On the Merits of Criticizing the Lebanese Government and Demanding its Resignation

There are some in Lebanon who claim that criticizing the government implicitly weakens the state without helping much. Given the current situation in the country and the region, the government cannot do much better, they claim. It is an interesting argument, and one whose detractors would quickly respond to by claiming that in fact no government could do much worse, pointing to protracted crises in water, electricity, sewage, public education, the economy, and national security. How could any self-respecting government stay in place if it cannot deal with any of these issues?

The fundamental question that begs itself, however, is: Does criticizing the government help or hurt the state? The answer indelibly must begin by highlighting a key difference: A state is not defined by a single government, but rather all its governments and institutions past, present, and future. Therefore, having a strong state is one thing, while assessing the government and justifying a mediocre performance in the name of safeguarding the state is another. One could very well argue, for instance, that only through constant government performance monitoring and accountability can any nation hope to build a stronger state. Whereas, protecting inefficient governments from any form of criticism is the surest way to mediocrity and a debilitation of the state. So perhaps the real question here is this: Is one not implicitly calling for a stronger state when asking for the changing of the guard of an underperforming government?

Another question to ask here: Who stands to benefit from having no political criticism in the name of "safeguarding the state" and why? History has shown that typically, dictatorships and autocracies use the "weakening of the state" argument to fend off critics, imprison, or banish them. For such systems, criticism of any form is seen as a threat to the existence of the state, simply because such systems assume that the government and the state are amalgamated into one big blob. And since these systems have no use for political opposition, the "weakening of the state" argument gets used often to justify clamping down on any form of dissent. Interestingly, while no dissent historically gave an impression of monolithic power, it has proven to be quite hollow. The Soviet regime, Latin American juntas, and Arab dictators all tried to get away with it and failed.

More plural societies who allow for criticism tend to do better with social experiments continuously yielding new ideas and energy through the constant changing of the guard. In time, this heterogeneous approach tends to create a stronger core and a stronger state. Unfortunately, in the case of Lebanon, which is also a relatively plural society, considering the tragic state of national affairs, one needs to ask whether it is possible not to criticize the government and demand its resignation at a time when bad governance can be seen, heard, touched, and even smelled daily everywhere in the country. For instance, how can one not be critical when for the past 15 years electricity has been promised but not delivered. How about water shortage in some cities, while it floods other regions? What about the public teacher salaries issue which resulted in strikes and also remains unresolved; and the garbage catastrophe befallen the nation, with no collection for months. And last but certainly not least, what about the ill-equipped Lebanese security services being asked to face a very difficult regional security situation? What gives any government the right to expect not to be criticized for its failure to resolve any of these issues? What gives it the right to remain in office?

These questions were alluded to somewhat by the outgoing British ambassador to Lebanon, Tom Fletcher, declaring that his government would likely have fallen if it had simply faced the predicament of the ongoing Lebanese garbage crisis (let alone all the others). His statement is historically correct and many a British government has been laid to rest for much less an infringement. Indeed, some were even dispensed with at their zenith. The case of Winston Churchill being thrown out of office weeks after winning World War II (while the post-war Potsdam conference was still in session!) is a classic example. The British public thought that their future lay elsewhere and sent him home. To argue that all this change of government was intended to weaken the British state is foolhardy. In fact, the entire British empire, from China to the Americas, was built on the ashes of expired governments.

Lebanon's history and future will never rest on one government, but on an institutional revolving door. This government as others will have to accept criticism and respond to it. As it has shown itself unable to, then as others before it, it will have to leave by the revolving door, paving the way for another to come in- one better equipped to provide serious answers to the nation. The net result will not be a weaker but a much stronger Lebanese state.

Is Syria’s Destiny Resting on False Geopolitical Analogy?

In the wake of the chemical gas attack in Syria that killed almost 1500 people, the debate in the West has centered on whether or not to apply a military response. Proponents argue for its compelling moral case and the moral hazard derived from not doing anything. Opponents rest their arguments primarily on analogies made with the post September 11^th, 2001 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—citing exorbitant costs in both blood and treasury and the lack of any hard interests in Syria.

At the outset, I will refrain from arguing the case on any moral grounds and voluntarily cede to counter-arguments of equivalent military immorality utilized by other regional powers in such places as Palestine and Lebanon. I am even willing to cede on the immoral use of nuclear weapons as far back as the Second World War and chemical ones during Vietnam.

With morality to the side, I would instead like to focus on real politik and the hard interests at play, pointing to a fatal mistake that opponents of any form of Syrian intervention are making. It starts with a commonly heard analogy—that of the US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The error and ensuing false conclusions are not in the chosen wars per se, but rather their cited starting dates. Afghanistan’s conflict, for instance, did not start in 2001, but rather in the late 1970’s with the Soviet invasion and the Jihadi resistance, which the United States fully supported. When the Soviets finally left, the Americans instead of modestly investing to develop an independent Afghan state, quite bafflingly decided to depart as well, leaving the Taliban and Al Qaeda to fill the void. As history would prove, this strategic blunder caused a chain of historical events that directly led to the September 11^th attacks in New York and the Pentagon, costing hundreds of billions. Eventually, it proved to be nothing but a procrastination with the United States forced to re-enter into Afghanistan, but this time in a much lengthier and costly war.

Opponents also cite the Second Iraqi War debacle and its massive cost. ‘Syria would be a bigger mess,’ they conclude. But again, they are citing an incomplete war story, which should start with the First Iraqi War. Led by President George H. Bush, the strategic objective of the First Iraqi War was to get Saddam out of Kuwait and substantially curb his power inside Iraq through crippling sanctions and no-fly zones. This war was a resounding success. It was swift, cost relatively few lives, and much less US tax-payer money—the bill for the most part was footed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. And yet by its end and with Baghdad in its sights and Saddam’s army on the run, instead of ridding Iraq of its dictator at a minor marginal cost, the allies decided to keep him in place, hoping that his presence would “stabilize” Iraq or in the very least stir its people to a popular revolt. It did everything to the contrary. Emboldened, Saddam would violently repress these revolts, would become richer than ever, more menacing, and belligerent. As the world watched, his cripplingly sanctioned nation and people fell into illness, poverty, and hunger. Fast forward a decade, the younger George W. Bush, with almost the same executive team as his father, found it inevitable to reverse the policy 180 degrees citing global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats as the primary arguments for a full-on invasion to finally rid Iraq of its dictator. Unfortunately, the dubiously substantiated Second Iraqi War mustered a much smaller coalition and as a result cost the US dearly—almost three thousand lives and trillions of Dollars of treasury. Again, delaying the inevitable ended up costing the US and Western powers much more than anyone could have ever imagined.

The obvious geopolitical question to be asked from the above often cited cases is how much of these costly wars could have been averted had the proper policies been implemented the first time around? Analysts argue that in the late 1980’s, a few hundred million dollars constructing Afghan schools and helping the state rebuild itself would have gone a long way in averting the terrorism that led to September 11^th. Similarly, in Iraq, had Saddam been removed from power after the First Iraqi War, with much wider international support, in all likelihood a democratization process could have begun earlier, costing Western powers much less lives and treasure.

Coming back to the case of Syria, when the Syrian uprisings began in 2011, the chips were all stacked (locally, regionally, and internationally) in favor of a swift and resounding removal of the dictatorial regime and its replacement with a more inclusive democratic form of government. The conditions were ripe for a much less tempestuous transformation—not unlike the cases of Afghanistan in the late 1980’s and Iraq in the early 1990’s. And yet, quite tragically, the West once again looked away, leaning towards fairly passive involvement. But the situation has been deteriorating by the day: The Syrian opposition has been weakened, the regime managed to regroup, and radicals have begun filling the void. Of course, atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, the razing of rebel cities, and chemical attacks have irreparably scarred the nation and its people. The situation continues to worsen.

As policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic ponder what to do next, they will need to consider the following two points: First, while there may be a strong moral hazard argument to be made for punitive action against the Syrian regime for directly or indirectly causing the chemical attacks, in itself this argument may not be  enough. Second, a more compelling argument is that of hard interests being affected by an inevitable face-off. Syria is no longer just a regional ticking time bomb (that one exploded as far back as 2011). Rather, it is quickly deteriorating into a global calamity with incalculable tentacles not unlike those that eventually led to the September 11^th catastrophe and the ensuing Afghan and Iraqi wars. This inevitability means that the West needs to act comprehensively and now to control the damage that Syria’s deterioration is causing on its own interests. The cost of deferment of such an inevitable face-off will only increase by the day. If real politik is to be applied, this is the primary geopolitical lesson to be learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and not the procrastination leading up to them.

Wissam S. Yafi is the author of Inevitable Democracy: New Realities in the Arab World published by Palgrave MacMillan.

The New Frontier by Gibran Khalil Gibran (Short works ,1925)

I accidentally came across a gem written by Gibran Khalil as far back as 1925!

"There are in the Middle East today two challenging ideas: old and new. The old ideas will vanish because they are weak and exhausted. There is in the Middle East an awakening that defies slumber. This awakening will conquer because the sun is its leader and the dawn is its army... 

In the fields of the Middle East, which have been a large burial ground, stand the youth of Spring calling the occupants of the sepulchers to rise and march toward the new frontiers. When the Spring sings its hymns the dead of the winter rise, shed their shrouds and march forward ...

There is on the horizon of the Middle East a new awakening; it is growing and expanding; it is reaching and engulfing all sensitive, intelligent souls; it is penetrating and gaining all the sympathy of noble hearts.

There are today, in the Middle East, two men: one of the past and one of the future. Which one are you? Come close, let me look at you and let me be assured by your appearance and your conduct if you are one of those coming into the light or going into the darkness."

- Gibran Khail Gibran, The New Frontier, 1925

Is Libya’s Democracy Dead or Very Much Alive?

The recent violence in Libya’s second largest city, Ben Ghazi, which led to the death of American ambassador Chris Steven, rang many an alarm bell in Western capitals—not least of which Washington—whose interests were directly targeted. Does this tragic incident represent the death knell of Libya’s nascent democracy? Is this North African nation falling into hopeless chaos following in the footsteps of its south eastern African neighbor, Somalia? Will it all be interpreted by the international community as a hopeless process, leading them to throw-in the towel on its democratization?

I will hence argue that the answer to these three questions is a resounding no. Indeed while uncertainty persists regarding the details of the tragic incident, the undeniable certainty that has emerged is that rather counter-intuitively it has led to the speeding up of the Libyan democratization process, and for increased international community engagement.

With respect to the first question, far from showcasing a nation whose democracy is dying, the recent tragic incident actually presented one whose democratization process while slow is actually cementing itself on different fronts. Elections, an open press, freedom of demonstration, and the peaceful transition of governmental have all begun transpiring—all of which are fundamental cornerstones to a well-functioning democracy. Not held for almost six decades, elections were successfully organized and won by secular parties in direct opposition to an Islamic regional trend, lending credence to their impartiality. The results were generally accepted by the Libyan population, a congress was elected, and a Prime Minister was tasked with forming a cabinet. Once the attacks transpired, local and international press reported in real time with no censorship. Stories and complaints of roaming militias paralleled those of how some Libyans had aided the stricken ambassador out of the burning building and had tried to save his life. As soon as news of the American ambassador’s death emerged, an outpouring of support followed. Massive peace demonstrations took place all over Libya in honor of what many described as a stalwart supporter of the Libyan revolution. That it came from the Libyan people was proof to the world that it was genuine. And finally, when it comes to the peaceful transition of power, since Gaddafi’s fall, several cabinet reshuffles have occurred to garner the support and allay the fears of the different parts of the country, its tribes, as well as the militias. The latest occurred when the elected Libyan congress appointed Mustafa Abu Shagur as Prime Minister. Unable to form a cabinet over the summer, he was soon replaced with Ali Zidan. All the above tend to point to an emerging Libyan democracy not one, which is about to expire.

Of course some prefer to shed light on Libya’s chaotic post-revolutionary state, claiming that it seems to be following in the footsteps of Somalia. They point to the absence of government armed forces and the preponderance of roaming Libyan militias, which have not yet been disarmed. While this is true, most regional experts understand that some of these militias are currently essential to maintaining order while the government’s armed forces—decimated under Gaddafi’s police state—ramp up. But again the recent calamity seems to have led to a positive outcome as the Libyan head of state, Mohammed Magarief, immediately announced a round-up of many of the smaller and uncontrolled revolutionary militias. In parallel, the government began negotiating timelines with the larger ones for them to join the armed forces. Furthermore, an investigation into the killing was launched and soon followed up with arrests. These are all positive signs of a government trying to take back institutionalized control, not one which is disintegrating. Things are likely to get better as unlike Somalia, the government of Libya is fortunate in that it has oil resources to support its plans, appease the different groups, and deliver on the promise of a strong central government. What Libya needs to accomplish this is time.

And finally, in terms of the international community giving up on Libya, nothing seems to be further from the truth. Indicative of this fact was the United States’ response to the tragedy. Notwithstanding the fact it had lost four members of its diplomatic corps, its measured reaction balanced a strong will to get to the bottom of what happened with an understanding of the shortcomings of the Libyan transitional government. Both the United States and Europe seem cognizant of the difficulties the Libyan government is facing reconstructing its apparatus and institutions after forty years of dictatorship. Their support remains steadfast; and less than two weeks after the incident occurred, the Libyan Prime Minister was welcomed to the United Nations and invited to the Clinton Global Initiative with arms wide open. If anything, Libya’s struggle was garnering the international community’s sympathy and support, not criticism, and certainly not blame. This global support would have been unheard of a handful of months earlier under Gaddafi’s dictatorial regime when a violent incident such as this would surely have led to strong international retaliatory measures against the entire nation.

As tragically ironic as it may seem, Ambassador Steven’s death seems to have given impulse to Libya’s democracy as opposed to weakening it. The nation he was trying to help has shown itself to be as grateful for his support as it was sorrowful for his passing.  To be sure, Libya is not yet a full-fledged democracy; but facts do increasingly point to it being on the right track nonetheless. Democratization may be slow and messy; and there may be major bumps and incidents along the way. In Libya, it won’t be any different. In the meantime, all indications continue to point to the fact that the Libyan people want democracy; the fledgling Libyan government is working on making it a reality; and the international community is committed to its support. All this leads to the conclusion that Libya’s democracy is very much alive and kicking. If anything, this should go down as Ambassador Steven’s dying legacy.

Interview on Global Voice Hall

This was a recent Arabic interview on the book held by journalist Ahmed Abdul Razzaq on Global Voice Hall. The specific topic of discussion was Lebanon and regional instability effects on its democracy.

http://www.globalvoicehall.com/al_mihak_episode_17.

According to the attached Agence France Press article, Libya's elections will field some 3700 candidates, of which 200 will be chosen by a total of 3 million eligible constituents 80% of whom have been shown to want an election ... And all this less than 1-year from the end of an almost 40-year Gadhafi dictatorship.

Can anybody still doubt the Arab people's true desire for democracy?

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/45814-libyans-cast-ballots-in-post-gadhafi-vote-some-polling-stations-closed

Congratulations Egypt on your election ! Here's to a better future free of corruption and nepotism ... It won't be easy any which way. Hang in there for the ride ... For now, all Egyptians should be proud of there democratic accomplishment. Go Egypt !!!

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18571580