Building a Bridge Between Constitutional Trenches

Lately some prominent Lebanese politicians have been vehemently rejecting—and on several grounds—the suggestion of a new constitutional assembly meant to introduce a new constitution. First, in light of the current political gridlock, they state that it would not be the right time. Second, they raise fears that it would likely come at the expense of minorities and may lead the country into an unknown. Third, they assert that no fair constitutional settlement can come about when one party is privy to weapons, while the others are not. And finally, they use the argument that the post-civil war constitution has yet to be implemented to begin with; and until it is, it would be pointless to discuss another constitutional assembly.

On the other side of the debate, those calling for a Constitutional assembly maintain that the country has fared disastrously for seven decades under the current constitution, so have the minorities. They point to an endemic lack of governance and accountability as being symptomatic of a deficient social contract, which needs ripping and replacing. They claim that a constitutional assembly drawing a new constitution is in fact the only way to fend off any of Lebanon’s communities who are trying to usurp power through an edict of “fait acompli”. And finally, they conclude that waiting for any previous constitution to be implemented is a fool’s errand adhering to an old Lebanese proverb, “If it were going to rain, it would have clouded”.

Of course the backdrop to all this debate is that Lebanon is seeing one of the worst constitutional crises in its history, with parliamentary elections postponed twice (and already talk of a third postponement), a Presidency seat vacant for more than 2 years, a gridlocked ministerial cabinet barely able to govern, and an inconsequential constitutional high court system. All the while, the nation is faced with immense security challenges, a massive national debt, uncontrollable fiscal deficits, water, energy and service delivery shortages, and a protracted influx of refugees that many fear will be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

In light of all the above, are either of the two sides in a position to win the debate and somehow convince the entire nation of a transcendental step in either of the polar opposite directions? Or is there perhaps a third way—a compromise of sorts?

On the one hand, the Anti-New Constitutional Order are implicitly arguing that the current system is the best anyone can get. Theirs is a somewhat strategically weak position, considering the deteriorating state of the nation. The primary question these Antis have to face, though, is whether it would be better to look at options now or to wait. If they wait and gridlock persists, they risk seeing a calamity unfold (financial or otherwise) placing them in an even weaker negotiating position. On the other hand, those in the Pro New Constitutional Order find themselves in a slightly less precarious strategic position, because facts generally support their argument of system dysfunctionality: Nothing seems to be working. The problem for the Pros, however, is that they face an opposition which sees itself in a zero sum game. This means the more the Pro-Constitutional Assembly group over-reaches in its demands, the more entrenched the Anti-group will become, having little to lose. Delays leading to systemic breakdown and chaos do not really help the Pros either, whose entire reasoning one assumes is to act to strengthen the state.

And so the question that emerges is can a compromise be reached; and is there an alternative Constitutional instrument that could possibly help bridge the emerging chasm?; and whose primary purpose would be to allow sufficient reform to get the wheels of government moving, while simultaneously allaying the fears of the Antis? The answer is yes, there is a constitutional instrument that can provide a middle ground; and it is what is typically referred to as a Bill of Rights.

A Bill of Rights essentially introduces certain basic rights that the Lebanese people are demanding to compensate for salient Constitutional deficiencies, while re-affirming the current Lebanese Constitution. It would aim to shift the focus of the Constitutional debate to that of protecting citizen rights. Of course, those rights that are already in the constitution, would remain the law of the land, whereas the new rights assure further protection from abuse. A Bill of Rights properly elaborated would also introduce mechanisms for guaranteeing that the Lebanese Constitution as well as amendments found in the Ta’ef accord, not only are properly respected, but thoroughly implemented. The overarching goal of a Bill of Rights would be to strengthen the Lebanese state by introducing the necessary tools to avoid gridlock, while balancing it with an eternal check on its power by the citizens themselves.

How are the Pros and the Antis likely to react to the concept of a Bill of Rights? Since there would be no constitutional assembly, the Antis should no longer be fearful of entering discussions. Indeed, a Bill of Rights could prove to be exactly the tool needed to strengthen the rights they so fear losing. Whereas the Pros who favor constitutional changes would also be satisfied, as such a Bill could bring the needed ingredients that can add stability and strengthen the state, without risking the entire enterprise. A Bill of Rights means both sides end up net beneficiaries: The different communities in Lebanon would find a way to protect their individual rights and their way of life, while the state is reformed and fortified.

As the Lebanese state sees a steady decline, can the Lebanese afford to sit idle and remain polarized in their Constitutional trenches? Or is it time for opposing communities to unite and try to build bridges towards a more positive future? If so, it appears there may be no other solution that represents an opportunity for a fair compromise, except for a Lebanese Citizen Bill of Rights.

Conversation with Syrian Refugees in a Camp outside Munich, Germany

I am in Unterschleissheim, a tech hub suburb of Munich in Germany. For a couple of days I had been going to business meetings in the area. Close by in the neighborhood, I spotted a small camp with a gate and sign that says Caritas. I also saw what looked like Middle Eastern men milling about or sitting on a bench basking in the sun whenever the weather permitted.

My wife by my side, I decided to stop by and talk to them to learn their story. As I approached the short open fence, I was not sure I would be allowed to speak to them, even though I could not see any security or police anywhere near.

- Marhaba (Hello), my name is Wissam. I was passing by and thought of stopping by to say hello. I am Lebanese.

The man looked at me silently for a moment, then broke a shy smile.

"Ahlan (Welcome), my name is Omar. Sorry my hands are a bit greasy. I have been fixing our community bikes."

- Are you a Syrian refugee? I asked.

Omar: Yes, most of us here are.

- Which part of Syria are you from?

Omar: Deir el Zor. But there are guys from all over in this little camp.

- I am from Beirut but I live in America. I am visiting Munich on business. How did you end up here in Munich?

Omar: Well, it was quite a long trip. Difficult to believe now ...  Walking, running, swimming, cars, buses, trains. Through Lebanon and Turkey ...

- Are you here with your family?

Omar: No I came alone. My family is still in Syria. We are all men here in this camp.

- Why aren't there any women?

Omar: Most couldn't take the trip. Once in Germany, the authorities put us single men in refuge camps like this and families with kids in other places.

- It must have been difficult for you to leave your family behind.

Yes, I miss them and we are all working on trying to bring them over in a safer way.

- May I ask why you decided to leave Syria?

Omar: I was forced to make a very difficult choice. Either leave or fight.

- What do you mean?

Omar: I received a letter inviting me to join the army, I decided with my wife that I would leave the next day before being forced into the army. I am an accountant not a fighter.

- You are an accountant?

Omar: Yes. I was the controller of a bank, a Lebanese bank in Syria actually, the Franco Libanais.

- Oh wow. Is everyone here this professional?

Omar: No, there are different backgrounds and different levels of education. Some cannot read Latin characters only Arabic. Others are ok and have begun learning the German language very quickly. (He breaks out showing off his German to my wife).

- Are you still in touch with your family back home Omar?

Omar: Yes, all the time.

- Really, how?

Omar: WhatsApp, Facebook, Skype, Email.

- You mean Syria still has Internet?

Omar: Yes, most cities still have it. This guy is from Qamishle. He is in touch with his family every day. The other one is from Damascus suburbs. The same. (They all come close to say hello)

- Are you allowed to leave this camp whenever you want?

Omar: Yes, of course, we are refugees not prisoners.

- How have you been treated by Germany?

Omar: Quite well. They have given us shelter, they give us a stipend, and are processing our refugee paperwork.

- You mean you are now legal?

Omar: Yes, some of us are, for the others its in the works. This is my refugee passport and ID. I am now allowed to travel all over Europe with it.

- Have you interacted with the local community?

Omar: We receive six-hour daily  German lessons, so some of us can now interact better. We are now trying to give back by providing Arabic courses to the community.

- Do the people treat you well here, Omar?

Omar: Yes, but they don't really know us. Some of them are afraid to interact with us not knowing what to expect. Everyone has heard of refugees but few actually get to meet them. Maybe once housing opens up, we can mix better.

- When will you be allowed to live outside the camp?

Omar: Once you are given papers. But here in Bavaria housing is not easy, so some of us have been here for eight months in this small camp, even though we already have papers. Hopefully, housing will become available soon. But its ok here and it has all the basic needs. Would you like to see the camp inside?

- Sure.

Omar: Let's sign you in first ... We don't really need to but its better. [We walk through gates to one of the modules and go in a door that says administration. To Caritas admin in Arabic]: These guys are here to visit us, can you please sign them in?

- He looks German. How come he speaks Arabic?

Omar: Actually, he is half German half Iraqi.

- Interesting to see how this housing was built.

Omar: All this housing was built out of containers.

- Looks nice on the inside. Do they clean it for you?

Omar: No, we keep it clean and organized ourselves. It is spacious. Here is our laundry room ... Our kitchen area. We buy our own food and cook ... This is our classroom. Would you like to see some of our bedrooms?

- Sure

Omar: Most have one or two beds, a closet, and a small fridge.

- I see you have Arabic pita bread.

Omar: We buy it from the Middle Eastern bakery in the town. Would you like to have some tea? Please sit down and I will invite some friends to join.

- Do you miss home, Omar?

Omar: There is no place like home.

- Would you ever go back?

Omar: Yes if the situation was better. But our region is not good for a family; and I am hoping to settle here once my family can join me.

- Have you been affected by the war?

Omar: Every Syrian has been affected by the war. My nephew was forced to join the army 6 years ago. His mother, my sister, has not been able to see him since. He is having to fight against his cousins and neighbors. I cannot imagine how he will be if he ever comes back. He was an innocent kid.

- Has your city been as affected as Hallab or Homs?

Omar: Most cities in Syria have been. He is from the reef of Damascus (suburbs) which are basically cities outside the city of Damascus and there has also been massive destruction there. We now have a housing problem here in Bavaria as much as we have it in Syria!

- What are your hopes for the future?

Omar: To live in peace, be productive, and raise a happy family.

Will Expats Boycott the Lebanese Government?

Over the past few weeks, scenes broadcast from Lebanon have reached the far corners of the globe. Lebanese expats from Australia to Argentina have seen the waste management calamity in Lebanon and protesters demanding accountability while the government offers no response or solution—only tightening security measures. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the expats are indeed concerned if not alarmed by the situation. So much so, that many of them launched their own protests in London, Paris, New York, Boston, Washington, and other global cities expressing their frustration at the government’s mishandling of the crisis. Why are the Expats so incensed? Who are they supporting? And what are they beginning to call for?

To begin with, one has to keep in mind that the Lebanese expats in themselves are not uniform. They represent different regions and backgrounds in Lebanon, diverse points of view, varying levels of education, and disparate attachments to the homeland. And yet, they do indelibly share one common trait; and that is their exile from their homeland. Generally, their departure was linked to opportunity, which implicitly was absent in Lebanon, and had to be sought elsewhere. For opportunity to be lacking within the context of Lebanon, essentially means that in all likelihood the expat was not part of the patron political system that would have offered a slice of the country’s spoils. Meaning, most expats never received benefits from the incumbent system. Instead not unlike many citizens in Lebanon, expats have had to pay a heavy price, leaving behind their lives, homes, friends, and loved ones.

But why would expats even care; after all, the crisis may be thousands of kilometers away and does not affect them in their daily lives? They are exasperated for two reasons. First, they know that the political system and elite responsible for the current crisis is the very same one behind their own exile. In fact, most of the people in power now have been there since the 1980’s, with minor exceptions. Second, expats have come to the sad realization that the slow dismemberment of the Lebanese state by this ruling elite now poses an existential threat to their own dreams of ever returning to a viable homeland. It is one thing for some public official to get a policy or another wrong and of little consequence. It is of an entirely different dimension altogether to see the slow but sure crumbling of a country to which one hopes to return one day by an intransigent system controlled by an elite few.

And so the question of who expats support is one not difficult to answer. They are naturally against the incumbent political class; and they are for those who are calling for change and for solutions to real problems. To Lebanese expats who live in free societies with basic citizen rights, it has become incomprehensible to see fellow countrymen’s rights being abused back in the homeland—be it the right to live in a clean and healthy environment, the right to hold public officials accountable, the right to ask for government transparency, or the right to vote. These are basic demands that expats have grown accustomed to in North and South America, Europe, Australia—even parts of Asia and Africa. To see them denied back home now, means they will continue being denied to expats upon their eventual return; and this is unacceptable.

So what are the expats beginning to call for? They are calling for the return of basic rights to all Lebanese citizens, which would provide for a responsive and accountable government, meeting the people’s needs. This means having rights that provide for a healthy, prosperous, and happy life, with opportunities, social justice and security. Expats believe anything less than that, would mean perpetuating the existing corrupt system and cause more national pain, which would destroy their dream of returning one day. Perhaps this explains why some Lebanese expats are beginning to call for a boycott of the Lebanese government, through a halt of investments and repatriation of funds (which is backbone of the national economy); while others are threatening that if the government does not hold accountable the ministers of environment and interior for the mishandling of the crisis and rather remains intransigent; they are even ready to relinquish their Lebanese citizenship altogether. In the current sad state of the nation, expats really would have little to lose. To Lebanon, however, whose livelihood depends so much on expat remittances, the cost may prove to be immeasurable.

Taking Advantage of Lebanon's Waste before it goes to Waste

Early in 2014, Lebanon faced a garbage crisis due to community complaints of an overfilled dump in the area of Naameh, which services the nation's capital, Beirut. The crisis was averted after an agreement was reached between the protesters and the incoming Prime Minister, Tammam Salam who confirmed that as soon as he is in power (he was sworn in that February), he will “establish an emergency committee to fix the situation as soon as possible.” Fast forward 18 months, the same Prime Minister and cabinet, having never fulfilled their promise to solve the issue, are now scampering to manage an even larger garbage crisis. Not only has Naameh been shut down again, but other regions in the country have revolted and refused to become new destinations for Beirut's garbage. While the capital's streets as well as those of neighboring regions have been contaminated with massive pile-ups of garbage, the Lebanese civil society has begun piling up it's own pressure, launching the "You Stink" campaign, in protest of the government's mishandling of the crisis. They recently began transferring some of the garbage piles to the front porches of buildings where cabinet ministers live. Several police face-offs have resulted.

The international community for its part has also registered concern. The British ambassador declared that had his country faced such a garbage crisis, the government would very likely have fallen. Meanwhile, it was being reported that his German counterpart offered Lebanon to pick up it's garbage and send it to Europe for the cost of $70 - $100 per ton of garbage, as compared to the staggering $147 per ton it was costing Lebanon under its current contracts. Under increasing pressure from all sides, the government urgently issued RFPs for new garbage collection contracts (Leaving one wondering what they had been doing for the past 18 months). But while bidders await adjudication, environmental groups and concerned citizens have begun voicing complaints and concerns that the measures being taken by the government are merely diversionary tactics, and will not get to the root of the problem.

The first complaint is that in Lebanon, the issue is now larger than just garbage; and includes the entire cycle of what happens to waste. Experts point to the fact that in developed nations only 5% of the total waste now goes to the dumps as garbage. The rest is all recycled or made into compost to be used in agriculture or even to produce energy. By simply contracting new garbage collection agencies and keeping all the old methods intact, not only would it not solve the dumps running at overcapacity, it would not optimize waste management nor will it resolve several reported environmental issues in the areas around the dumps.

The second complaint is that of existing over-capacity dumps being left in their current state with little if any environmental oversight or care--be it with respect to the radioactivity they emit, the temperature rises they cause, or the black liquid seepage that could end up in the nation's water supply. Protestors are asking whether any of these new potential contractors are equipped to handle this crucial element?

The third concern and corollary to the previous one has to do with the modern mining of trash that many nations have delved into, realizing the wealth of material that could exist in old dumps. Everything from Steel to wood to plastic can be mined, separated, and monetized. The idea here is to assure old dumping ground and the communities around them, that they will be mined, cleaned, and reduced in both toxicity as well as volume.

The fourth complaint is that the paradigm being used currently as well as those being put out for contracting are archaic. Whereas old methods included separation of materials at the source (different bins for different garbage type), modern equipment makes it easy to separate material in real time, avoiding the initial cost of separation or the need for multiple collection cycles and trucks. Instead, new technology allows the collection of garbage and its separation into recyclable material, compost, and trash. It's all done on the go. Experts in Germany say that in the long term, this is the most efficient and least expensive method. They recommend that nations who are about to deploy national waste management systems look into these as opposed to expired methods and paradigms.

The fifth concern is that of economic development. Lebanese jobs could be created from collection to processing, mining, and recycling. In talking with one trusted expert in Germany, he summarized it succinctly in one phrase: The environment is good for business. So before Lebanon decides to ship off these jobs Asia, Germany, or anywhere else, protestors are insisting that the government take a look closer to home for solutions that can involve and help the Lebanese themselves.

The last but certainly not least of complaints is that of lack of decentralization. Naturally, all Lebanese regions produce garbage and most have expressed a willingness to deal with their own waste. The primary problem is Beirut's trash, which rightfully no one wants to contaminate their backyard with. So the question is how to involve the disparate Lebanese regions so that they can share in the cost but also in the benefits that proper waste management offers.

In voicing the above complaints, protestors are presenting positive ideas that can create more harmony between the capital, Beirut and the regions, whereby the national waste management becomes fair for all, decentralized, economically viable, and above all environmentally sustainable. The German offer to collect Lebanon's garbage while appreciated should raise a question mark in the mind of Lebanese policy makers. How come one of the world's richest and advanced nations can offer to collect Lebanese garbage at HALF the cost that we have been paying all these past years, including shipping it to Europe? And what is the current government going to do IMMEDIATELY to assure that the paradigm and technology, which will be contracted for a comprehensive waste management solution will in the short, medium, and long term extract every possible efficiency yielding a clean, environmental, and rewarding process for all Lebanese regions? Protestors are awaiting the government's reply. If it comes back negatively, then in all likelihood many of these protestors will revert to asking the government to take the British ambassador's advice.

On the Merits of Criticizing the Lebanese Government and Demanding its Resignation

There are some in Lebanon who claim that criticizing the government implicitly weakens the state without helping much. Given the current situation in the country and the region, the government cannot do much better, they claim. It is an interesting argument, and one whose detractors would quickly respond to by claiming that in fact no government could do much worse, pointing to protracted crises in water, electricity, sewage, public education, the economy, and national security. How could any self-respecting government stay in place if it cannot deal with any of these issues?

The fundamental question that begs itself, however, is: Does criticizing the government help or hurt the state? The answer indelibly must begin by highlighting a key difference: A state is not defined by a single government, but rather all its governments and institutions past, present, and future. Therefore, having a strong state is one thing, while assessing the government and justifying a mediocre performance in the name of safeguarding the state is another. One could very well argue, for instance, that only through constant government performance monitoring and accountability can any nation hope to build a stronger state. Whereas, protecting inefficient governments from any form of criticism is the surest way to mediocrity and a debilitation of the state. So perhaps the real question here is this: Is one not implicitly calling for a stronger state when asking for the changing of the guard of an underperforming government?

Another question to ask here: Who stands to benefit from having no political criticism in the name of "safeguarding the state" and why? History has shown that typically, dictatorships and autocracies use the "weakening of the state" argument to fend off critics, imprison, or banish them. For such systems, criticism of any form is seen as a threat to the existence of the state, simply because such systems assume that the government and the state are amalgamated into one big blob. And since these systems have no use for political opposition, the "weakening of the state" argument gets used often to justify clamping down on any form of dissent. Interestingly, while no dissent historically gave an impression of monolithic power, it has proven to be quite hollow. The Soviet regime, Latin American juntas, and Arab dictators all tried to get away with it and failed.

More plural societies who allow for criticism tend to do better with social experiments continuously yielding new ideas and energy through the constant changing of the guard. In time, this heterogeneous approach tends to create a stronger core and a stronger state. Unfortunately, in the case of Lebanon, which is also a relatively plural society, considering the tragic state of national affairs, one needs to ask whether it is possible not to criticize the government and demand its resignation at a time when bad governance can be seen, heard, touched, and even smelled daily everywhere in the country. For instance, how can one not be critical when for the past 15 years electricity has been promised but not delivered. How about water shortage in some cities, while it floods other regions? What about the public teacher salaries issue which resulted in strikes and also remains unresolved; and the garbage catastrophe befallen the nation, with no collection for months. And last but certainly not least, what about the ill-equipped Lebanese security services being asked to face a very difficult regional security situation? What gives any government the right to expect not to be criticized for its failure to resolve any of these issues? What gives it the right to remain in office?

These questions were alluded to somewhat by the outgoing British ambassador to Lebanon, Tom Fletcher, declaring that his government would likely have fallen if it had simply faced the predicament of the ongoing Lebanese garbage crisis (let alone all the others). His statement is historically correct and many a British government has been laid to rest for much less an infringement. Indeed, some were even dispensed with at their zenith. The case of Winston Churchill being thrown out of office weeks after winning World War II (while the post-war Potsdam conference was still in session!) is a classic example. The British public thought that their future lay elsewhere and sent him home. To argue that all this change of government was intended to weaken the British state is foolhardy. In fact, the entire British empire, from China to the Americas, was built on the ashes of expired governments.

Lebanon's history and future will never rest on one government, but on an institutional revolving door. This government as others will have to accept criticism and respond to it. As it has shown itself unable to, then as others before it, it will have to leave by the revolving door, paving the way for another to come in- one better equipped to provide serious answers to the nation. The net result will not be a weaker but a much stronger Lebanese state.

Is Syria’s Destiny Resting on False Geopolitical Analogy?

In the wake of the chemical gas attack in Syria that killed almost 1500 people, the debate in the West has centered on whether or not to apply a military response. Proponents argue for its compelling moral case and the moral hazard derived from not doing anything. Opponents rest their arguments primarily on analogies made with the post September 11^th, 2001 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—citing exorbitant costs in both blood and treasury and the lack of any hard interests in Syria.

At the outset, I will refrain from arguing the case on any moral grounds and voluntarily cede to counter-arguments of equivalent military immorality utilized by other regional powers in such places as Palestine and Lebanon. I am even willing to cede on the immoral use of nuclear weapons as far back as the Second World War and chemical ones during Vietnam.

With morality to the side, I would instead like to focus on real politik and the hard interests at play, pointing to a fatal mistake that opponents of any form of Syrian intervention are making. It starts with a commonly heard analogy—that of the US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The error and ensuing false conclusions are not in the chosen wars per se, but rather their cited starting dates. Afghanistan’s conflict, for instance, did not start in 2001, but rather in the late 1970’s with the Soviet invasion and the Jihadi resistance, which the United States fully supported. When the Soviets finally left, the Americans instead of modestly investing to develop an independent Afghan state, quite bafflingly decided to depart as well, leaving the Taliban and Al Qaeda to fill the void. As history would prove, this strategic blunder caused a chain of historical events that directly led to the September 11^th attacks in New York and the Pentagon, costing hundreds of billions. Eventually, it proved to be nothing but a procrastination with the United States forced to re-enter into Afghanistan, but this time in a much lengthier and costly war.

Opponents also cite the Second Iraqi War debacle and its massive cost. ‘Syria would be a bigger mess,’ they conclude. But again, they are citing an incomplete war story, which should start with the First Iraqi War. Led by President George H. Bush, the strategic objective of the First Iraqi War was to get Saddam out of Kuwait and substantially curb his power inside Iraq through crippling sanctions and no-fly zones. This war was a resounding success. It was swift, cost relatively few lives, and much less US tax-payer money—the bill for the most part was footed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. And yet by its end and with Baghdad in its sights and Saddam’s army on the run, instead of ridding Iraq of its dictator at a minor marginal cost, the allies decided to keep him in place, hoping that his presence would “stabilize” Iraq or in the very least stir its people to a popular revolt. It did everything to the contrary. Emboldened, Saddam would violently repress these revolts, would become richer than ever, more menacing, and belligerent. As the world watched, his cripplingly sanctioned nation and people fell into illness, poverty, and hunger. Fast forward a decade, the younger George W. Bush, with almost the same executive team as his father, found it inevitable to reverse the policy 180 degrees citing global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats as the primary arguments for a full-on invasion to finally rid Iraq of its dictator. Unfortunately, the dubiously substantiated Second Iraqi War mustered a much smaller coalition and as a result cost the US dearly—almost three thousand lives and trillions of Dollars of treasury. Again, delaying the inevitable ended up costing the US and Western powers much more than anyone could have ever imagined.

The obvious geopolitical question to be asked from the above often cited cases is how much of these costly wars could have been averted had the proper policies been implemented the first time around? Analysts argue that in the late 1980’s, a few hundred million dollars constructing Afghan schools and helping the state rebuild itself would have gone a long way in averting the terrorism that led to September 11^th. Similarly, in Iraq, had Saddam been removed from power after the First Iraqi War, with much wider international support, in all likelihood a democratization process could have begun earlier, costing Western powers much less lives and treasure.

Coming back to the case of Syria, when the Syrian uprisings began in 2011, the chips were all stacked (locally, regionally, and internationally) in favor of a swift and resounding removal of the dictatorial regime and its replacement with a more inclusive democratic form of government. The conditions were ripe for a much less tempestuous transformation—not unlike the cases of Afghanistan in the late 1980’s and Iraq in the early 1990’s. And yet, quite tragically, the West once again looked away, leaning towards fairly passive involvement. But the situation has been deteriorating by the day: The Syrian opposition has been weakened, the regime managed to regroup, and radicals have begun filling the void. Of course, atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, the razing of rebel cities, and chemical attacks have irreparably scarred the nation and its people. The situation continues to worsen.

As policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic ponder what to do next, they will need to consider the following two points: First, while there may be a strong moral hazard argument to be made for punitive action against the Syrian regime for directly or indirectly causing the chemical attacks, in itself this argument may not be  enough. Second, a more compelling argument is that of hard interests being affected by an inevitable face-off. Syria is no longer just a regional ticking time bomb (that one exploded as far back as 2011). Rather, it is quickly deteriorating into a global calamity with incalculable tentacles not unlike those that eventually led to the September 11^th catastrophe and the ensuing Afghan and Iraqi wars. This inevitability means that the West needs to act comprehensively and now to control the damage that Syria’s deterioration is causing on its own interests. The cost of deferment of such an inevitable face-off will only increase by the day. If real politik is to be applied, this is the primary geopolitical lesson to be learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and not the procrastination leading up to them.

Wissam S. Yafi is the author of Inevitable Democracy: New Realities in the Arab World published by Palgrave MacMillan.

The New Frontier by Gibran Khalil Gibran (Short works ,1925)

I accidentally came across a gem written by Gibran Khalil as far back as 1925!

"There are in the Middle East today two challenging ideas: old and new. The old ideas will vanish because they are weak and exhausted. There is in the Middle East an awakening that defies slumber. This awakening will conquer because the sun is its leader and the dawn is its army... 

In the fields of the Middle East, which have been a large burial ground, stand the youth of Spring calling the occupants of the sepulchers to rise and march toward the new frontiers. When the Spring sings its hymns the dead of the winter rise, shed their shrouds and march forward ...

There is on the horizon of the Middle East a new awakening; it is growing and expanding; it is reaching and engulfing all sensitive, intelligent souls; it is penetrating and gaining all the sympathy of noble hearts.

There are today, in the Middle East, two men: one of the past and one of the future. Which one are you? Come close, let me look at you and let me be assured by your appearance and your conduct if you are one of those coming into the light or going into the darkness."

- Gibran Khail Gibran, The New Frontier, 1925