In the wake of the chemical gas attack in Syria that killed
almost 1500 people, the debate in the West has centered on whether or not to apply
a military response. Proponents argue for its compelling moral case and the
moral hazard derived from not doing anything. Opponents rest their arguments primarily
on analogies made with the post September 11th, 2001 wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq—citing exorbitant costs in both blood and treasury and the lack of any
hard interests in Syria.
At the outset, I will refrain from arguing the case on any moral grounds and voluntarily cede to counter-arguments of equivalent military immorality utilized by other regional powers in such places as Palestine and Lebanon. I am even willing to cede on the immoral use of nuclear weapons as far back as the Second World War and chemical ones during Vietnam.
With morality to the side, I would instead like to focus on real politik and the hard interests at play, pointing to a fatal mistake that opponents of any form of Syrian intervention are making. It starts with a commonly heard analogy—that of the US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The error and ensuing false conclusions are not in the chosen wars per se, but rather their cited starting dates. Afghanistan’s conflict, for instance, did not start in 2001, but rather in the late 1970’s with the Soviet invasion and the Jihadi resistance, which the United States fully supported. When the Soviets finally left, the Americans instead of modestly investing to develop an independent Afghan state, quite bafflingly decided to depart as well, leaving the Taliban and Al Qaeda to fill the void. As history would prove, this strategic blunder caused a chain of historical events that directly led to the September 11th attacks in New York and the Pentagon, costing hundreds of billions. Eventually, it proved to be nothing but a procrastination with the United States forced to re-enter into Afghanistan, but this time in a much lengthier and costly war.
Opponents also cite the Second Iraqi War debacle and its massive cost. ‘Syria would be a bigger mess,’ they conclude. But again, they are citing an incomplete war story, which should start with the First Iraqi War. Led by President George H. Bush, the strategic objective of the First Iraqi War was to get Saddam out of Kuwait and substantially curb his power inside Iraq through crippling sanctions and no-fly zones. This war was a resounding success. It was swift, cost relatively few lives, and much less US tax-payer money—the bill for the most part was footed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. And yet by its end and with Baghdad in its sights and Saddam’s army on the run, instead of ridding Iraq of its dictator at a minor marginal cost, the allies decided to keep him in place, hoping that his presence would “stabilize” Iraq or in the very least stir its people to a popular revolt. It did everything to the contrary. Emboldened, Saddam would violently repress these revolts, would become richer than ever, more menacing, and belligerent. As the world watched, his cripplingly sanctioned nation and people fell into illness, poverty, and hunger. Fast forward a decade, the younger George W. Bush, with almost the same executive team as his father, found it inevitable to reverse the policy 180 degrees citing global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats as the primary arguments for a full-on invasion to finally rid Iraq of its dictator. Unfortunately, the dubiously substantiated Second Iraqi War mustered a much smaller coalition and as a result cost the US dearly—almost three thousand lives and trillions of Dollars of treasury. Again, delaying the inevitable ended up costing the US and Western powers much more than anyone could have ever imagined.
The obvious geopolitical question to be asked from the above often cited cases is how much of these costly wars could have been averted had the proper policies been implemented the first time around? Analysts argue that in the late 1980’s, a few hundred million dollars constructing Afghan schools and helping the state rebuild itself would have gone a long way in averting the terrorism that led to September 11th. Similarly, in Iraq, had Saddam been removed from power after the First Iraqi War, with much wider international support, in all likelihood a democratization process could have begun earlier, costing Western powers much less lives and treasure.
Coming back to the case of Syria, when the Syrian uprisings began in 2011, the chips were all stacked (locally, regionally, and internationally) in favor of a swift and resounding removal of the dictatorial regime and its replacement with a more inclusive democratic form of government. The conditions were ripe for a much less tempestuous transformation—not unlike the cases of Afghanistan in the late 1980’s and Iraq in the early 1990’s. And yet, quite tragically, the West once again looked away, leaning towards fairly passive involvement. But the situation has been deteriorating by the day: The Syrian opposition has been weakened, the regime managed to regroup, and radicals have begun filling the void. Of course, atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, the razing of rebel cities, and chemical attacks have irreparably scarred the nation and its people. The situation continues to worsen.
As policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic ponder what to do next, they will need to consider the following two points: First, while there may be a strong moral hazard argument to be made for punitive action against the Syrian regime for directly or indirectly causing the chemical attacks, in itself this argument may not be enough. Second, a more compelling argument is that of hard interests being affected by an inevitable face-off. Syria is no longer just a regional ticking time bomb (that one exploded as far back as 2011). Rather, it is quickly deteriorating into a global calamity with incalculable tentacles not unlike those that eventually led to the September 11th catastrophe and the ensuing Afghan and Iraqi wars. This inevitability means that the West needs to act comprehensively and now to control the damage that Syria’s deterioration is causing on its own interests. The cost of deferment of such an inevitable face-off will only increase by the day. If real politik is to be applied, this is the primary geopolitical lesson to be learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and not the procrastination leading up to them.
Wissam S. Yafi is the author of Inevitable Democracy: New Realities in the Arab World published by Palgrave MacMillan.
At the outset, I will refrain from arguing the case on any moral grounds and voluntarily cede to counter-arguments of equivalent military immorality utilized by other regional powers in such places as Palestine and Lebanon. I am even willing to cede on the immoral use of nuclear weapons as far back as the Second World War and chemical ones during Vietnam.
With morality to the side, I would instead like to focus on real politik and the hard interests at play, pointing to a fatal mistake that opponents of any form of Syrian intervention are making. It starts with a commonly heard analogy—that of the US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The error and ensuing false conclusions are not in the chosen wars per se, but rather their cited starting dates. Afghanistan’s conflict, for instance, did not start in 2001, but rather in the late 1970’s with the Soviet invasion and the Jihadi resistance, which the United States fully supported. When the Soviets finally left, the Americans instead of modestly investing to develop an independent Afghan state, quite bafflingly decided to depart as well, leaving the Taliban and Al Qaeda to fill the void. As history would prove, this strategic blunder caused a chain of historical events that directly led to the September 11th attacks in New York and the Pentagon, costing hundreds of billions. Eventually, it proved to be nothing but a procrastination with the United States forced to re-enter into Afghanistan, but this time in a much lengthier and costly war.
Opponents also cite the Second Iraqi War debacle and its massive cost. ‘Syria would be a bigger mess,’ they conclude. But again, they are citing an incomplete war story, which should start with the First Iraqi War. Led by President George H. Bush, the strategic objective of the First Iraqi War was to get Saddam out of Kuwait and substantially curb his power inside Iraq through crippling sanctions and no-fly zones. This war was a resounding success. It was swift, cost relatively few lives, and much less US tax-payer money—the bill for the most part was footed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. And yet by its end and with Baghdad in its sights and Saddam’s army on the run, instead of ridding Iraq of its dictator at a minor marginal cost, the allies decided to keep him in place, hoping that his presence would “stabilize” Iraq or in the very least stir its people to a popular revolt. It did everything to the contrary. Emboldened, Saddam would violently repress these revolts, would become richer than ever, more menacing, and belligerent. As the world watched, his cripplingly sanctioned nation and people fell into illness, poverty, and hunger. Fast forward a decade, the younger George W. Bush, with almost the same executive team as his father, found it inevitable to reverse the policy 180 degrees citing global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats as the primary arguments for a full-on invasion to finally rid Iraq of its dictator. Unfortunately, the dubiously substantiated Second Iraqi War mustered a much smaller coalition and as a result cost the US dearly—almost three thousand lives and trillions of Dollars of treasury. Again, delaying the inevitable ended up costing the US and Western powers much more than anyone could have ever imagined.
The obvious geopolitical question to be asked from the above often cited cases is how much of these costly wars could have been averted had the proper policies been implemented the first time around? Analysts argue that in the late 1980’s, a few hundred million dollars constructing Afghan schools and helping the state rebuild itself would have gone a long way in averting the terrorism that led to September 11th. Similarly, in Iraq, had Saddam been removed from power after the First Iraqi War, with much wider international support, in all likelihood a democratization process could have begun earlier, costing Western powers much less lives and treasure.
Coming back to the case of Syria, when the Syrian uprisings began in 2011, the chips were all stacked (locally, regionally, and internationally) in favor of a swift and resounding removal of the dictatorial regime and its replacement with a more inclusive democratic form of government. The conditions were ripe for a much less tempestuous transformation—not unlike the cases of Afghanistan in the late 1980’s and Iraq in the early 1990’s. And yet, quite tragically, the West once again looked away, leaning towards fairly passive involvement. But the situation has been deteriorating by the day: The Syrian opposition has been weakened, the regime managed to regroup, and radicals have begun filling the void. Of course, atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, the razing of rebel cities, and chemical attacks have irreparably scarred the nation and its people. The situation continues to worsen.
As policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic ponder what to do next, they will need to consider the following two points: First, while there may be a strong moral hazard argument to be made for punitive action against the Syrian regime for directly or indirectly causing the chemical attacks, in itself this argument may not be enough. Second, a more compelling argument is that of hard interests being affected by an inevitable face-off. Syria is no longer just a regional ticking time bomb (that one exploded as far back as 2011). Rather, it is quickly deteriorating into a global calamity with incalculable tentacles not unlike those that eventually led to the September 11th catastrophe and the ensuing Afghan and Iraqi wars. This inevitability means that the West needs to act comprehensively and now to control the damage that Syria’s deterioration is causing on its own interests. The cost of deferment of such an inevitable face-off will only increase by the day. If real politik is to be applied, this is the primary geopolitical lesson to be learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and not the procrastination leading up to them.
Wissam S. Yafi is the author of Inevitable Democracy: New Realities in the Arab World published by Palgrave MacMillan.
