The Rise of Citizenry: The emerging philosophy behind the Lebanese revolution

Published by Annahar 10-06-2020 | 16:37 

What best describes the philosophical underpinnings of the Lebanese Revolution? Is it some traditional ideology akin to Capitalism or Communism? Or perhaps it is some form of re-emerging Nationalism, possibly at odds with unrelenting Globalization. What about age-old dichotomies such as democracy and autocracy, both being challenged by Populism? In this context of utter ideological confusion, it is not hard to see why some analysts have struggled to determine a precise ideology to pin onto the Lebanese Revolution. 

But why haven’t any of these traditional ideologies been able to serve the Lebanese Revolution? Some introspection shows that unbridled Capitalism has failed the Lebanese people by leading to endemic corruption and seizure of public goods. Demanding more of it would be nonsensical and unsustainable . It is equally out of the question that a people with such a deeply enterprising history would harken back to Communism, whose train left the station decades ago. As for Globalization, the Lebanese people are arguably among the most far-reaching in the world with a disproportional Diaspora. And yet, the Lebanese identity has held steady and indeed has been growing steadily. While roaming the world, culturally the Lebanese wish to remain proud of their flag, art, cuisine, architecture, music, jokes, and more ... Politically, the Lebanese are among the most democratic in the region, but have paid the price for such openness in a violently autocratic neighborhood. ‘If only we had a dictator to clean things up!’ some like to say. Questionable at best, if one considers that the last three Presidents have all been army generals—all failing to reverse the country’s dwindling fortunes. 

So, where does this leave the Revolution’s philosophical foundation? While there are a variety of focus areas among different revolutionary groups, there is one underlying theme that has been unifying everyone: Elevating the Lebanese citizen and their rights above all else in the state. This can be summarized succinctly as Citizenry. Citizenry basically aims to pull everyone together under the aegis of equality and fraternity—unlike Populism, which aims to divide populations along ethnic or religious lines. Also unlike Sectarianism, which typically elevate the leader to cultish proportions, Citizenry raises the ordinary citizen above any other consideration through the equal application of the law. Aiming to lift the Lebanese citizen through Citizenry is perhaps the ideology that best represents the motivation driving the Lebanese Revolution from South to North, East to West. 

Citizenry is a philosophy that may not always oppose the traditional ideologies. Rather, it sees them through the prism of how they may or may not help the citizen. As an example, the Revolution has been against corruption and against the corrupt, not against any Lebanese citizen for being a capitalist. The Revolution has been for free enterprise, but against the theft of public or citizen property. It has been for the rule of law but against those who apply justice sporadically for their own benefit. It has been for the freedom of religion, but against using religious sectarianism to usurp power or use it to apply unequal citizenship. It has been for the right of self-defense, but against those who intimidate other fellow citizens with arms. To its credit, while elements of the Revolution have tried to take it in certain undesirably dogmatic directions, in its collective wisdom, the Lebanese Revolution has maintained a consistent line not to exclude anyone and to focus instead on demands that empower citizens to get their rights back. From this perspective, the primary objective of Citizenry is based on assuring ALL the Lebanese of equal rights. Any vision, strategy, or policy contrary to this ideology is considered anathema to the Lebanese Revolution’s ideology.

But if the ideology of the Lebanese Revolution is that of Citizenry, how to demand it and later apply it? Citizenry happens through peaceful, democratic, and legal means by demanding a list of rights that the citizens wish to assert on themselves and those they elect to govern. This list of rights is typically referred to as a Citizen’s Bill of Rights, which is a constitutional tool that fundamentally shifts the balance of power of any nation in favor of the citizen along multiple fronts: Political, economic, social, judicial, and even environmental. A Bill of Rights is generally the primary tool that Citizenry uses to elevate the citizen to a level capable of holding their state accountable. As a tool, it can also provide serious reform helping the state eliminate archaic institutions such as sectarianism, replacing it with equal opportunity and justice. 

Detractors of the Lebanese Revolution who represent the traditional parties have been incapable of understanding the Lebanese Revolution’s philosophy of Citizenry because their context and ideas are those of an age of corruption, cynicism, division, and violence—all of which shackle them to an undesirable past, while blinding them of the potential future. The Lebanese Revolution represents an alternative future. Its Citizenry ideology places the Lebanese citizen at the apex of the state, not at its bottom. It can protect and indeed empower the Lebanese citizens to overcome existing challenges while preparing them to face a globalized future. Citizenry provides the Lebanese a framework based on absolute equality and fairness; and a tool such as a Citizen Bill of Rights to effectuate the change. By fortifying its nucleus, the common citizen, Citizenry promises to strengthen Lebanon at a time when all other failed ideologies have been doing nothing less than destroy it.

To Form or Not to Form a New Lebanese Government- That is the Question

As the economy continues to deteriorate precipitously in Lebanon, many are expecting Prime Minister Diab’s government to collapse. It garners little support from the people, from the international community, and recently barely much from those who put it in power in the first place. Considering that this government, like those before it, has been unable to present any convincing solutions to Lebanon’s predicament, what will be the options? Short of an outright coup leading to civil war, there appears to be three peaceful alternatives being discussed.

The first is basically more of the same. Already there is talk of bringing back former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to power. What exactly he would do that is different from a handful of months ago is not clear. After all Hariri’s government repeatedly failed to deliver on promises made to both the people and the international community. Furthermore, he and his party have held the Premiership for the better part of thirty years; and few could dispute the economic mismanagement that ensued. Objectively, there is plenty of blame to spread around the entire political class not just his lot. However, his primary credentials used to be mustering economic support from the Gulf and the International community. Unfortunately, even during better times, it proved to be insufficient to plug the economic suction by an insatiable establishment. What would be the likelihood of success now? Slim at best.

The second alternative involves a temporary reduced military government, akin to that of 1952 when Army General Fouad Chehab took the helm to keep the peace. In the midst of a global cold war, the reasons back then were more ideological than economic, and Chehab’s firm but fair presence subdued matters until elections could be held. But the general didn’t have to deal with anything near as economically challenging as today’s crisis. Considering that the protests have been mostly peaceful and related to living conditions, the root problem does not seem to be that of security to be dealt with as such. Plus, one needs to keep in mind that the latest three Lebanese Presidents have all been army generals; and none have managed to solve the economic slide. So how exactly would having more military thrown into the mix help diffuse Lebanon’s current predicament, except as it were to call for new elections?

This brings us to the third option. The revolution has been proposing an independent government that is capable of presenting to the Lebanese people and to the international community an alternative future for the nation based on true reform. In most democracies, considering the state the country is in, this would have been considered a no-brainer. Not so in Lebanon, where those in power still seem to be in denial. Since they control the Presidency and the parliament—the two institutions necessary to bring forth a desired shuffle in cabinet—their preference has been a beholden cabinet keeping their interests intact, as per Diab’s government now and Hariri’s before him. Of course, the level of deterioration has them worried because by controlling all elements of the government, they also shoulder all the responsibility. Therefore, somewhat counterintuitively, there is a chance that the incumbents could opt to take a calculated risk, bringing independent elements spread their mounting liability.

A national unity government is likely to be there first go-to, as it has been for generations. If the revolution or independents acquiesce and join a unity government, there is nothing to suggest that they would fare any better than previous ones, which witnessed incoherence, delays and corruption. Meaning, such a government would not likely muster enough of the necessary reform, and ultimately would fail. However, unlike previous governments, which the revolution did not want, support, or participate in; the cost of participation in failure for independents or affiliates of the revolution would be substantial, because now they have to share responsibility. This is therefore unlikely to be a choice for the Independents.

What if the Revolution is all of a sudden allowed to form its own government without any prior agreements or conditions by the incumbents? In such a surprise scenario, those in power, through their control of the Presidency and parliament, could still block it at every curve, causing it to fail to meet the aspirations of the people. In fact, one might expect that incumbents may try even harder to force it to fail, because success would expose further their bad practices during all these past decades. Under this scenario, while initially it could diffuse tensions, in the medium term the cost of failure to the Lebanese revolution would be incalculable—and incumbents will pounce.

Is there a solution then to forming the next government to avoid the above failure traps? And how to signal to the world that Lebanon is genuinely capable of reforming itself, and hence merits international support? What if the revolution were ceded cabinet power, with pre-negotiated terms and tangible commitments made by powerful incumbent elements with oversight by the international community? What if only after these commitments had been accepted and fully committed to, would the independents accept to form a government and begin their marathon reformist agenda? And what if parliament monitored this government as opposed to beholding it? Is this perhaps worth a try? If not, the current political class is welcome to continue holding onto power. History will gladly give them all due credit for all that ensues.

Wissam Yafi is an author, technologist and economic development practitioner. He has written books on democracy in Lebanon and the Middle East, with "Inevitable Democracy in the Arab World" published by Palgrave MacMillan. Yafi has lectured at Harvard, Stanford, and Georgetown. His latest research centers on how a Bill of Rights can serve as a counterweight instrument to correct dysfunctional constitutions in Lebanon and the Middle East. Yafi is a Lebanese expat and graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

Separating Fact from Fiction—Lebanon’s Train ... Backward

Published on Annahar on May 24,2020 |16:34

Lately it seems, whenever Lebanese politicians find themselves in a bind, the go-to has become to take their audience on a wild train ride of fanciful fiction. Some have promised metro transportation systems, others grand-scale highway projects, and some the elusive grand treat of 24-hour electricity! More recently the laundry list of fanciful projects has expanded to wilder claims, including massive touristic developments, offshore islands, and maglev trains—all transporting Lebanon to a prosperous future. At a time when Lebanon is in a tail-spin dive due to economic mismanagement, one first and foremost must wonder whether any of the fiction that they are peddling is justified. I should know … 

Last year, I published a new book, a novel titled Fina (KDP, 2019). My previous books on Lebanon had all been non-fictional and of a political economy nature—firmly chained to either evidence or contemporaneous analysis. For Fina, my first novel, I wanted to let my imagination roam. And so, I started chronicling the fictional life of Raja, a young Lebanese expat who left his homeland at the beginning of this century, swearing never to return. Decades later, in his golden years, he suddenly feels compelled to return home to bid a final farewell to someone he had held dear. What follows is a trip through a utopian futuristic Lebanon, utterly disassociated from the one he had left. Everything from agriculture to industry to educational institutions, historical monuments, parks, highways, tunnels, train systems, robots, all the way to responsible citizens and, yes, caring leaders governed by a bill of rights! It would leave the novel’s main character—and through him hopefully the reader—in utter astonishment, making ironic mockery of a pretty dismal present.

 Some have asked me whether it was easier to write such a whimsical science-fiction than a factual book. It was harder and took longer. The reason for this was perhaps most eloquently described by Mark Twain when he once famously said, “The difference between fiction and nonfiction is that fiction must be absolutely believable.” Meaning, while fiction could be imagined or even exaggerated, it still must be based on some facts that the reader can somehow believe or relate to. It is this intricate interlacing of fiction with fact, which makes the genre more challenging.  Presumably the same applies to all art pieces, including those being expressed by verbose Lebanese politicians. Therefore, when one hears them speak, the first question that should come to mind is whether they are touting works of non-fiction or fiction. 

If on the one hand, it is a non-fiction, then the suggestion would be for it to be presented with a healthy dose of factual evidence. As an example, if the politician presents 24/24-hour electricity plans, they should delve into the details of what, how, when, and where. And if they happened to be somehow involved in that sector before, they must explain why they had failed their nation then; and what could possibly be different now for them to merit being re-entrusted. More generally, anyone who is or has been in leadership positions has to be able to explain what exactly has changed to suddenly permit them to embark on grandiose visions, given their failures in executing much smaller tasks before.

If on the other hand, their art form is purely fictional, then out of common courtesy, they should start by noting it to their audience. They should then buildup a selection of credible facts to buttress their work of fiction. Yes, it would be nice to imagine having Caribbean islands facing the Lebanese shore, but is it climatically and architecturally viable? Is it environmentally friendly? Is it ecologically sustainable? Is it even touristically advisable? And is it financially even possible? The suspension of any such forms of justification risks shattering their illusory visions and making the whole exercise nothing more than fictional escape, kind of like my book! 

Unfortunately, it seems the more Lebanon has been deteriorating, the more detached the politician’s visions have become and the higher the balloon of fantasy, leading to a complete suspension of reality not befitting any respectable work of fiction. But why this disconnect between fact and fiction? Is it the laziness of genius—would anyone dare question Picasso for simply drawing silhouettes and challenging his viewers to fill in the colors with their imagination? Is it some naivety or the loss of touch with any semblance of reality most common in moments of psychological despair? Or is it perhaps some narcissistic survival mode switch that is willing to peddle any fictional account to cruelly detract the people from their impending hunger instead of attempting to do something about it?

Regardless of the reasons behind all their fiction, there is one irreconcilable fact in their story: No matter how much Lebanese politicians try to sell imaginary maglev trains transporting Lebanon into the future, the only trains they are leaving behind are rusted steam trains, which stopped working decades ago.

Wissam Yafi is an author, technologist and economic development practitioner. He has written books on democracy in Lebanon and the Middle East, with "Inevitable Democracy in the Arab World" published by Palgrave MacMillan. Yafi has lectured at Harvard, Stanford, and Georgetown. His latest research centers on how a Bill of Rights can serve as a counterweight instrument to correct dysfunctional constitutions in Lebanon and the Middle East. Yafi is a Lebanese expat and graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

Open Letter to Prime Minister Saad Hariri: Lebanon Needs Less Debt Not More

In your recent visit to Washington DC, Prime Minister, you announced that the Lebanese government wanted to get the country back into strong economic growth, in order to create jobs. For this to happen, you declared that your government’s plan requires the world to pitch-in to the tune of about $14 Billion in grants and soft loans over a seven-year period. I hate to break it to you Prime Minister, but the sort of economic help you are passing the hat around for will not likely be forthcoming—not in the short, medium, or long term. The reasons for this rather austere assessment are several:

First, the world is currently not placing Lebanon in the priority column. It has been a quarter of a century since Lebanon’s civil war ended, and the country has received its fair share of financial support through multiple international donor conferences. At a time when places such a Yemen, Syria, and Libya are being torn apart with massive destruction, social displacement, and economic calamity, the international community has much more pressing regional matters. That is not to say that Lebanon may not be supported (militarily or for hosting Syrian refugees), but expectations will need to be more grounded.

Second, the international community has quite serious concerns on the merit of guardianship of large sums of grants and soft loans by a government, which has done little to tackle reform and corruption. Lebanon ranks quite dismally when it comes to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions (as of this writing, it is ranked 136 out of 176, with a very low score of 25 out of 100). Lebanon’s fiscal mismanagement is well known in international circles. At the end of the civil war, the nation’s debt was a mere $3 Billion, which was 30% of GDP. Now it is a whopping $71 Billion, which is more than 146% of Lebanon’s GDP (Credit Libanais, 2016), with very little to show for in terms of infrastructure and public services. Debt servicing now takes up more than 50% of the government’s budget with little room left for any fiscal stimulus programs. Ironically, almost all this debt occurred under governments led by your party. Is it a wonder then, that the little (non-military) aid that Lebanon recently received has rarely ever gone through the Lebanese government, but rather through International NGOs?

Third, Lebanon’s Central Bank (BDL) currently has more than $53 Billion in International Reserves, which is almost 120% of GDP. Lebanon’s reserves are higher than Kuwait’s, Denmark’s, Sweden’s, Colombia’s—and even Egypt’s—a country with 20 times the population and almost 10 times the GDP. Furthermore, Lebanon has advertised quite heavily its reserves of oil, and has even invited global oil companies to participate. It is estimated that the reserves could sum to somewhere between $200 Billion and $600 Billion. This begs the question: Why would any other nation support a country that sits on this type of wealth?

Fourth, assuming all the above concerns are somehow miraculously overcome, there is no reason to believe the Lebanese themselves want their nation to be burdened with more debt. What they seem to prefer is a sustainable economic model that provides opportunity and shares in the wealth. Unfortunately, Lebanon’s economy has become an oligopoly of sorts with a vast and growing chasm between the few rich and the growing poor. Lebanon’s Gini coefficient according to the World Bank, is among the world’s highest with 0.3% of the population owning 50% of the country’s wealth—a powder keg waiting to explode. Barring the Lebanese banking sector and some limited (albeit encouraging) recent activity in a nascent tech sector (also funded by the Central Bank), there does not seem to be much emphasis on other sectors such as agriculture, industry, or transportation—all decimated after years of abandon. Tourism is also suffering due to the country’s embarrassingly short-sighted abuse of its environment and beaches. Beirut’s sewage spewing into the Mediterranean can literally be seen by anyone flying overhead. The ill-named, sadly-positioned, and terribly malodorous garbage dumps north and south of the capital are a daily reminder of mismanagement; ironically while Lebanon’s infamous Costa Brava dump on the Mediterranean turns tourists away, Spain’s famous Costa Brava attracts them in hordes with 75 million expected this year alone. Is this the sustainable economic model that will induce increasingly thrifty European or American policy-makers to believe in investing in Lebanon’s future?

Prime Minister, with all the above in mind, the last thing the country needs right now is more international loans (soft or otherwise). It first needs to plug the holes of wasteful infrastructure such as energy and water. It should then launch small business job-inducing projects (industry, environment, and agriculture). Most importantly, the government should seriously consider having the Lebanese Central Bank pay down part of the national debt from its $53 Billion foreign reserves. This would give the government the ability to fund more growth-inducing fiscal policies from the resulting savings on interest. If, for instance, we calculate that $13 Billion of the national debt can be paid off at an average interest rate of 8%, this would save the government over the next 7 years close to $7 Billion, which could be deployed to reduce national unemployment, improve national infrastructure, and boost industry and growth. Lower debt-to-GDP will also work to improve confidence, debt ratings, and in the process lower interest rates. BDL would still have a safety net of $40 Billion in reserves, almost equaling the nation’s GDP.

In conclusion, the Lebanese government needs to start thinking in terms of self-sufficiency at dimensions that the Lebanese are willing to accept and the international community to digest. The government should abandon the quest for more loans; Lebanon needs less debt not more.

LDE's Expat Citizenship Decree Misses the Point: Citizenship without Rights Is Worthless

Recently the Lebanese Diaspora Energy event was held in Lebanon under the auspices of the President of the Republic. During the event, Lebanon’s President and Prime Minister signed a decree allowing Expats to “retain” their Lebanese citizenship.

While initiatives to engage Lebanese expats are generally welcome and in some circles seen as badly needed, considering the state of the nation, the likely results are not clear. In the very least, this decree raises some key questions:

First, it is unclear what the purpose of the decree really is. After all, there has been a law on the books since 1925 (Decree #15) to allow Lebanese descendants born outside of Lebanese territories to get their citizenship, if they could prove paternal linkage (not maternal unfortunately). So how is this decree any different, except for some slightly added expediency?

Second, how would such a law serve the expats if they do not plan on living, working, or retiring in Lebanon? After all, the vast majority of Lebanese expats worldwide will unlikely return, nor can the nation really afford them to—since according to the World Bank, on a per capita basis they make six folds what their homeland compatriots make, repatriating more than 20% of the country’s GDP.

Third, in certain countries, including some significant ones in Europe, dual citizenship is not allowed. What incentive would Lebanese expats, let alone their descendants, have in acquiring the Lebanese citizenship at the expense of a much more valuable citizenship that costs them much less. For instance, the German passport allows its holders to travel visa-free to more than 176 countries worldwide and barely costs 80 Euros for 10 years. The Lebanese passport gives access to 32 countries and costs 200 Euros for 5 years. Meaning, the privilege of having a Lebanese passport costs its holder a whopping TWENTY-FIVE times the German passport not counting the cost of visas!

Fourth, if voting is the purpose of retaining the Lebanese citizenship, how many Lebanese are likely to be interested in Lebanese sectarian politics, given the very little change that it causes and the highly fractious state of the nation. Personally, I left Lebanon in the late 1980’s, and the same exact political leaders--to the man—are still in power even though the country has gone through crisis after another. Is it a wonder that of the millions of Lebanese expats less than 10,000 actually registered overseas to vote in the last parliamentary elections held in 2008?

And last but certainly not least, why would any Lebanese expat who has acquired full rights in his adopted land ask for a citizenship that may take it away from them and their families? My Lebanese sister’s children could have become American citizens, but never Lebanese, because she had a non-Lebanese husband. My friend’s children cannot inherit in Lebanon, nor can their mother because the mother is non-Lebanese and from a different religion; but they would inherit in Europe without a problem. My own son can run for any public sector job in the United States or Colombia, including for President if he wishes to, but not in Lebanon because of the sectarian constitution. Most of us expats across the world have rights to clean air, pure water, and electricity—none of which Lebanon assures. We have a right to peace and quiet in green parks, public beaches, and a clean environment. Can Lebanon offer any of this? By law, we have access to public libraries to assure fair knowledge transfer. Lebanon has yet to open its doors to the public to its national library in Sanayeh since 2014, even though its built and ready. Instead its entrance is shamefully sealed with 10 foot concrete walls. Where expats immigrated generally provides a fair economic safety net and healthcare in case things go wrong. Can a retained Lebanese citizenship provide this, knowing the state of the bankrupt Social Security fund? And finally, we have equal rights in front of the law with any other citizen from any other background, regardless of creed, color, or economic background. Can Lebanon guarantee this?

The government’s attempt to engage with Lebanese expats through LDE, its foreign delegations, and this citizenship decree while perhaps well-intentioned appears to miss the point. We expats all left Lebanon because Lebanon did not offer us the rights and opportunities we aspire. In this day and age of globalization and border-less connectivity, brandishing the right of citizenship that offers no rights is worthless. Unfortunately, signing decrees that give Expats rights they have had for a century but walked away from is the wrong way of looking at the problem. Rather, giving ALL the Lebanese (including Expats) ALL the rights that we Expats enjoy may be a smarter way.

Lebanon has to learn to compete harder on a global level if it sincerely wants to get its Expats back. For only then could Lebanon ever hope to rise to a level beyond the tenuous emotional attachment and get its Expats around the globe to be truly interested. Harsh reality perhaps, but unfortunately anything less will prove to be little more than a photo op and yet another wasted opportunity for Lebanon to benefit from the Lebanese Diaspora’s true Energy potential.

The Irrelevance of Election Law to Lebanese Expats

Recently, there has been much discussion in Lebanon about the upcoming parliamentary elections in terms of what law would be adopted and its effects? Expats themselves are asking what are the true implications and will election results truly make a difference one way or the other?

The debate centers around the ideal formula to be utilized for the next parliamentary elections. The existing election law was fundamentally passed in 1960 under the Administration of President Chehab; and yet from recent declarations made, no parliamentarian seems to like it—even though ironically it brought them into parliament. The 1960 law has mid-sized districts, and is based on a winner-take-all model within each district, which, it is often argued, may not give much voice to minorities. So, one group is demanding that the 1960 law be replaced with one with smaller districts gerrymandered around religious community clusters—basically each community is segregated and votes for its own sect, assuring itself of parliamentary representation. The opposing group prefers larger districting, which while merging different communities within one voting district, aims to assure proportional representation to everyone, large or small. Seeing that none of the options are likely to pass, a third group has been seeking compromise by introducing a law that mixes both with some regions doing it one way and others another way. Adding a pinch of intrigue into the boiling pot has been the possible introduction of a senate, which aims to allow the vote to be one way in a newly created Senate (presumably to keep a sectarian balance locked) while the house would be transformed to a more proportional vote.

Of course, the backdrop to all this debate is that the Lebanese parliament has been unable to find an “acceptable” alternative election law for almost a decade, renewing its own term twice already since 2009. With the current discussion having reached yet another deadlock, it seems increasingly likely that a third extension might be called for. This has both infuriated and mobilized civil society, who claim that at this point a vote under any law, would be better than none at all. While there may not be much of a consensus in the country, there does appear to be a sense that parliament extending its own term a third time borders on abuse.

Where do the Expats figure in all this and what are their thoughts on it? As of 2008 and for the very first time, Expats obtained the right to vote in their foreign place of residence. Not many registered or voted back then. The question now is would more of them even bother? For one, most Expats are not fans of this parliament. They have not forgotten that this was the same parliament, which shirked in its basic duties to elect a President or a Prime Minister on time. Expats have not forgotten the eternal postponement of very critical pieces of legislation, which had to do with transcendental issues such as the budget, the environment, and the exploitation of natural resources—all of which have had dire economic consequences. They have not forgotten that this was the very same parliament, which while repeatedly shelving pay raises for public employees, found it quite convenient to give its own members pay-raises and then impose controversial new taxes on the people. And lastly, they have not forgotten that this parliament has yet to pass a 2012 draft law giving Expats their very own representatives within parliament.

While they would like to see change happen, Expats approach the current election law debate with a healthy dose of skepticism. They see it as futile tweaking, which generates little more than a tug war between the controlling parties, to gerrymander and choose their own electors as opposed to having the electors chose them. Expats also scoff at the thought of creating a Senate, which under the existing system not only would add an unnecessary extra layer of complexity, but would increasingly tighten the noose on an already suffocating political system. If over the past decade, the Lebanese parliament was barely able to pass any meaningful legislation, Expats ask, how likely is it to do any better with the extra approval step of an even more sectarian Senate? To truly begin making a difference, Expats believe that the Lebanese political system must first and foremost be driven towards more open election choices, which reduce sectarian gerrymandering not increase it-in line with what is stated in the Lebanese Constitution.

What will Expats do? First, they are fully aware that they do not currently have much political power nor will they likely have any meaningful representation any time soon. But they also realize that they can vote with their feet and with their wallets. In 2009, for instance, out of the millions of Lebanese Expats globally, less than 10,000 actually registered to vote, and only a portion voted—meaning they voted with their feet to stay away from a system, which is alien and irrelevant to them and the lives they lead abroad. This trend will not likely change as Expats will continue to feel disenfranchised and won’t feel compelled to waste their time voting for the same faces, by using tweaked laws. As importantly, Expats will continue to vote with their wallets; and at this point it is safe to say they are not scurrying to invest in Lebanon or change their touristic support, especially not after the serious environmental degradation, sea-side garbage dump debacles, and illegal beach grabs.

Instead, Expats are likely to take a wait and see course of action, entertaining the incumbent political class’ oligarchic hold on the Lebanese political system and all the futile attempts at mask-taping what is clearly broken. Like most Lebanese, they see major economic and political storms on the horizon; and they wonder if it would not be wiser to let it all fall on those who created the mess in the first place and those continuing to refuse serious reform. As such, they ask: What is the point of fiddling with the election law to begin with?

Mandating the Fate of Lebanon's New Tax Law

The current government in Lebanon hit a brick wall this week when it tried to pass a tax bill aimed at funding long overdue pay raises to public sector employees and teachers. To fund the estimated $1 Billion needed to cover this expenditure, the government proposed no less than a whopping 27-tax increases across the board. No sooner had the laws been passed by parliament, with few objections, then dissent rose all over the nation.

Of course, proponents of the taxes tried to argue that anyone who opposes them is actually opposed to the pay raises themselves. They added that the pay increases will generate positive economic activity, far outweighing the potential cost of the tax. Prime Minister Saad Hariri, whose cabinet is behind the tax law, somewhat disingenuously invited anyone with a better solution to come to the seat of government and propose it. Those protesting the tax, appear to have taken up his offer, heading straight to the Saray to demand that the tax increases be abolished. They retorted that the state of the economy is in such shambles, any new taxes will hurt businesses, working classes, and the poor. “Go get your taxes from the multi-millionaires, not from those working two or three jobs to make ends meet,” they cried.

Somewhat lost in the ensuing mayhem are the following questions:

First, who gave this Lebanese parliament the popular mandate to raise taxes to begin with? After all, this parliament has postponed elections twice self-extending its term, and many are expecting them to do it a third time. And while some may dispute legitimacy, even if one were to assume it, at this point does anyone in the Lebanese parliament truly believe that they have any extra-ordinary popular mandate to carry out sweeping tax changes of such magnitude?

Second, where is the cabinet itself drawing its mandate from? In reality, it was voted in by the same parliament in question, casting doubt on its own mandate. But again, even if it’s given the benefit of the doubt, wasn’t the primary job of this cabinet simply to ensure proper parliamentary elections, paving the way for a new cabinet? Or is this Prime Minister under some illusion that his government has a popular mandate to pass any and all taxes necessary? If so, and judging by the immediate popular outcry, it seems the Prime Minister has miscalculated.

While constitutionally, some may argue that it is within the prerogative of both of these branches of government to pass tax laws, political savvy suggests carrying it through without holding a clear mandate would be unwise. Why? Primarily to avoid suffering the consequences of a popular backlash and the subsequent voter punishment at the ballot box. Unfortunately, at this juncture it seems the cabinet had not fully thought through the consequences of legislating without a clear popular mandate nor one strong enough to allow it to pass any substantial piece of legislation, least of all sweeping tax change.

This begs the third and final question: How can a mandate be retained? Quite simply through elections. In other words, the strength of a mandate is directly proportional to the proximity of the latest elections. The more distant the elections, the weaker the mandate. It is no wonder that Presidents and cabinets all over the democratic world usually begin with very strong mandates and end in what is typically referred to as “lame duck” rule. The same has been the case in Lebanon where Presidents and cabinets who begin with strong mandates, when controversially over-extended, typically face substantial erosion. And when this occurs, only immediately called-for elections renew the mandate.

As it stands in Lebanon, the repeated extensions of parliament’s terms have served to weaken its mandate as well as that of the cabinet. Under such circumstances, it is quite difficult to discern any sustainable scenario in which fiscally painful reform or new tax laws of any kind could withstand the inevitable popular backlash. As such, both the cabinet and parliament would be well advised to either change the tax base or shelf their tax plan altogether and call for fresh parliamentary elections as soon as possible. Nothing less will re-establish the pre-requisite mandate needed for real change.