What no judiciary means to Lebanon

Disturbing scenes have been surfacing on TV with protesting parents of the victims of the Aug 4, 2020 Beirut explosion, being roughed up by Lebanese police and security agencies. This was coupled by the Lebanese minister of justice himself accusing the parents of the victims as being agents receiving money in order to protest against the lack of truth and justice in the killing of their own families!? All the while, former ministers and officials who have been subpoenaed to appear in front of the investigating magistrate have flouted the law and refused to appear, with the magistrate himself now being condemned as ineffective. Efforts appear well underway to replace him.

At first view, this may appear to be the Lebanese ruling regime simply trying to save its own from prosecution. “It’s just a couple of ministers. It’s just politics, what’s the big deal?” they ask. But is it really? Or is what’s at stake much larger, like ripping the fabric of the democratic nation of Lebanon and risking its entire existence?

Let us start with the structure of modern democracies. As we have grown to know them, they typically  have three key elements to them. The people themselves, who are the source of all power. Then we have those they elect to represent them to create laws on their behalf in a chamber of deputies or parliament. And then there is the elected executives tasked with implementing these laws in a cabinet. These three elements while necessary, are insufficient because in themselves they do not answer the question of what would happen when differences arise within society, or between society and the elected bodies of government? For that, there is a fourth critical element meant to pull the fabric all together: The judiciary. Its job is to make sure it adjudicates rights when conflicts emerge. The judiciary makes its rulings based on the law of the land applying it equally to all affected citizens or parties. In so doing, the judiciary essentially allows society to feel that come what may, fairness and justice will prevail hence keeping the democracy intact.

The question that begs itself is what happens when this judicial “fabric” rips or ceases to be? In some cases, people will feel inclined to take the law into their own hands (resulting in anarchy or chaos). In other cases, leaders or regimes no longer have any checks over their power, doing away with any form of legal accountability, hence becoming an autocracy. This means the powers will be able to do as they please to the people, which includes usurping their rights, stealing their hard-earned savings, and even taking away their lives when it suits them. This sounds hauntingly similar to what is currently transpiring in Lebanon. 

When such seismic change occurs, it ceases to be an isolated case relating to this judge or that procedure. It becomes systemic; and its implications reverberate at all levels, in all sectors of society, and even internationally. No matter how much the ruling regime tries to paint over it, the rip in the fabric, is there for everyone to see, and react to. As an example, if some ministers refuse to appear in front of a magistrate in contempt of court orders, and they go unpunished for a perpetrated crime, what stops a bereaved citizen of taking the law into their own hands and imposing injury on such a minister or any other citizen? Would they be in their right to do so or not? Could they be held accountable, while the minister responsible for the original crime is rejecting to appear in front of justice? Similarly, if a governing regime violates its own people and their rights, can they legitimately have claims against third parties (local or international) who may do the same?

In the case of the explosion of Beirut, many sectors were affected, not least of which the insurance sector, the financial sector, the security sector, the transportation sector, the agricultural sector, among many others. If such a massive calamity were to go unresolved, how will the liabilities of such sectors be resolved? Who will assume responsibility for the lives lost? Will affected asset owners be compensated appropriately by insurance companies, or will their unjustified failure to pay be held also in contempt of the court? What about the destruction of the business livelihood and employment? And what of any economic contracts that may have been broken due to the destruction of the ports? 

Beirut’s calamity being among the largest non-nuclear explosions in the history of mankind occurred at such massive dimensions that it simply cannot be swept under a rug as if nothing has occurred. Aside from the lives lost, and the bodily injuries incurred, there are tens of billions of Dollars at stake and awaiting judicial adjudication. If Lebanon’s judiciary is not allowed to proceed unhindered, it will send the strongest of signals to all the Lebanese, the Lebanese expats, as well as the international community that Lebanon has completely lost its rule of law and as such is a failed democratic state. What then? Would anyone be willing to enter into any form of a contract with a Lebanese firm or the Lebanese government? And if they aren’t willing to, then where does it leave the nation as a whole and its ability to claw itself back from the abyss?

At a time when the Lebanese people have lost their livelihood, their savings, and their economy, they are desperately trying to grasp for any last straw of hope. Unfortunately, what the Lebanese ruling regime is doing by undermining the judiciary is essentially ripping among the nation’s last remaining fabric lines that could knit a viable state; and instead is driving Lebanon heads-on into a failed status. Bottom line, if there is no judiciary, there can really be no Lebanon.

Policies not Politics- What The Lebanese People Really Want to Hear

In a recent debate on Lebanese television, the host had a representative from the Change Movement (Change) facing off with one from the regime. The incumbent representative responded most questions with answers that hid behind political jargon and excuses, such as “the broken political system has not allowed us”, “there is too much corruption”, or “we are actually reformists and are on the side of change”. The Change representative tried to argue using a little of political history and a somewhat light dose of policy. It quickly became clear the strengths and weaknesses of each of their positions.

On the one hand, the regime representative found it hard to defend their record; and under current circumstances, it is not hard to see why. Lebanon’s multiple disasters in the past handful of years speak for themselves: An economic calamity that has seen the economic output fall by more than 50% and the currency by more than 90%, was soon followed by a financial collapse, bankrupting the entire banking sector with depositors unable to withdraw their funds. This in turn caused a social deterioration with more than 80% of the population falling into poverty, and hundreds of thousands migrating to safer shores. As if that were not enough, a nuclear sized explosion destroyed a third of the capital city Beirut, killing hundreds and destroying tens of thousands of homes—the crime has so far gone unpunished without a single regime leader held responsible. With such an indefensible record, the tactics being used by the regime seem to focus on politicizing any debate and clobbering audiences with wild evasions of any sort of policy, let alone record.

On the other hand, in the above-mentioned discussion, the Change representative’s debate strategy at times seemed reticent and at others too polite, delving unnecessarily into irrelevant political science and ideology (left versus right), while not having clear and concise messaging to differentiate positions or establish audience trust. At no time did the Change’s representative attack the incumbent on the regime’s record; and very little was given in the way of policy. Worse yet, the representative fell into the trap of a cynical political discussion against an opponent who seemed vastly more versed and experienced at it.

In the end, the entire debate seemed unnecessary or relevant, particularly for the elections. If anything, it probably became confusing to the audience, who may be forgiven for drawing equally negative conclusions about both sides. In this sense, the winner of the debate would have to be seen as the incumbent regime, not for winning the debate, but rather for not losing it, having managed to drag the Change’s representative down into an opaque and muddy swamp.

An important lesson can be drawn here: If Change is to have any breakthrough results in the elections, it has to come more prepared to counter the regime’s primarily political strategy. To do that, it needs to deploy debate tactics that don’t cheaply give away two very important tactical advantages, while simultaneously making sure to circumvent at all costs a third, which is to the advantage of the regime. What are these three tactics that could make up a winning election for Change?

The first tactic is to stay on message by attacking the regime for its failed record. There is no policy maker on this earth capable of defending the incumbent regime’s disastrous state of affairs, corruption, and incompetence. Common political excuses to such a record are falling flat on voters who are struggling and need to hear solutions not excuses. Failed policies hidden behind political jargon don’t feed mouths, and Change needs to highlight this. This tactic should be considered as “low hanging fruit”, and all that is needed is preparation to have specific talking points and discipline to stay on message.

The second tactic has to be to present a program and a plan that are clear, concise, consistent, and achievable. There is no need to over promise or exaggerate. Everyone with reasonable knowledge knows that Lebanon’s economic and social problems cannot be resolved overnight. Sticking to policies that focus on the most essential and the most doable should be enough to establish trust with the voters. Striking a balance between being candid and being optimistic will sway voters from incumbents who have been promising for decades while achieving nothing.

The third tactic is to avoid engaging on a battleground that is clearly to the advantage of the regime—and that is Lebanese politics. Considering that the country has been under the rule of the same incumbent clique for well over 30 years, it is quite implausible for anyone to expect new candidates to be able to beat these entrenched politicians at their tried and tested game—that of sectarian politics. Rather, the tactic here should be to evade any such engagement, refocusing on the first two tactics, meaning questioning the record and presenting alternative policies. Falling into a trap of endless circular political debate is pointless, laden with risks, and presents no benefits for the Change movement.

The combined strategy can therefore be thought of “Attack the policy record”, “Present achievable policies”, and “Avoid murky politics”. Unfortunately, after listening to the debate earlier this week, Change failed on all the three tactics: First, it did not attack the regime enough on its record, second it did not present clear or concise policy alternatives, and third it fell into the trap of political mud slinging against a regime that has been at it for 30 or more years. The net result is one of a lost debate, or in the very least one that was not won.

As parliamentary election season heats up, the Change candidates will have to up their game quickly and deploy a winning strategy through smarter tactics that make voters want to support them. For that to happen, the voter’s bottom line is this: They want to hear achievable policies not murky politics. The sooner Change realizes this and can show the people that it does through clear debate, the sooner will it be given their vote of confidence.

Sunni Community Might Be Pathway to Lebanese Nationhood and Citizenry

There are some in Lebanon who would like to believe that the Sunni leadership situation in the country is precarious, potentially leading the community to disorganization and disarray. They somehow equate the declared exit of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri from public life to a vacuum in the “traditional Sunni leadership” (Za3ame Suniyye). While they point to other known figures within the Sunni community and others emerging, they claim that none rise to the level; and they evidence recent polls, which found that no one had favorability ratings higher than 3%, except for Saad Hariri at a paltry 18%.

Several questions beg themselves. 

First: What does “traditional Sunni leadership” (Za3ame Suniyye) really mean? To answer this question, perhaps we need to look at Lebanese post-independence history and the main figures from the community. Interestingly, what we find is that the Sunni community does not have as much static or enduring “zaim” figures as other communities. As an example, Lebanese Maronites have had only 12 Presidents, Shiites 7 Speakers, while Sunnis have had 26 different Prime Ministers—18 of them from totally different families, most of whom have exited politics altogether. Families that had more than one figure, like the Solh, Salam, and Karame families, barely lasted more than a generation. Arguably, Rafik Hariri attempted to become a Za'im, but since his assassination, much of that leadership has dissipated. His son and successor Saad recently exited the scene; and his other son, Bahaa, who now seems to aspire for a community leadership role recently polled at less than 2%. The lack of political dynasties and the shuffling of leadership in the Sunni community both cast a shadow on the notion --or even existential importance-- of a “traditional Sunni leader” or Za’im.

It is as telling to try and understand why there hasn’t been dynastic dominance within the community as say in the Druze or Shiite communities. Several reasons may explain this, among which is the community’s relatively diversified centers of power between the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida (all of which has now expanded to other regional cities like Dubai, Riyadh, and Doha). The abundance of educated families from mercantile and banking backgrounds has been a fertile ground for leaders, which stood in stark contrast to feudal backgrounds in some Lebanese communities in the mountains and rural areas, restricting options. Related to this is the fact that traditional existential insecurity, present in other Lebanese communities never really existed within the Sunni community, given the Turkish and Arab hinterland, both of which are Sunni. This basically negated the need for "protection" strongmen, replacing them instead with institutions and traditional families. With the exception of Rafik Hariri, who tried for a limited time but was hindered, no single family or figure could truly claim dominance over the Sunni community since independence.

And so, when people warn of the absence of “traditional Sunni Leadership” as an existential threat to the community, they are actually breaking away from the more politically diversified and somewhat egalitarian history of the community, which could be seen as a source of strength not weakness. The diversity and security of the Sunni community has permitted its transitory leaders to carry a nationalist agenda, first in the establishment of the state, then in its development, and ultimately in trying to keep it together. Several would pay the ultimate price for doing so. The first post-Independence Prime Minister Riad Solh was assassinated for his Lebanese nationalist stance against the Syrian Social Nationalists. Rashid Karame paid with his life because he refused to allow projects to be built at a time when they could have fractured the nation further. And Hariri himself met the same fate because of his wish to disengage Lebanon from regional conflict.

Yet all the while, the Lebanese Sunni community carried on forward, never needing to establish ideological parties, carry arms, fight during the civil war, or carry sectarian cleansing in any of their coastal cities.

And so, at a time when the entire nation finds itself in flux and traditional community leadership models (za3amat) are beginning to fall by the wayside, is it the time for Sunnis to attempt to search for one of their own, who might carry the Sunni banner into the future? Or is it perhaps time to double down on the more diversified nationalist approach, tapping the educated resources within the community and putting it at the disposal of the entire nation?

More than ever before, it seems Lebanon is in dire need today of a paradigm shift that takes the nation from a failing divisive sectarian state to one that unifies all citizens, giving them equal rights and privileges regardless of sect, gender, region, or race. Surely, the more democratized representation model of the past century of the Lebanese Sunni community can be put to good use to attempt this and serve the entire nation. 

Indeed because they don't have the same constraints as other communities, emerging Sunni leaders may find themselves upon a historic opportunity to change the discourse from that of sect to that of nation, serving as an example to all the other communities. 

What this also means is that much more so than needing a “traditional Sunni leader”, what the community and indeed Lebanon truly needs at the moment are community leaders that can help move them away from their ever-dwindling sectarian privileges and rather guide them towards a nationalist approach that eliminates privileges altogether, focusing instead on the citizen’s needs and rights. 

Will such leaders be given a chance by the community? Lebanon’s future might very well depend on it.