ante perspective, the dictator cannot ascertain victory or defeat, but they may very well see it as a chance worth taking- not unlike the chance they once took decades ago when they themselves usurped power. Unfortunately, as they are not trying to defeat a coup, but rather a popular uprising, defeating an entire population is a human endeavor that is doomed to fail. The Egyptian and Tunisian Presidents for all their military might, state resources, and support simply could not stand against the masses of the people. The second reason is that under such a scenario, the dictator hopes to postpone what deep inside they may very well know is inevitable. Still, in their eyes, if they could hold out long enough, conditions may become more favorable. Unfortunately, “postponing the inevitable” by forcefully trying to subdue the masses tends to have the exact opposite effect- speeding up the revolutionary process. While the Libyan revolution started after the Yemeni one, its level of violence was ever higher that the people’s reaction was stronger and more swift. Gadhafi fell before his Yemeni counterpart. And the third reason is the notion of going down with one’s head held high. Unfortunately, seeing Mubarak on a stretcher, Yemeni Saleh’s bandaged head, and Gadhafi’s corpse strewn on the floor pretty much answers it.

This brings us to the perplexing case of Bashar Assad in Syria. Unlike the other Arab dictators, Assad himself is a derivative of the Syrian Baath regime, not its creator. Arguably, while his father ruled Syria with an iron fist for almost three decades, almost everyone understands that Bashar’s rule was serendipitous and generally speaking not violent. Bashar not having blood on his hands, begs the following question: What did Assad have to lose by stepping down, or in the very least promising to step down at the end of his term?

The answer here is not as easy as in the other cases. In none of the other cases was there occupation (The Golan Heights). In none of the others was there existential geopolitical support coming from an outside state (Iran). And in none of the other cases, was a sizeable portion of the population supportive or as Bashar himself stated in a recent TV interview not opposing. Is it for these three reasons that Bashar has decided to stand and fight? Perhaps, unfortunately, by doing so he has also caused the single most important condition that was in his favor to turn against him, and that is not having the blood of his people on his hands. For in the ongoing 10 month insurgency more than 6000 Syrians have reportedly been killed.

What happens now? It is increasingly unlikely that the Syrian conflict could be brought to a peaceful end. If the deaths continue to rise, internally the emerging civil war may intensify, and externally more sanctions if not outright genocide charges may be brought against Bashar Assad and the regime. But did this really have to happen? It appears that Bashar’s end game is increasingly becoming a zero-sum game where either his regime wins or the entire Syrian nation will be made to pay. Unfortunately, in this game no one in Syria wins.

Saturday, January 21, 2012

What on Earth Would Prompt a Newspaper Editor to Call for Obama's Assassination?

Not sure what to make of this ... Shocking, even more so if Adler's analysis is true or worse yet if it was some kind of message from Israel to attempt to pressure the US into attacking Iran ...
WY


By Adam Clark Estes | The Atlantic WireFri, Jan 20, 2012
Article on: http://news.yahoo.com/earth-prompt-newspaper-editor-call-obamas-assassination-194702814.html
 
It's unclear if he was being satirical or just insensitive, but Atlanta Jewish Times owner and publisher Andrew Adler more or less called for President Obama's assassination in his column last week. Gawker's investigative hawk John Cook blogged about the column on Friday, prompting a collective facepalm on Twitter. What in the world was this newspaperman thinking when he wrote this? "Maybe it's meant as parody, I don't know," The Atlantic's Jeff Goldberg wondered, after admitting that he'd first heard of Adler's paper on Friday afternoon. "Not that the Atlanta Jewish Times is known for parody. Or anything." Cook notes that the Atlanta Jewish Times "appears to be a real community newspaper" with "a circulation of 3,500 and a staff of five."

The statement itself does sound ridiculous enough to be described as Swiftian, however:
Three, give the go-ahead for U.S.-based Mossad agents to take out a president deemed unfriendly to Israel in order for the current vice president to take his place, and forcefully dictate that the United States' policy includes its helping the Jewish state obliterate its enemies.
Yes, you read "three" correctly. Order a hit on a president in order to preserve Israel's existence. Think about it. If I have thought of this Tom Clancy-type scenario, don't you think that this almost unfathomable idea has been discussed in Israel's most inner circles?
Really we can imagine one or two answers to the what-was-he-thinking question. The first, Cook addresses in his post: Adler was floating a conroversial-sounding hypothetical to spark a debate. He didn't really want somebody to kill the president over his views on Israel. Adler told Cook, "I wrote it to see what kind of reaction I was going to get from readers." Cook wondered:
And what was the reaction? "We've gotten a lot of calls and emails." [Adler replied]
The second basically awful answer is that Adler meant it, immediately heard from readers that it's an offensively horrible idea and hustled to cover his tracks when it hit Gawker. Who knows -- satire or not, it's certainly sparked a Friday night cocktail conversation topic that nobody's been waiting to have! It's cool to be provocative, especially if you're a journalist or employer of journalists. But it's definitely not cool to put out a hit on the president.